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Abstract
Cellular and wireless communications are widely used as preferred technology for accessing
network services due to their flexibility and cost-effective deployment. 4G (4th Generation)
networks have been gradually substituting legacy systems, relying on the existing commercial
and private Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) infrastructures, mainly based on the IEEE
802.11 standard, to provide mobile data offloading and reduce congestion on the valuable
limited spectrum. Such predominant position on the market makes cellular and wireless
communications a profitable target for malicious users and hackers, justifying the constant
effort on protecting them from existing and future security threats.
Radio communications are exposed to the most basic Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack known
as radio jamming, aiming at disrupting the communications by tackling the physical layer, or
the more complex intelligent jamming, exploiting vulnerabilities on specific communication
protocols to disrupt the service. Jamming attacks have been widely studied, being possible to
reduce or completely counteract their impact on the network. Conversely, intelligent jamming
attacks are easily misclassified as legitimate activity due to its complex detection, offering a
powerful solution for malicious users to launch selective attacks against specific target nodes.
The work conducted on this thesis has proven effective for strengthening both, 4G and
Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks, by implementing a new detection mechanism to detect DoS
attacks in real time. The proposed mechanism provides an efficient and lightweight Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) for identifying intelligent jamming attacks against service availability.
The initial experiments tackle first a virtual jamming attack exploiting the CSMA/CA
mechanism on IEEE 802.11 networks, which has been reproduced and successfully detected on
a test-bed with real-life scenarios. The proposed metrics monitor the difference on the Network
Allocation Vector (NAV) value, the frame inter-arrival time (or DeltaTime), the difference on
the Frame Sequence Number (FSN), the data Throughput (T) and the Frame Check Sequence
(FCS) error rate.
The detection performance provides a 100% DR when using the NAV metric individually,
only reduced to 88.93% and 66.67% when combined with the DeltaTime and CRC metrics
xrespectively. The T metric has proven more effective when the nodes are located far from the
AP, while the DeltaTime obtains better results on the analysis of TCP traffic.
Additionally, three metrics are suggested for detecting an intelligent jamming attack on
the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard. This
attack exploits the plain-text transmission of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI) to perform a DoS attack against the core network. The main proposed LTE metric,
Connection Request Rate (CRR), provides an overall 98% DR, obtaining its best performance
when combined with the Success Rate (SR) metric to achieve a 100% DR. The last metric,
Session Mean Time (SMT), registers DR values above 93% in 2 out of 3 scenarios, confirming
its suitable to detect the attack.
The proposed mechanism applies Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence as data fusion tech-
nique to reveal anomalies, combining the evidences collected from the metrics. Complimentary,
a Basic Probability Assignment (BPA) function is computed for performing live evaluation of
each metric and classifying the data frames as malicious, normal or uncertain cases.
This thesis introduces a test-bed designed to evaluate virtual jamming attacks in Wi-Fi
networks, and describes the use of a LTE emulator for replicating the studied DoS attack.
Results are collected for both technologies and analysed with the proposed algorithm to assess
its detection performance. Finally, conclusions are extracted from the analysis, proposing
further improvements and research directions for strengthening future cellular and wireless
communication systems.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Wireless communications are widely used globally and heavily integrated in our life, offering
an affordable and easy access to network services without demanding neither a complex
infrastructure nor expensive equipment to be deployed. The combination of a secure and
reliable infrastructure to procure Intranet and Internet services, together with the flexibility of
having a non-physical endpoint link and seamless connectivity when in motion, makes this
technology equally appealing for enterprise and consumer solutions.
In a similar manner, mobile communications provide a wider coverage while still offering
the same advantages and minimal differences when the actual user data throughputs are
compared. Long Term Evolution Advanced (LTE-Advanced) cellular networks have a maximum
peak data rate on release 10 of 1.5 Gbps and 3Gbps for uplink and downlink [1] respectively,
against the 7.2 Gbps peak data rates of the latest IEEE 802.11ad standard [2] currently available
in the market. Further releases are aiming at reducing this gap and providing faster data rates to
cope with the constant increase of mobile subscribers, and the exponential growth [3] of user
data consumption.
Although the deployment cost is much higher if cellular and Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi)
networks are compared, the current figures of active subscribers, and future forecast, make the
investment very profitable and attractive for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). The latest
survey produced by Ericsson estimates the use of mobile broadband services in more than 7.5
billions subscribers worldwide for 2016, forecasting an increase to 9 billions by the end of
2022 [3].
The actual perception of current society trends reveals a prominent future for non-wired
technologies, where the Internet-of-Things (IoT) revolution is actively contributing to increase
the number of devices connected to the Internet [4] and the expansion of Wireless Sensor
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Networks (WSNs). Furthermore, young generations become users of multiple mobile gadgets
since the very beginning of their life, adding more challenges for the MNOs and Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) to cover new user needs and quickly adapt to the required increase of
access bandwidth, to cope with the data-traffic demand.
Looking at market analysis reports, the perception is easily acknowledged, identifying a
changing pattern in the way users are consuming data services [5], with a dominant position
of wireless and cellular technologies over the conventional wired Ethernet infrastructures.
Furthermore, the estimated forecast predicts a massive fall on traffic coming from fixed network
access from 52% in 2015 to 33% by 2020, forcing a rapid evolution of the technology to cope
with the constantly-increasing number of active nodes and the volume of data to be processed
by cellular and wireless technologies.
This phenomenon can also be explained by looking at the increase on the use of WiFi
networks as principal technology for cellular traffic offloading, registering a 63% of the
traffic offloaded from 4th Generation of mobile communications (4G) networks in 2016 [5].
Furthermore, the traditional model of complex and expensive deployment of IT infrastructures
in corporate networks is being gradually replaced to facilitate the creation of flexible workspaces.
Using open-space offices with hot-desks facilitates co-working in collaborative environments,
with a 22.9% increase in conversion from traditional office services to co-working spaces [6] in
2016. This office model relies on IEEE 802.11 as the predominant technology for delivering
on-premises and cloud-based business network services with a minimal investment and easy
adaptability to the constant redistribution of workspaces across the office.
1.1 Security communication systems
Every communication system should be designed taking security into account, focusing on six
main pillar or principles [7]: integrity, availability, confidentiality, authentication, authorization
and non-repudiation. Multiple solutions have been developed over the years since early releases
of wireless and cellular communication standards, aiming at providing mechanisms to protect
each of these principles.
Protecting the communication channel is usually achieved using encryption algorithms to
preserve confidentiality, adding hash functions or Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) codes as
integrity check of the information transmitted. The authentication and authorisation is usually
grouped into the user account management system, requiring the exchange of a secret parameter
only known by sender and receiver, such as a password or public/private key pair.
However, it is common to incorrectly associate availability with maintaining the commu-
nication system running, ignoring allthe range of threats a system should be protected from
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to guarantee a reliable service. These actions are beyond the correct dimensioning of the
network, to cope with current demand and the expected growth. Active security mechanisms,
such Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), are essential for protecting the system against service
disruptions due to bad-intentioned users.
Unfortunately, communication systems constantly evolve at the same speed as the number
of security threats they are exposed to, exploiting vulnerabilities and weaknesses to compromise
them. Despite of the massive effort taken by the research community, standardisation bodies,
manufacturers and security companies for enhancing wireless and cellular communications,
new threats arise every year, requiring amendments on the technology specifications. The
proliferation of global cyber-attacks, including hacktivism and cyber-crime, together with a
constant coverage of new threats and security breaches by the media, have raised awareness of
how relevant security is for digital communications and the requirement of additional efforts to
strengthening our communication systems.
Since the inception of the IEEE 802.11 standard[8] back in 1997, security has always been
a major concern due to the natural openness of the radio channel and the inexpensive equipment
available in the market for intercepting and/or disrupting the communications. As several
papers[9–12] revealed, the number of identified vulnerabilities ranges from basic network
traffic analysis and eavesdropping, due to the openness of the communication channel, up
to more complex active attacks, where the attacker intentionally performs radio emissions to
conduct the attack.
Looking at the cited list of active attacks, it is possible to include the aforementioned Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks, aiming at disrupting the availability of the communication service;
Masquerade attacks, where the attacker impersonates the identity of a legitimate user; or Replay
attacks, where the malicious user can take advantage of the information extracted during the
monitoring period to gain legitimate access to the systems impersonating a legitimate node, or
even disrupt the communications for a particular node by constantly replaying disassociation
messages previously captured.
LTE networks have been suffering similar threats, as reported within the research community
since early releases of the standard. Initial attacks were able to disclose the International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) value of legitimate subscribers by passively listening to the channel
[13, 14], or even gaining access to IP network parameters after tampering a femtocell device
[15]. Multiple solutions have been published aiming at strengthening the Authentication and
Key Agreement mechanism (AKA), which is the main vulnerability exploited in most of the
documented attacks. However, no action has been taken by the standardisation body to mitigate
it.
4 Introduction
This thesis is focused on the definition of new security mechanisms for wireless and 4G
cellular networks, with the aim of providing safer services to the end-user and resilience
on the MNO’s core network. In particular, the approach presented on this thesis focus the
interest on DoS attacks tackling both technologies, imposing an important threat for critical
services such as first responders, military networks and public services using Wi-Fi and LTE as
main technology for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN)
services, respectively. A mandatory zero tolerance policy must be applied when assessing
the infrastructure against potential service disruptions, system failures and QoS standards for
public communication services [16].
1.2 Service availability in radio communications
Service availability for wireless and cellular communication system is crucial, preventing
MNOs and corporations from suffering important loses whenever an outage occurs in their
networks due to customer claims and expensive fines imposed by public regulatory entities.
The harmful effects of a service disruption become more obvious when considering the gradual
replacement of legacy communication systems for public services with LTE technology [16–
19].
The UK is about to initiate the testing phase of the next Emergency Services Network (ESN),
as part of the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP) [20], based
on LTE technology. Public services, including emergency units of fire-fighters, police and first
responders, will relay on an LTE network where any service disruption could cost hundreds of
lives. IEEE 802.11 technology has also been used as quick and cheap deployment technology
for fast response in natural catastrophes such as the Indian Ocean or Haiti tsunamies [21, 22], in
combination with other WANs technologies such as Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access (WiMAX).
MNOs are aware of how crucial service availability is for their customers, having a negative
impact on their life whenever an unexpected service disruption occurs. Moreover, the legislation
and regulatory entities protect service availability with strict compliance regulation [23],
affecting every telecommunication provider. In addition, they are obliged to meet conditions
agreed on the contract and Service-Level Agreement (SLA) when a customer acquires their
services. Failing to do that could result in facing the risk of economic penalties, customer
compensation for the downtime period and, most importantly, invaluable damage to their brand
reputation due to the constant service disruptions.
However, several vulnerabilities were revealed once the technology was released in the
market [24]. A DoS attack was identified over the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer by
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Da Yu et al’s [25] in 2012. Moreover, the disclosure of the user identity during the initial
attachment has been a major concern within the research community since the first release of
LTE, proposing numerous methods to tackle this issue [26].
Avoiding service interruptions is crucial on critical situations, where a network disruption
could have a severe economical impact or, in the worse-case scenario of a terrorist attack, the
cost of human lives. In particular, service availability is extremely necessary for emergency
services and first responders Telecom infrastructures, as they must coordinate their actions
across different teams, who are located in multiple locations, in a matter of seconds.
The increase on the demand for radio equipment by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs),
and the fast evolution experienced on the microprocessor industry, have made a big impact in
the prices of jamming stations. Radio jamming devices are actively used in public spaces, such
as theatres, prisons and military basements, where a legitimate isolation of communication
services is required to prevent noisy interruptions during a show, guarantee a secured and
controlled access to them by the inmates, or preventing any terrorist attack from happenings
at a military base, respectively. Off-the-shelf hardware-based and low-cost software-based
jammers can be easily acquired in the market for interrupting the communications within a
local area at affordable prices [27].
The quick obsolescence of previous technologies has also contributed to the reduction on
the prices, by making the construction of home-made jamming stations more accessible at a
lower price. All these factors create the ideal environment to make jamming stations affordable
not only by companies, but also individuals and radio amateur users. The proliferation of mis-
behaved users, who acquire the equipment to perform attacks against commercial and domestic
networks with malicious intentions, is inevitable and can only be tackled by strengthening the
security measurements.
Nonetheless, corporate networks tend to have a higher awareness of how crucial service
availability is and always consider a potential service disruption when planning their business
continuity plans and/or assessing business risks. The economical consequences of suffering a
service interruption at a critical time makes the prevention of DoS attacks more attractive for
corporations and MNOs, demanding additional mechanisms to prevent them from public and
private research communities.
1.2.1 Jamming attacks
Jamming attacks are the most efficient method for interfering radio-based communications,
using a jammer device to emit on the same radio channel where the data is transmitted. A
jammer is a simple radio device, equipped with a transmitter to beam radio signals, designed
with the purpose of causing harmful effects on wireless communications.
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The immediate consequences of a jamming attack can vary from a light decrease on the
network performance to a complete service disruption, depending on the type of jamming
attack performed, the emitting power and the duration of the jamming transmission.
In early stages, jammer devices were designed to inhibit communications within an delim-
ited area, broadcasting meaningless data over the communication channel to inflict distortions
on the original data transmission due to the collisions. This process is known as physical
jamming, as no other layer on the protocol stack is required to perform this attack. However,
physical jamming requires constant transmission power over long periods of time, facilitating
the traceability of the emitting station and, in some cases, revealing the attacker location.
Intermittent jamming aims at protecting the jammer’s location so the attacker is less
vulnerable to be identified, reducing also the required power to launch the attack. The beam
emissions are performed following preselected intervals or random patterns. However, multiple
studies have proven this technique inefficient to prevent jammer tracking, since the transmission
interruptions only delays the detection.
The evolution of intermittent jamming is known as intelligent jamming, a more sophisticated
jamming method which optimises the energy consumption without affecting the efficiency of the
jamming action. In this category, the jammer station takes into account the previous knowledge
of how the targeted communication protocol works, and uses it against the communication
system to imped any data exchange among the other nodes.
Looking into the particularities of intelligent jammers, it is possible to identify different
types of intelligent jamming attacks depending on the property exploited on the communication
protocol to jam the radio channel. This thesis focused on the detection of two particular types
of intelligent jamming attacks: virtual jamming attacks on IEEE 802.11 networks, and RRC
signalling attacks for LTE networks.
The following section provides a more detailed description of every type of physical and
intelligent jammers, with a classification on different subcategories depending on the method
used to jam the communication channel.
1.2.2 Physical jamming
Physical jamming devices can initially be classified based on the criteria they follow for
jamming the communication channel, distinguishing two categories [9]: active or reactive.
Active jammers also known as constant jammers, do not sense the channel before jamming
it. Their functionality is reduced to the emission of sense/senseless radio signals through all
the time the device is powered on. Depending on the duration of the jamming transmission,
physical jammers can be divided into three groups [28, 12]:
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Constant jammers
A constant jammer offers the simplest method to disrupt communications by producing
constant emissions of meaningless radio signals over the targeted radio frequency band.
The complexity of manufacturing this kind of jammers is minimal, reducing their price
in the marked and making them easily accessible to malicious users.
On the contrary, constant jamming devices must be provided by dedicated power sources,
as the continuous emission of radio signals demand a considerable energy consumption.
This characteristic makes them also less practical for malicious users and facilitates the
detection due to the easy traceability of radio stations emitting continuously on a static
position.
Deceptive jammers
A deceptive jammer requires a bit more of complexity, as this jammer injects a constant
stream of well-constructed packages with a valid header, followed by a sense-less pay-
load or no payload at all. The level of energy consumed is similar to a constant jammer,
requiring slightly higher computational load due to the construction and validation of
the header values. Following the same reasoning, the location of this jammer is easily
traceable,as the stream of packages is constant and the emission never is interrupted
unless the power source fails.
However, the effects of the traffic injected on the network can be more difficult to
detect by the victim nodes, as they are well constructed and will not raise any alarm
of suspected behaviour. A deceptive jammer is not considered an intelligent jamming
device, since it does not require any deep knowledge about the communication protocol
mechanism, and only takes into account the structure of a valid package to replicate it.
Random jammers
A random jammer is an evolution of a deceptive or constant jammer with the aim of
reducing the emission periods to save energy, and increase the complexity of being trace-
able. This type of jammer enables the emissions of meaningful/meaningless packages
to the communication channel at random intervals. The duration of the emission also
follows a random duration pattern, making the detection by any monitoring station more
complicate due to the lack of any pattern in the emission period and duration.
The second category includes the reactive jammers, able to sense the channel and only
jam whenever radio activity is detected on it. The aim of this kind of devices is to interfere
the legitimate communications by emitting at the same time intervals and frequency/ies of
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the legitimate nodes to corrupt their transmissions. This type of jammers consume lower
energy levels and are considered more efficient, since they are able to produce the same service
disruption but optimising their jamming activity to the specific periods when the network
channel is busy.
1.2.3 Intelligent jamming
Intelligent jamming evolved as a natural solution to reduce the probabilities of detection on
physical jamming devices. This type of jammers have a deep understanding of the targeted
communication protocol, and often require a special configuration tuning depending on the
characteristic of the jamming attack implemented. Due to this issue, it is difficult to define a
generic sub-classification of all the intelligent jamming types. For the purpose of understanding
the two specific attacks studied on this thesis, which fall into this type of jamming, two main
groups of intelligent jamming are defined: virtual and signalling jamming. The following
paragraphs introduce the most generic characteristics of each type, the particularities of their
implementation and the evaluation of benefits and disadvantages.
Virtual jamming
The name of virtual jamming was initially introduced by D. Chen et al. [29] for defining a
particular DoS attack tailoring the virtual carrier-sense function of IEEE 802.11. This function
was introduced to predict when the communication channel will be occupied and reduce
the collisions inflicted by the hidden node problem [30]. The mechanism uses the Network
Allocation Vector (NAV) value, which is included in most of the frames, as indicator of the time
the communication channel will be idle due to a node emission.
Virtual jamming techniques exploit this mechanism by falsely reporting idle periods in
the communication channel, causing the rest of the active nodes in the network to initiate the
back-off period in which they will not use the channel. This back-off period has a total duration
composed of the actual duration reported by the malicious node in the NAV field, and an extra
random time to avoid colliding with other active nodes waiting to access the channel.
The jammer will need to initiate at least a short transmission to guarantee the jamming
effect success, as all the IEEE 802.11 nodes will compare the virtual availability of the channel
against the reported availability while sensing the channel by the physical layer.
Signalling jamming
Finally, the last category of intelligent jamming is named as signalling jamming. This kind of
jamming exploits the legitimate use of signalling packets exchanged between the legitimate
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nodes and the serving network with the aim of disrupting the communications in the channel.
In particular, this thesis studies a specific signalling jamming attack for LTE networks [25],
which missuses the mechanism for establishing an RRC connection to perform a DoS attack by
flooding the LTE core-network with thousands of connection requests per second.
This type of jamming requires an initial phase of monitoring, when no transmissions are
executed, to gain legitimate access to the serving network. Once the required information has
been collected, such as IMSI or other type of identification for subscribing nodes, the jamming
process will be triggered against the serving network. The jamming activity will remain for
as long as required to bring the service down, and the desired time to maintaining the service
inaccessible.
1.3 Motivation
Service availability is usually taken for granted, since having a temporary service disruption
does not impose a major risk for most of domestic communications. However, radio-based
communication services not only provide services to individuals on home networks, but are also
used on critical situations by emergency services and first responders, or in military deployments
at the battlefield. In addition, wireless communications are the preferred technology used by
companies to provide a flexible and secure access to their network services, as discussed during
the introduction of this chapter.
A minimal interruption on the communication service could have catastrophic consequences
in a temporary network deployment during a natural disaster, or massive terrorist attack, with a
cost in human lives. On the contrary, a minimal network outage on a corporate network for
a trading company has the potential of causing massive losses in profits, where thousands of
transactions are performed every second to optimise capital investments.
This research project aims at addressing current challenges in securing cellular and wire-
less communications, and contributing to guarantee service availability by strengthening the
intrusion detection techniques. Focusing on two major issues affecting the main technologies
for future networks, this thesis gives an answer to:
Virtual jamming attack on IEEE 802.11 networks
This research has identified a set of metrics to detect virtual jamming attacks by analysing
the network traffic. Detection results corroborate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm
and reveal the most suitable metric combination for reducing the false positive alarms.
New ideas are suggested for further research on this matter.
10 Introduction
Intelligent DoS attack on 4G networks
A set of metrics is proposed to allow the implementation of countermeasures in the
core-network, as part of the rules included in the IDS. The suggested detection algorithm
provides an on-line mechanism to identify the attack in real time with a reasonable
detection rate and reduced number of false alarms.
1.4 Main contributions
This thesis has contributed to enhance the security of cellular and wireless communications by:
• Identifying a set of metrics based on multiple-layer data fusion for detecting virtual
jamming attacks on IEEE 802.11 networks.
• Providing a real test-bed for performing virtual jamming attacks on IEEE 802.11 net-
works.
• Designating a set of metrics associated with a particular DoS signalling attack for LTE
networks.
• Replicating the effects of executing a DoS attack on a LTE emulated deployment with
high density on each cell.
• Proposing a new on-line detection system to detect multiple DoS attacks in wireless
networks with hight accuracy and low ratio of false positives.
The following chapters provide a completed description of each of the aforementioned
contributions, depicting the new enhancements proposed on this research project. It is important
to remark the involvement and collaboration of a visiting PhD student, Diego Santoro, as part
of an authorised collaboration between Loughborough University and Parthenope University of
Naples, Italy.
All the experiments conducted on the Wi-Fi and LTE test-beds were proposed and led by the
author of this thesis, but conducted in collaboration with the visiting student. The development
of the source-code for implementing the proposed detection algorithm was led by the visiting
student, in collaboration with the author of this thesis. The work conducted together has lead to
several publications mentioned in Chapter 5. However, all the work presented on this thesis
has been individually produced by the author of this thesis, including all the analysis of the
datasets collected, the optimisation of the detection algorithm and Sliding Window (SW) size
for each technology. The presented final conclusions have been carried out individually by the
author of this thesis and represented his own ideas.
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1.5 Research scope
This thesis focuses on intelligent jamming attacks and detection techniques applicable to
wireless communication technologies. The work conducted on this project tackles two specific
types of intelligent jamming attacks: virtual jamming on IEEE 802.11 networks and RRC
signalling attack on LTE systems. The proposed metrics have no relation among them, offering
independent belief sources compatible with Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence [31].
Despite the fact that results of the proposed detection mechanism are based on traffic mea-
surements collected from a laboratory test-bed, including an emulator on the LTE experiments,
conclusions can directly be applied to real infrastructures. Wi-Fi network traffic was collected
on a self-designed test-bed composed by real nodes equipped with IEEE 802.11 wireless
interfaces, recreating real-life scenarios with multiple nodes.
LTE experiments were initially simulated using OPNET Modeler Suite [32], and later on
emulated using equipment manufactured by Aeroflex [33], a leading company on the Telecom
industry for providing testing equipment on cellular networks due to the reliability of their
products, having a strong support from MNOs and Telecom manufacturers. Both companies,
OPNET Technologies Inc. and Aeroflex Inc. have been recently re-branded as Riverbed
Technology and Cobham Plc., respectively.
However, this thesis preserves the original company names to guarantee all the software
tools and hardware devices mentioned on the experimental phase are accurate. This action
removes the chances of confusing the reader when identifying the equipment used on the
test-beds, as upgraded or renamed versions of the same products were released after both
company acquisitions.
1.6 Thesis outline
The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the IEEE 802.11 and 3GPP LTE/LTE-Advanced standards for WANs and
cellular networks respectively, analysing the main security mechanisms for protecting the
data exchange and preventing threats against the service availability. Then, the chapter
focuses on the two shortcomings exploited to conduct virtual jamming attacks on each
standard: the Carrier-Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA)
mechanism for Wi-Fi networks and the AKA protocol for cellular networks. Finally, the
last section introduces the state of art on the existing solutions to tackle the aforemen-
tioned shortcomings and detecting virtual jamming attacks, providing an overview of
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each proposal and highlighting the pros and cons. Research gaps are identified, leading
to the definition of the research scope and challenges faced on this thesis.
Chapter 3 presents the proposed new algorithm to detect DoS attacks in real-time on IEEE
802.11 and LTE/LTE-Advanced networks, providing reliable results with minimal impact
on network performance and light computational cost.
Chapter 4 outlines the conducted experiments and test-bed description, with a thorough
explanation of all the equipment and configuration required for producing the simulation
scenarios. A summary of the initial network traffic is presented, including an analysis
of the results after processing the dataset. To conclude, the outcome of executing the
proposed detection algorithm is evaluated on each attack, and final conclusions are
deducted.
Chapter 5 closes the thesis with a synthesis of this research project, together with a summary
of the major contributions and the discussion of potential research directions for future
work. Further ideas and improvements are suggested aiming at optimising the current
detection algorithm.
CHAPTER 2
Background analysis
2.1 Introduction
This chapter defines the state of the art in the detection and prevention of the two Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks studied on this research project, including a brief assessment of the
countermeasures mechanisms proposed by the research community to address them. The
analysis of the background, and related literature review, has been split into two different
sections to facilitate the comprehension by the reader.
Section 2.2, provides a basic description of the IEEE 802.11 standard[8] and the specific
mechanisms required to understand how the virtual jamming attack is carried out to produce a
DoS in the wireless network. In particular, the Carrier-Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) mechanism is described together with its main vulnerabilities, leading
to the explanation of the hidden node problem [34, 30]. Lastly, the Request-To-Send/Clear-
To-Send (RTS/CTS) mechanism is explained concluding with a summary of the DoS attack
studied on this thesis and the solutions suggested by other researchers.
In a similar manner, section 2.3 provides an explanation of the Long Term Evolution (LTE)
architecture, and the mechanisms involved in the security of the Radio-Access Network (RAN).
The two mechanisms related with the signalling DoS attack studied on this thesis are presented:
the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol, which acts as entry point for the
legitimate users to gain access to the serving network; and the Radio Resource Control (RRC)
session establishment mechanism, the first step to establish a logical data link between the User
Equipment (UE) and the serving network. The last part of this section provides an overview
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of the suggested solutions to strength these two mechanisms, a critical analysis of them and a
short review of the research background.
This chapter concludes with section 2.4 with a brief summary of all the technical information
covered on this chapter.
2.2 IEEE 802.11 standard and WiFi networks
The first release of the IEEE 802.11 standard was first published back in 1997 by B.P. Crow et
al.[8], as a disruptive technology able to bring radio communications into local networks for
business or domestic use. This technology quickly evolved to a commercial standard released
in 2012 by the IEEE Standard Association [35]. This initial version included several security
mechanism for preserving the security of the information exchanged by adding an encryption
layer.
The first encryption mechanism was named as the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol,
in an attempt to provide robustness to a extremely vulnerable communication radio channel.
This protocol was based in the exchange of a secret key shared between the Access Point (AP)
serving the network and their client hosts. However, it was quickly considered not secure due
to its weak RC4 encryption algorithm [36, 37], facilitating the decryption of the secret key by
monitoring the network for a short period of time to capture Initialization Vectors (IVs) located
on the frame header.
The Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol was the ideal alternative to WEP, offering a
more reliable encryption mechanism, while still not offering mutual authentication between
client node and AP. Only the AP is able to prove the identity of the client node when the
WEP/WPA protocols are used as authentication mechanism. Sadly, this protocol became
quickly vulnerable against well-known brute-force and dictionary attacks [38].
The decision of using stronger encryption algorithms was mandatory, relying on bullet-
proof encryption algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Temporal
Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), which have not been compromised until now, to preserve
confidentiality of the communications over the radio link. These two algorithm were included
as part of the WPA2 protocol, also known as IEEE 802.11i [39].
If the three main methods used by the IEEE 802.11 standard to authenticate the client nodes
are analysed, it is possible to distinguish between:
Open:
There is no authentication between client node and AP, leaving the communication
channel open for any available node in within the coverage area. This authentication
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method is not recommended and impose a huge risk of disclosing personal information
to any potential attacker.
Shared key: This authentication mechanism provide identity validation of the client node to
the AP. However, the client node has no method to prove the authenticity of the serving
network. The authentication of each client node is reduced to the possession of the shared
secret key. Once the user has been authenticated, the following communications will
be authorised by looking at the Medium Access Control (MAC) address of the Wireless
Network Interface Card (WNIC), with the additional risk of suffering MAC spoofing
attacks [40].
802.1x [41]:
This authentication mechanism rely on an external server, such a Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server [42], for validating the authenticity of the client
node. The main advantage of this method is the mutual authentication between AP and
client node.
The following challenge faced by IEEE 802.11 networks is the management of the access
to the radio channel, which is shared between all the active nodes and serving AP associated
with the same Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) network or Basic Service Set Identifier
(BSSID). This responsibility belongs to the CSMA/CA mechanism [30], which manages the
access to the medium by establishing the aims at solving the hidden node problem previously
mentioned before.
2.2.1 MAC layer and CSMA/CA mechanism
The MAC layer manages the access to the physical radio channel by the upper layers of
the protocol stack, regulating the behaviour expected by each wireless node when sharing
the channel. This mechanism requires all the client nodes to sense the channel during their
transmissions with the aim of detecting any collision should it happens.
The IEEE 802.11 distinguish from physical carrier-sensing function, using information from
the physical layer to identify if a collision occurs, and the virtual carrier-sensing function relying
on the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) field to determine the duration of a transmission. The
NAV field is included on the header of most of the control, management and data frames. This
parameter should always have as value the time required for completing the transmission of the
entire frame, in milliseconds, with a maximum value of 32767 milliseconds[35].
In the event of suffering a collision, the transmitting node should stop the frame transmission
and immediately proceed sending a jam signal to inform the rest of active nodes about the
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incident. Once the jam signal has been fully transmitted, the node will immediately migrate
to idle mode and wait for a random and self-imposed delay time, which includes the back-off
time defined by the CW. This back-off time will increase whenever the number of consecutive
collisions increases without registering a successful transmission, to reduce the chances of
suffering future collisions.
2.2.2 Vulnerabilities and improvements
The main shortcoming identified in the MAC layer is the hidden node problem [30]. This event
occurs when two frames collide in the communication channel, but one of the nodes involved
in the collision is not able to identify it. Both emitting nodes are within the coverage area of
the AP, although they are not within the range of the other node due to the distance.
While the first node detects the collision and transmits the jamming signal, the second
emitting node will continue its transmission, keeping the channel busy to transfer a frame
already corrupted by the collision. This node will not realise about the collision until the
jamming signal reaches its coverage area. However, by the time the node is concious about the
recent collision, its transmission will be already completed.
To prevent this phenomenon from happening, the IEEE 802.11 standard defines an addi-
tional mechanisms to control the communication channel: the RTS/CTS mechanism. This
mechanisms imposes the transmission of a warning messages, named as RTS, with the intention
of informing the rest of active nodes about the intention to make a transmission, including the
NAV value of the expected transmission. This information is used by the nodes sensing the
carrier to estimate for how long they have to wait until attempting to use the radio channel.
Fig. 2.1 Representation of waiting times for RTS/CTS mechanism [43]
At the end of the transmission, the emitting node will send a CTS frame, to inform about
the successful completion of the transmission. Figure 2.1 represent this situation with two
nodes attempting to use the communication channel, with the RTS/CTS mechanism enabled.
It is important to emphasis on the mandatory implementation of this mechanism for all the
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well-behaved nodes, being required to wait for the completion of the emission with a CTS
confirmation frame.
The waiting time imposed by the RTS/CTS mechanism on each node also takes into account
the Distributed coordination function Inter-frame Space (DIFS) and Short Inter-frame Space
(SIFS) delay. The DIFS is the time required for each node sensing the carrier before being
authorise to legitimately transmit a frame. On the other side, the SIFS is the time needed by the
receiving node to process the incoming frame, and reply to it.
2.2.3 Virtual Jamming Attack on IEEE 802.11 networks
This attack was initially reported by D. Chen et al. [29], emphasising on its effectiveness
to disrupt the service and its simplicity to be carried out. The authors provide a theoretical
analysis of the vulnerability, suggesting the definition of three timers to decide whether the
incoming frames should be processed or discarded. The first two timers are used to control
the RTS and CTS messages, which should always be followed by a data or Acknowledgement
(ACK) frame respectively. Using these times, the legitimate node attempting to use the channel
will be able to identify the misuse of the channel and automatically ignore the RTS/CTS frames
to proceed with its transmissions. The third timer suggested is for the NAV duration reported in
the frames, which will allow the legitimate node to transmit whenever the NAV value reported
does not match with the expected value for the data transmitted.
The solution proposed has been taken into account when designing the NAV metric used
on this thesis, as the duration indicated in the NAV field has been acknowledged in other
publications as clear evidence of the attack [44, 27, 45].
Performing the Attack
In order to perform the attack, only two modifications must be carried out in the aforementioned
security mechanisms. The first change consist on eliminating the functionality of the Contention
Window (CW), which defines the minimum and maximum back-off delay a node should be
waiting before attempting to use the communication channel. The implementation of the attack
used on this thesis has modified the CW to have a CWMAX =0 and CWMIN=0, setting the duration
of the back-off delay to zero for all the collisions detected on the attacker node. The direct effect
of this change is that the attacker will automatically start transmitting a new frame without
waiting for the radio channel to be idle and free to be used.
The second change on the standard behaviour of a node is produced by the establishment of
a fixed value in the NAV field, the maximum value of 32767 milliseconds[35]. Including this
NAV field value on every frame transmitted by the attacker will impose unnecessary delays in
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the remaining active nodes of the network. The combination of this change with the lack of
CW gives the attacker the potential to monopolise the communication channel for as long as
the attack is enabled.
The specific software modification used on this thesis to execute the attack are cited in the
Appendix C.
2.2.4 Research Background
The study of mechanisms to detect and mitigate jamming attacks has always been an important
research area for wireless communications [45, 46, 44, 28, 47, 29]. In this section, this
thesis introduces the specific research publications that contributed to define the research path
followed on this PhD, and helped on the selection of the candidate metrics for detecting the
virtual jamming attack.
The initial publication of D. Chen et al. [29] acted as starting point to characterise the attack
and being aware of the potential impact it could have on a Wi-Fi network, as it was previously
introduced on section 2.2.3. In addition, other publications extended the analysis of the attack,
offering different approaches to mitigate the effects of jamming attacks [48].
The most basic type of DoS attack is the physical jamming, as Chapter 1 explained. A.
G. Fragkiadakis et al. [45] proposed a distributed solution to tackle this type of jamming
by monitoring the status of the radio channel and the analysis of the Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR). The jamming activity is detected either using a threshold or a cumulative sum (Cusum)
algorithm. A second version of the algorithm is also proposed, applying Dempster-Shafer (D-S)
theory to the outcome of both algorithms. Although this solution improves the results up to
80%, it only uses physical layer metrics making the detection performance sensitive to any
normal alteration of the radio signal parameters, such as during network congestion periods.
Complementary to the detection solution, W. Xu et al. [49] present two simple methods
to neutralise physical jamming attacks: channel surfing, where the client nodes move to a
different communication channel whenever a jamming attack is detected; and spatial retreats,
where mobile clients move to safe positions whenever they are victims of a jamming attack (in
coordination with the rest of the active nodes in the network).
Using NS-2 simulator, L. Wang et al. [28] managed to evaluate an algorithm that is able
to determine the type of jamming attack implemented by monitoring each node within the
network. The authors define first the Packets Send Ratio (PSR), or number of packet sent in
comparison with the actual number of packet transmissions reported by each node; and the
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), which compares the number of packets reported as sent against
the actual received packets. As final validation, the algorithm uses the signal strength to verify
the cases where the PDR might adopt low values as part of a legitimate network activity. This
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solution is useful to detect physical and virtual jamming attacks, and is also able to classify
the type of jamming being executed, following the classification exposed in Chapter 1. On the
contrary, a heavy monitoring on all the node transmissions is required, and it also requires an
initial state to set the normal pattern in the signal strength records.
A completely different approach is offered by M. Raya et al. [46], where the software-based
solution named DOMINO is presented. The software runs in the AP to be able to monitor the
active nodes within the network, and identify rogue behaviours. The DOMINO app is modular
and segregates the functions into three components: the Deviation Estimation Component
(DEC), the Anomaly Detection Component (ADC) and the Decision Making Component
(DMC). In the same manner, this solution also requires of a constant monitoring on all the
communications, to analyse variables such as the NAV field, the back-off time and the correct
utilisation of the predefined times for implementing the Carrier-Sense Multiple Access with
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) procedure.
The solution proposed by G. Thamilarasu et al. [44] is a distributed system to detect
multiple types of jamming attacks looking at metrics from the lower layers of the protocol
stack. All the nodes within the network are responsible for monitoring the communications
at some point, as the role is randomly assigned. The system looks first at the idle periods in
the physical layer, computes the average number of RTS/CTS packets sent by each node, the
idle time reported on the NAV field and performed retransmissions. The constant monitoring
of these four variables makes this solution not applicable for networks with a big number of
active nodes, as the included simulations with GloMoSim confirm. The main novelty is the
identification of the CRC errors as valuable metric to determine whether a collision occurs.
The last proposal studied on this thesis is the security mechanism presented by D. Chen [29]
to protect the MAC layer protocols. Using timers, the RTS and CTS functions are monitored,
together with the NAV virtual idle time reported and implemented. Whenever no new frame
is received right after the RTS timer, the algorithm will set the NAV value to zero as a rogue
activity has been detected. In the same manner, if a CTS timer expiration is not followed by
an ACK packet reception, the NAV timer will be set to zero again to release the channel. The
results presented are very positive, since the legitimate nodes barely experience a decrease on
the registered throughput during the attack, but this implementation requires of a change in the
protocol stack for both network equipment and Wireless Network Interface Cards(WNICs).
The previously introduced publications offer an insight of the variables that could help to
characterise the virtual jamming attack studied on this thesis, such as SNR levels, CRC errors,
NAV field values, real transmission and reported times when sending/receiving packets and the
monitoring of variables related with the CSMA/CA mechanism. Nevertheless, the detection of
the specific virtual jamming attack selected on this thesis has not been fully addressed on the
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literature review. A lightweight detection algorithm is required to guarantee the applicability in
a real on-line Intrusion Detection System (IDS) without any prior knowledge.
2.3 LTE/LTE-A standard and cellular networks
The next generation of mobile cellular networks is aimed at providing high-speed access
to broadband mobile services even in the worse scenarios, such as high mobility scenarios,
overcrowded cells or rural areas; without detriment to the Quality-of-Service (QoS). Addition-
ally, 4th Generation of Mobile Communications (4G) systems are expected to provide safe
communications among a huge number of cellular users, which is growing constantly every
year.
The major contribution of the 4G is the portability of the entire network architecture into
a flat, all-IP infrastructure where all the services are provided over IP networking and circuit
switching is no longer used. This improvement facilitate an easy mobility among different radio-
access technologies, such as Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX),
Wireless Fidelity (WiFi), Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) or Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), besides making easy backward compatibility
with previous technologies.
However, compatibility with heterogeneous access technologies, which are provided by
multiple Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), produces an increase of the number of hangovers
in the RAN. The main consequence of this effect is the mandatory negotiation of strict security
policies between the MNOs with the purpose of defining trust policies and authorized users’
migration, as well as defining secure countermeasures against identified vulnerabilities.
Since the first release of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) for the Long Term
Evolution (LTE) standard, several publications have pointed out important shortcomings with
regards to the security capabilities of this technology[13, 25, 50, 51]. Most of the weaknesses
were identified in the RAN, which is the most vulnerable part of the entire system due to its
wireless nature and attacks can be easily performed remotely without having physical access to
the equipment.
The security capabilities of LTE to protect the radio link are based in pre-defined secure
domains with limited scopes and security contexts associated to each user, which are established
during the attaching procedure. The security context is built based on a pre-shared master key
between the core network and the mobile user or UE, but using additional secondary keys
which are dynamically assigned per session to guarantee freshness of the session keys.
The procedure in which the session keys are derived is called EPS-AKA, or Authentication
and Key Agreement Protocol for Evolved Packet System (EPS), and it is triggered as first
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Fig. 2.2 LTE End-to-End Network Architecture
security mechanism during the initial attachment of the mobile device. This protocol plays an
important role into the establishment of an initial security context for each user. At the same
time, it exhibits most of the identified vulnerabilities of LTE, such as breach of privacy for the
user’s identity, weak mutual authentication between core-network elements or lack of forward
secrecy into the key hierarchy.
This report focuses its interest into the analysis of a particular vulnerability of the EPS-AKA
protocol which allows the attacker to perform a DoS attack against the core network. At first,
Section 2 describes the vulnerability itself and a wide description of how to perform a local DoS
attack over the RRC layer in a pre-selected cell and, to complete it, describes the consequences.
Finally, conclusions are stated at the end of the reports, with ideas for further research to
strengthen future mobile network communications in LTE deployments.
2.3.1 Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol
Identification of the user is the first step before gain access to the network. UE establishes
contact with the nearest evolved-Node B (eNB) triggering the registration process. During the
first attempt, Mobile Management Entity (MME) is not able to identify the UE by means of a
temporary identity (Globally Unique Temporary Identity - GUTI), thus, serving network will
send an IDENTITY REQUEST message.
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A reply message is made by the UE with its International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
transferred in clear text, because no security context has been established before. It breaks
the requirements of user identity confidentiality mentioned in the security requirements [52],
exposing the user identity to eavesdropping attacks over the radio interface.
Once the MME receives the IDENTITY RESPONSE, GUTI is allocated and paired with
the original IMSI. The temporary identity may change for different reasons, being no necessary
to transfer the unique subscriber identifier unless serving network can not retrieve it from the
GUTI.
Before the establishment of a security context, serving network needs to verify the authentic-
ity of the Mobile Equipment (ME), as well as the UE has to verify the serving network. Mutual
authentication is achieved by means of an AKA protocol, called EPS-AKA. The process is
triggered by the serving network, after the identification success. Figure 2.3 shows the sequence
diagram.
Fig. 2.3 Authentication sequence for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
(E-UTRAN)
Initially, MME checks the stored key material and its freshness. If there is any Authentica-
tion Vector (AV) available it will use it to start the authentication process. If there are no vectors,
or the existing ones are no fresh enough, MME will request new AV to the Home Subscriber
Serve(HSS). Each AV is associated with an IMSI, being only used once per AKA instance.
3GPP recommends to send only one vector on each reply message, but it is not mandatory.
Each AV is composed according to the equation
AV := RAND ∥ AUT N ∥ XRES ∥ KASME (2.1)
where each parameter is:
RAND is the challenge to proof the user authenticity.
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AUTN is the parameter to proof freshness of authentication vector and serving network
authenticity.
XRES is the expected response to the challenge.
KASME is an identifier to derives the same key hierarchy in both sides.
The process start with an AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message, composed by an
authentication challenge RAND, AUTN parameter to verify the freshness of the key material
besides of serving network authenticity, and KSIASME , a value used by the mobile equipment to
generate the same key value for KASME .
Once the ME receives the message, it retrieves the KSIASME parameter and passes the other
ones to the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). USIM verifies the freshness of the
authentication vector, deriving the sequence number from the AUTN parameter. If the derived
value match with the expected sequence, a challenge response RES is computed and send back
to the UE. Then, two keys are derived from the master key K, one for integrity (IK) and another
for confidentiality (CK).
An AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE is sent back to the MME, generating on it the same
key pairs CK/IK and completing the AKA process. Now, both extremes are able to generate
the same key material, following the scheme of figure 2.4.
Fig. 2.4 Key hierarchy for E-UTRAN
Each time an AKA process is called, key material is re-generated based on the new value of
KASME . Master key K is securely stored in the HSS and IMSI, without being transmitted or
used directly. It is only used to derive the entire key hierarchy.
Access-Stratum and Non-Access-Stratum Security (AS/NAS)
In contrast with UMTS, LTE incorporates a secondary security layer with an extra encryption
and hashing level. These two layers are Access-Stratum (AS) and Non-Access-Stratum (NAS)
security. AS security protects the signalling and data traffic between the UE and the eNB,
where all signalling messages are confidentially protected by KRRCenc and integrity protected by
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KRRCint . User plane traffic is only encrypted using the key KUPenc, leaving integrity protection
as free choice of the operator.
On the other hand, NAS security duplicates the robustness of the system against attacks,
incorporating another integrity and confidentiality protection for both data flows (signalling
and user plane) between UE and MME. The keys used to encrypt and calculate hash codes are
KNASenc and KNASint respectively.
DoS in the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer
The Radio Resource Control layer manages all the functionalities related with the radio interface,
negotiating the establishment of the logical channels over the previously assigned radio bearer.
It is located in layer 3 and it retrieves all the information about the physical and data link from
the lower layer 2, which is composed by three individual sub-layers: Packet Data Convergence
Protocol (PDCP), Radio Link Control (RLC) and MAC.
Fig. 2.5 RRC connection data-flow diagram
The procedure with which the UE is attached to the core-network as a client requires an
initial phase where the designated radio bearer is split into logical channels for the downlink,
uplink and control traffic. This process is the RRC CONNECTION establishment, which is
precedent to the negotiation of the security context and the initiation of AS/NAS security. Thus,
security mechanisms are not enabled until the RRC connection is established since all the
security capabilities are implemented over the NAS layer.
Consequently, all the exchanged messages to initiate the process, negotiate the conditions
and acknowledge the establishment of a RRC connection need to be transferred in plain-text.
These messages are RRCConnectionRequest, RRCConnectionSetup, RRCConnectionSetup-
Complete, RRCConnectionReject and RRCConnectionRelease. Figure 2.5 shows the successful
establishment of a RRC connection as it is specified by 3GPP files [53]. The procedure is
triggered from the user side by sending the RRCConnectionRequest message, opening the gap
to missuses from rogue users.
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Regarding the status of the mobile terminal, initially the device is in the RRC-IDLE status,
which only allows the use of "emergency call" services. Once the RRC connection is enabled,
the status is moved to RRC-CONNECTED and all the available services for a particular user
are activated.
(a) RRC Connection Rejection
(b) RRC Connection Release
Fig. 2.6 Data-flow diagram for additional RRC messages
The RRC protocol take into consideration the unusual case of having problems during the
establishment of the RRC connection, where the MME could reject a RRCConnectionRequest
if the identity of the user is invalid or any parameter included in the message does not match
with the expected value. Then, MME will communicate the rejection by sending a RRCConnec-
tionReject message, as figure 2.6(a) shows, and the negotiation will finish. A new instance of a
RRC connection need to be started to initiate a new negotiation.
The specifications also contemplate a third case where the eNB or base station can re-
lease the established RRC connection in order not to consume unnecessary resources if the
RRC connection is not required to be used in the future. In this case, the UE receives a
RRCConnectionRelease message as it is represented in figure 2.6(b) and it changes from
RRC-CONNECTED to RRC-IDLE.
However, neither RRCConnectionRelease nor RRCConnectionReject implies any additional
threat, since those messages are only sent from the mobile operator side through the eNB.
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2.3.2 Vulnerabilities and improvements
In the previous section the functionality of the RRC layer was depicted, pointing out the lack
of security before establishing a radio connection. Considering this breach of security, it is
possible to use the normal procedure to establish a radio link with the aim of consuming
resources to perform a DoS attack. The attack is widely explained in the next section, which is
based on the original paper of Yu Da et al. [25].
Fig. 2.7 Data-flow diagram of a DoS attack over the RRC layer
In this paper, the authors identified the vulnerability and performed a simulation in a
self-implemented tool with the purpose of getting measurements to assess the impact of the
attack inside the core network. The results conclude that there is no requirement of having
high-computational hardware in order to perform the attack, since it can easily be launched by
using a non-sophisticated equipment, such a normal desktop PC. The attack is able to collapse
the system in just 30 seconds by using a bunch of legitimate IMSI values which has been
gathered previously to send 500 service request per second following a Poisson distribution
[25].
The attack exploits a vulnerability in the protocol specifications of the RRC layer of the
protocol stack [53], which is at level three of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model
as shown in figure 2.8. The vulnerability was initially identified by Da Yu et als. [25], and
subsequently acknowledged in several publications [24, 54, 55].
Performing the Attack
The aim of this attack is to consume available resources inside the core network by flooding
the system with radio service requests which contains legitimate IMSIs previously collected.
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Fig. 2.8 Protocol stack for LTE control plane traffic[56] against OSI model[57]
Initially, the malicious user retrieves legitimate user identities or IMSI from the radio channel
by fooling the user to connect with a rogue MME to force the transference of the IMSI with an
Identity Request message. The attack to gather all the IMSI is widely explained in [58].
Once the attacker has collected enough number of legitimate identities to perform the
attack, the second phase is initialised by sending RRCConnectionRequest messages including
one of the hijacked IMSI. MME receives the service request and retrieves an authentication
vector from the HSS. Although MME and HSS validate the user identity by checking the value
of the IMSI, the injected message would not be identified as illegitimate message, thus, the
authentication process continues as normally.
MME sends a RRCConnectionSetup message and launches time trigger waiting for a
RRCConnectionSetupComplete message which will never arrive. Once the timer is expired, the
authentication session is cancelled and all the occupied resources a free.
HSS requires to consume hardware resources, such as RAM memory and CPU usage, in
order to compute each authentication vector, as well as storing the derived session keys until
the authentication session is completed; or MME manages to detect the attack and the session
is cancelled.
The attacker only has to initiate a limited number of RRCConnectionRequest simultaneously
in order to collapse the available resources of the HSS and block the cell service completely.
In conclusion, this attack has two side effects into the performance of the system. First,
the access through the Evolved-Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) in a
particular cell, where the attack is being performed, is blocked and legitimate users are isolated
since the RAN is inaccessible. Secondly, as a consequence of serving multiple fake service
request from the attacker, the core network is driven to the collapse. The collapse occurs due
to a heavy computing load registered on the HSS to generate and distribute the authentication
vectors.
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2.3.3 Research Background
Looking at the work carried out by the research community, two main research lines are clearly
defined: the identification and impact assessment of the studied signalling DoS attack, and the
enhancements on the AKA mechanism.
The first publication acknowledging the studied signalling DoS attack was presented by
Da Yu et al. in 2012 [25], where the authors described the entire process to launch the attack.
First, the UE is fooled to transmit the IMSI value instead of using the temporary identity. This
action allows the attacker to gather the required list of legitimate IMSIs, and finally perform
the signalling attack as explained in section 2.3.2.
Other signalling DoS and intelligent jamming attacks have been identified on LTE networks
[59, 60], exploiting the initial allocation of radio bearers to exhaust the resources within the
radio cell and disrupt the service. The authors in [59] successfully managed to replicate the
attack in an OPNET simulator, and provide a detection mechanism without evaluating its
performance thoroughly. However, such type of attacks go beyond the scope for this thesis,
which focuses on DoS attacks above the physical layer.
The other line of investigation has focused on improving the existing AKA mechanism
proposed by the 3GPP. The disclosure of the IMSI during the initial UE attachment to the RAN
is the main vulnerability exploited for performing DoS attacks[61] in LTE networks.
The research community have proposed interesting solutions to deal with this shortcoming,
proposing a list of amendments on the original AKA protocol. G.M. Køien’s proposed and
enhanced AKA mechanism [62] able to provide mutual authentication between RAN and
UE. The protocol includes a new concept of USIM card [62], called Enhanced Subscriber
Identity Module (ESIM), which is capable of computing pseudo-random values. The new
feature enables the generation of challenge requests inside the UE which are used to confirm
the identity of the serving network.
However, this solution adds additional computational load to the original radio access
procedures, and could impose further challenges when maintaining compatibility with legacy
systems.
Xiehua et al. [61] modify the security architecture to act as a wireless public key infras-
tructure and use digital certificates to confirm identity. The certificates have to be provided in
advance to all the entities involved in the authentication process, to be able to gain access to the
radio system. This requirement makes more difficult the actual implementation on a real LTE
deployment.
A more robust solution is introduced by Yu Zheng et al. [63, 64], combining passwords
with fingerprints and public keys to provide full mutual authentication since the initial UE
attachment.
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Unfortunately, the high computational cost to execute the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
and mutual authentication, and the requirement of storing biometric parameters, make its
implementation less viable in a commercial deployment.
Due to the aforementioned inconveniences, the author of this thesis believes that further
research is required to improve the existing standard of LTE without actually modifying
the specification documents. A detection mechanism is required to provide security against
signalling DoS attacks while still transferring the IMSI in clear-text whenever the use of
temporary identities is not possible.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has covered the technical details involved in protecting the radio channel for
LTE and IEEE 802.11 networks. The analysis of each mechanism has revealed a number of
weaknesses that can be exploited for compromising the security of the entire communication
system. A specific attack has been selected for each technology, to conduct further research
experiments and contribute on the early detection of the attacks with a new mechanism.
The selected virtual jamming attack for IEEE 802.11 has proven very effective for disrupting
all the communications within a WLAN, impeding the rest of nodes to communicate with the
AP. This attack represent a real threat for corporate networks and future 4G/5G systems, where
Wi-Fi will be one of the main technologies for facilitating cellular traffic offloading and provide
seamless connectivity across heterogeneous RANs.
Several attempts have been able to identify the attack under specific conditions, without
tackling real-life situations were multiple nodes behave differently. Additional mechanism
should be developed to identify the aforementioned virtual jamming attack and protect the
availability of the service. The goal of this thesis is to identify some of the meaningful metrics
suggested on the literature review and propose new ones to better characterise the attack,
facilitating its on-line detection with high accuracy.
The RRC signalling attack for LTE becomes an important vulnerability in LTE systems,
which has to be taken into consideration for future releases of the standard specification versions.
Although the targets of the attack are specific segments of the network, and must be performed
within a short-distance to the serving network to target an specific cell, it has a direct effect into
the entire core-network of a particular MNO.
Due to this issue, the author consider as a priority to face this vulnerability by identifying
metrics from multiple layers which might be useful to detect an attack in real time, and provide
countermeasures to block it without having a real impact in the QoS of the legitimate users.
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The aim of this thesis is to identify suitable metrics from the traffic generated through
software-based simulation tools and hardware-based emulators, such as OPNET [32] and
Aeroflex equipment [33], with the purpose of implementing them in an Intrusion Detection
System for LTE networks. These metrics should be accurate enough to detect the attack in real
time with a minimal false-positive ratio.
Strengthening cellular and wireless communication systems is crucial to guarantee the
availability of the service, a crucial requirement in particular scenarios where these attacks
would be specially harmful, such as terrorism, first-responder communications, domestic
burglar alarms, or any other criminal actions which could benefit from isolating the victim
network for a short period of time.
CHAPTER 3
Proposed detection methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter depicts the detection methodology used on this thesis for processing the experi-
mental dataset for both the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 and
Long Term Evolution (LTE) experiments. It is important to remark that the first version of this
algorithm was initially published by F.J. Aparicio et al. [65, 66], and adjusted to be applied to
multiple types of attacks for Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks, such as: Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) and disassociation attacks.
However, the new version applied on this thesis has been readjusted to be compatible with
the proposed metrics, and able to address the particularities of the two Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks studied. Moreover, this algorithm has never been applied to LTE network traffic to the
best knowledge of the author of this thesis, having no reference on its efficacy with the traffic
patterns registered on cellular networks.
The following section 3.3 explains the proposed detection algorithm, and all the mechanisms
involved on the process from the live collection of the metrics to the final phase, where all the
sources of evidence are fused into a final decision.
Finally, section 3.4 presents the core part of the detection algorithm: the metrics. A list
of five metrics are introduced for detecting virtual jamming attacks in wireless technologies,
followed by the description of three additional metrics designed for identifying Radio Resource
Control (RRC) signalling attacks in LTE cellular networks.
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The chapter ends with a brief summary in section 3.6, where the main topics covered on the
previous sections are highlighted, leading to the introduction of Chapter 4, where the actual
results of applying this detection algorithm are presented.
3.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory
In order to understand the proposed algorithm, it is necessary to introduce first Dempster-Shafer
(D-S) theory of evidence[31]. This technique is used to fuse the information collected from
different observers about the same events. The observers on this thesis are the proposed metrics.
The total number of possible events are grouped into the Frame of Discernment, represented on
formula 3.1, which creates a finite set with all the possible mutually exclusive responses about
an specific problem.
Θ=Θ1,Θ2, ...,Θn (3.1)
The Frame of Discernment allows the elaboration of hypotheses, or subsets of Θ, having
a maximum number of mutually exclusive subsets defined by the power set. The formula to
represent the power set is as follows:
P(Θ) = 2Θ (3.2)
It is important to remark that the empty set (φ ) is always part of the power set. Any of the
subsets defined by the intersection of different responses, or elements of Θ, are considered
uncertainty, as there is not enough evidence to prove a single hypothesis as valid.
Applying the theory of evidence, probabilities are assigned to each of the hypothesis, using
the following mass probability function:
m : 2Θ→ [0,1] (3.3)
The main difference between the theory of evidence and the probability theory is that the
additivity rule is no longer applied when computing the beliefs. The resulting probability will
always fall within the following confidence interval [31, 67]:
[∑
A⊆H
m(A),1− ∑
A∩H=φ
m(A)] (3.4)
where
A is the perception of the observer providing the evidence.
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The assignment of probabilities must follow these conditions[31]:
m(φ) = 0 (3.5)
m(H)>= 0,∀H ⊆Θ (3.6)
∑
H⊆Θ
m(H) = 1 (3.7)
where
m(φ) is the probability of the empty set, always equal to zero.
m(H) is the probability for the hypothesis H.
∑H⊆Θm(H) is the overall probability of all the hypotheses included in the set (Θ).
Once a probability has been assigned for all the hypotheses, the rule of combination[31]
defines the method to combine evidences from multiple observers about the same event. The
fuse of evidences is only possible whenever all the observers are facing the same problem and
set of events/hypotheses, as mentioned before. In essence, this condition requires for all the
observers to share the same Frame of Discernment.
The rule of combination is applied to fuse beliefs of two independent observers into a
common belief, and it is defined by the following formula:
mcomb(H) =
∑X∩Y=H = m1(X)∗m2(Y )
1−∑X∩Y=φ = m1(X)∗m2(Y )
∀H ̸= φ (3.8)
where
mcomb(H) is the probability of the hypothesis H, obtained as a result of fusing into a single
belief the probability assigned by two independent observers for the same hypothesis H.
X ,Y are the two different perceptions produced by each observer about the same event.
m1(X) is the probability associated with the hypothesis X perceived by the observer 1.
Since this rule can be generalised by iteration [67], the resulting belief can be used as new
source of evidence for the same problem. Reducing the number of observers to only two on
each iteration keeps the computational cost of the D-S process low. The proposed detection
algorithm combines the evidences collected from multiple metrics by consecutively applying
the rule on each key pair. The outcome of combining the first two metrics is used as new belief,
being possible to apply again the rule including a third metric as second input on the next
iteration.
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3.3 Detection Algorithm
In order to understand the mechanism used on this thesis for detecting DoS attacks, it is
important to define the sources of information used to feed the entire detection process. All
this information is captured by constantly monitoring the activity of the network to extract
the required metric information. Figure 3.1 describes the general view of the entire detection
process, where it is possible to identify four main zones:
Fig. 3.1 General view of the detection process
1. MONITORING ZONE:
This phase is represented on the left side of figure 3.1, where the Open Systems Inter-
connection (OSI) model of the protocol stack is represented. The proposed metrics are
mentioned, indicating from which layer the information is extracted to compute them:
Physical, MAC or Network layer. LTE metrics are indicated in red colour, coming from
the Network layer, while the IEEE 802.11 metrics are marked in red colour and are
computed with information extracted from the MAC layer.
The outcome of this phase will be a single buffer for each metric, containing the individual
samples collected from the network traffic for each monitored metric.
2. BPA COMPUTATION ZONE:
During this phase, the statistical parameters are computed using a sliding window with
a pre-defined size. These values are introduced into the Basic Probability Assignment
(BPA) function together with the original metric samples from each frame, producing
the BPA values on each buffer for the three evaluated hypothesis: normal, attack and
uncertainty. The outcome of this phase will be three different buffers containing a BPA
value for each frame and evaluated hypothesis.
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3. DATA FUSION ZONE:
During this phase, the individual buffers obtained during the BPA computation phase are
fused, using the outcome of each data fusion as new input to be merged with the next
metric. Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory [31] is used to merge the two sources of evidence
on each iteration for the three hypothesis, creating three output buffers with all the belief
predictions obtained from the fusing process. A triplet of beliefs for each frame will be
the final outcome of this phase.
4. DECISION ZONE:
The last part of the process is the final decision, in which the resulting beliefs in Attack,
Normal and Uncertainty are received, selecting the hypothesis with the highest probability,
or uncertainty whenever the probability matches for both Attack and Normal hypotheses.
The aforementioned explanation of the detection algorithm only provides a general view of
the overall process, requiring a more detailed analysis of each phase to better understand how it
works. The detection algorithm is composed by six principal steps, covering all the stages of
the detection process since the initial monitoring of the network up to the final outcome of the
algorithm, where the beliefs are fused and the final prediction is communicated.
Fig. 3.2 Phases of the detection methodology proposed
Figure 3.2 reveals a more detailed view of each zone previously introduced. The following
sections depict all the actions to be executed on each phase, the logic hidden behind the input
data sources of each phase and the produced outcome. The rest of this section analyses each
of these actions individually, with additional figures to support the explanation. Although
the following figures have been created using the metrics for the Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi)
experiments as example, the detection process is executed in the same manner for the LTE
experiments.
3.3.1 Collecting Selected Metrics
The collection of the metric samples is produced by analysing the field values of every frame
captured during the duration of the monitoring phase. The required information for computing
each metric is collected by individually analysing the frames in the dataset.
Using the specific formula of each metric, the metric values are computed for every frame.
The outcome of this phase is a sorted buffer composed by multiple time slots. Each time slot
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contains a vector with the resulting values for each metric on that particular time slot. The
buffer is sorted using the timestamps included on every frame.
Fig. 3.3 Process for collecting the metric values
For the purpose of validating the detection algorithm proposed on this thesis, the actual
execution of this phase was divided into two sub-phases. First, the experiments were conducted
while a passive node was constantly sensing the channel and capturing all the traffic transferred
through it. Once all the traffic was collected into a Packet Capture (PCAP) file, an off-line
metric collection process was executed for computing the metrics previously introduced on
Chapter 2 and creating the aforementioned buffer. Each time slot of the final buffer was tagged
as malicious or normal, since having a labelled dataset was crucial for being able to identify
how accurate the detection algorithm is.
3.3.2 Computing Statistical Parameters
Once all the metric samples are collected and ready to be processed, the next step is computing
the desired statistical parameter to build the normality pattern and identify the anomaly values
within the sample.
The analysis of a single sample does not provide evidence of any event happening in the
network, unless this sample is compared against other samples from the same metric. In this
phase, the concept of Sliding Window (SW) is introduced to construct the relational pattern
between the samples, as shown in figures 3.4.
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Fig. 3.4 Process for computing the statistical parameter - Iteration 4
The SW is a First-In/First-Out (FIFO) buffer, with a predefined fixed size, that slides across
the samples buffer to group them. By grouping them, it is possible to compute the desired
statistical parameters to build the relational pattern across the same type of samples.
This thesis has selected the mean value x = ∑xn as reference statistic parameter, which is a
clear indicator for building the normality pattern of the collected network traffic. The mean is
computed for every time slot of the metric samples buffer, on each metric of the slot. Once
the mean has been obtained for every time slot, the value will be used to compute additional
parameters and finally obtain the beliefs on the next stage of the detection process.
Using the value of the metric on that particular time slot, and the historical values of the
same metric included within the SW, the statistical parameters are computed and placed in a
temporary buffer. The statistical parameters are computed following this formula:
SXi, j =
∑ j+n−1x=1 vi(x)
n
(3.9)
where
SXi, j(x) is the statistical parameter for the metric ’i’ collected on the time slot ’j’.
vi(x) is the value of the metric ’i’ in the slot time ’x’.
n represents the number of slots contained within the SW.
Fig. 3.5 Process for computing the statistical parameter - Iteration 5
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In the first iteration of the SW, the time slot 1 will obtain the same statistical parameter as
the metric value on that time slot, since there are no previous records or historical samples.
However, any future iteration of the SW will contain new time slots, as seen in figure 3.5.
During the sliding process, the SW is moved one slot forward per iteration, causing the variation
of the final statistical parameters computed on each slot.
Following the example on the analysis of the WiFi experiments, if the statistical parameter
is computed for the metric 1 on the forth SW iteration, which is represented in figure 3.4, the
obtained result would be as follows:
SX1,4 =
v1(1)+ v1(2)+ v1(3)+ v1(4)
4
(3.10)
The initial buffer of samples obtained on the previous phase leads to the generation of the
temporary buffer with all the statistical parameters, which is composed by recursively applying
this process on each slot. Both the main sample buffer, and the temporary buffer with the
statistical parameters have the same number of slots.
Once the statistical parameters have been computed for all the possible iterations of the
SW, the temporary buffer will contain now a vector on every time slot matching the following
formula:
{SX1,4,SX2,4,SX3,4,SX4,4,SX5,4} (3.11)
In this example, the vector contains 5 elements, which is the equivalent number of metrics
used for the analysis of the Wi-Fi experiments taken as reference for explaining the algorithm.
3.3.3 Evaluating Distance from Reference Value
Using the temporary buffer computed before, this phase measures the distance between the
current sample registered in the main metric sample buffer, and the normality pattern already
built on the temporary buffer.
On this thesis, the distance from the reference statistical parameter is computed following
the approach indicated by F.J. Aparicio et al. [66]. In this publication, the authors define the
angular mean for computing the belief in Attack, and a pre-defined linear scale with multiple
ranges for selecting the belief in Normal.
During this stage, the variables required to apply the formulas for the aforementioned
beliefs will be computed, using the temporary buffer with the statistical parameters obtained on
the previous stage. The actual method to compute the beliefs in Normal/Attack/Uncertainty,
and assign the final probability to each hypothesis, is defined as Belief Assignment.
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3.3.4 Belief Assignment
Using the values computed on the previous phase, the beliefs are assigned to each metric sample
included in the main buffer. The following paragraphs explain the process in detail.
Belief in Normal
The belief in Normal is computed by composing the BPA scale for the selected metric and the
metric values included on this iteration of the SW. The scale follows the well-known statistical
method for descriptive analysis of samples, called ‘box and whisker’ [68], which helps to detect
anomalies in the group of samples by analysing the distribution of samples within it.
The quartiles are computed for all the frames included on the SW, using the Q2 as the range
with the highest probability in Normal, as this value represent the Mean of the group. The
first and third quartile are also used to compute the Minimum (Min), Maximum (Max) and
Interquartile Range (IRQ) values of the sample group, following the formula indicated by this
statistical method:
Min = Q1−1.5∗ IQR (3.12)
Max = Q3+1.5∗ IQR (3.13)
IQR = Q3−Q1 (3.14)
Using this statistical method, any value lower than the Min value, or higher than the Max
value will be considered an anomaly. To compute the belief in Normal BPAN(x) for that specific
time slot and metric sample, the sample value is evaluated, obtaining the probability indicated
in the list depending on which one of the intervals the sample falls into. The closer the sample
value is to the edge cases (Min and Max values), the lower the probability assigned to it is.
In the same manner, the closer the sample value is to the mean value (Me), the higher the
probability assigned to it is. The ranges are defined as follows:
• vi(x) ∈ [−∞,Min) =⇒ BPAN(x) = 0.15.
• vi(x) ∈ [Min,Q1) =⇒ BPAN(x) = 0.3.
• vi(x) ∈ [Q1,Me) =⇒ BPAN(x) = 0.4.
• vi(x) = Me =⇒ BPAN(x) = 0.5.
• vi(x) ∈ (Me,Q3] =⇒ BPAN(x) = 0.4.
• vi(x) ∈ (Q3,Max] =⇒ BPAN(x) = 0.3.
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Fig. 3.6 Assigning Beliefs in Normal
• vi(x) ∈ (Max,+∞] =⇒ BPAN(x) = 0.15.
The author of this thesis has used the same range definition used by F.J. Aparicio et al.
[65, 66], as it follows a fair probability assignment depending on the distance from the average
value (Me) taking into account the distribution of the total number of collected samples.
Belief in Attack
In the process for computing the belief in Attack BPAA(x), the automated BPA function
considers two statistical parameters: the Euclidean distance of the sample value on the current
frame, and the frequency of the sample values within the current iteration of the SW. The
method proposed in [66] merges both parameters by following these steps:
• First, this method calculates the highest number of times a sample value is repeated
within the SW, defining it as Frequency (F), for the total n samples within the SW.
• Using the Mean (Me) of the n samples within the SW, this method computes the angle
α generated by the frequency, represented in the Y axis, and the value with the largest
Euclidean distance (Dmax) from the Me, which is represented in the X axis defining a
triangle between the two vectors (F and Dmax). The triangle is represented in blue on
figure 3.7.
• The Dmax is calculated by comparing the current sample value against the maximum and
minimum values registered on the current SW iteration. The Dmax will be the maximum
value when comparing the distance from the sample value to the maximum value in the
SW, and the distance from the minimum value to the sample value. The Dmax) value will
always be a positive number.
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• For each evaluated sample, the system calculates the β angle as indicated in formula 3.15.
This angle draws a second triangle, represented in green on figure 3.7, composed by the
original F vector and the Distance (D) from the sample value (represented with the red
dot in figure 3.7) to the Me value of the SW.
• Finally, the resulting β angle is compared against the original α angle, and the belief in
Attack is computed as follows:
If β >= α: 50% probability in Attack is assigned.
If β < α: the probability in Attack is defined by β2∗α
Fig. 3.7 Assigning Beliefs in Attack
β = cos−1(
F
(D2+F2)( 12)
) (3.15)
Belief in Uncertainty
Finally, the last belief to be computed is the belief in Uncertainty, which is computed taking
into account the two belief already obtained on the previous steps. This belief does not
require of any additional algorithm to be computed, since it is deducted from the two beliefs
previously obtained in the same manner the original authors did in the references [65, 66]. The
formula 3.16 to calculate its value is:
BPAU(x) =
Min(BPAN ,BPAA)
2∗Max(BPAN ,BPAA) (3.16)
where
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Min(BPAN , BPAA) represents the value of the belief with the lowest probability (belief in
Normal or in Attack).
Max(BPAN , BPAA) represents the value of the belief with the highest probability (belief in
Normal or in Attack).
Beliefs Adjustment
In the event of registering the maximum value for the belief in Attack and the belief in Normal,
which is set to 0.5, it would not be possible to estimate how much uncertainty exists without
breaking the rules defined to apply D-S theory. The overall probability of the Frame of
Discernment, which includes any subset of events that could lead to an hypotheses, must be
equal to 1. The solution to meet this requirement is adjusting all the beliefs to avoid overpassing
the maximum value of 1 when the probability of any subset is aggregated in the frame of
discernment. The correction factor, named as Ψ when first presented by F.J. Aparicio et al.
[65, 66], is defined as:
Ψ=
(BPAN +BPAA+BPAU)−1
3
(3.17)
The final outcome of this phase is a probability value for each hypothesis on the current
time slot, after applying the correction factor to the three probabilities:
BPAN = BPAN(x)−Θ (3.18)
BPAA = BPAA(x)−Θ (3.19)
BPAU = BPAU(x)−Θ (3.20)
Once the correction factor is applied, the algorithm complies with all the requirements for
applying D-S. This factor guarantees a maximum value when evaluating the overall probability
for all the subsets within the frame of discernment. However, the method used to compute the
correction factor does not compromise the independence for the three hypothesis observed.
The proposed algorithm evaluates three independent hypothesis with no relation between
then, and only applies the correction factor to equally reduce the estimated values of each
hypothesis before applying D-S theory.
3.3.5 Data Fusion
The process of combining the individual beliefs computed for each metric is named as data
fusion. This algorithm applies the D-S theory [31] to combine the selected metrics in groups
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of two. This theory has been applied to anomaly detection in the past [67, 45, 69, 65, 70, 71],
enhancing the individual results of multiple sources of evidence.
The process begins by defining the frame of discernment with all the possible independent
results of the studied problem. In the attack detection process, the proposed algorithm considers
the following results:
Θ= {Attack,Normal} (3.21)
Once the frame of discernment has been defined, the next step is considering all the possible
mutually exclusive hypotheses available on this scenario:
P(Θ) = 2Θ = {φ ,Attack,Normal,Attack|Normal}= {φ ,Attack,Normal,Uncertainty}
(3.22)
It is important to remark that the process followed to compute the probabilities on each of
the three hypothesis meets the conditions previously introduced in section 3.2:
m(φ) = 0
m(Attack),m(Normal),m(Uncertainty) ∈ [0,1]
∑
A⊆Θ
m(A) = m(φ)+m(Attack)+m(Normal)+m(Uncertainty) = 1
The calculation of the mass probability function defined by the theory of combination for
two of the proposed metric would be obtained evaluating the formula:
mcomb(H) =
∑X∩Y=H = m1(X)∗m2(Y )
1−∑X∩Y=φ = m1(X)∗m2(Y )
∀H ̸= φ (3.23)
where
mcomb(H) is the probability of the hypothesis H, obtained as a result of fusing into a single
belief the probability assigned by the two metrics for the same hypothesis H.
This process will be repeated recursively, combining the resulting belief with the remaining
metrics.
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3.4 Proposed metrics for DoS on WiFi networks
This section introduces the metrics proposed for detecting the DoS attacks studied on this
thesis, as a result of the information collected during the background analysis and literature
review. First, five metrics are presented in section 3.4.1 to detect the virtual jamming attack
for IEEE 802.11 networks, covering the information extracted from two layers of the IEEE
802.11 protocol stack: MAC and Logical Link Control (LLC) layers. These two layers are the
equivalent to the second layer in the OSI model [57], the Data Link (DL) layer.
Each metric has a long name, which is more descriptive to intuitively understand how it
is computed. Furthermore, a short name is also assigned to each metric, indicated between
brackets, which is used in all the following sections of this thesis to reduce the space required
and make easier for the reader to understand all the explanations.
3.4.1 Metrics definition
The virtual jamming attack has been characterised using 5 metrics from the MAC layer: Frame
Check Sequence Error Rate (CRC), Frame Duration Difference (NAV), Inter-arrival Time (∆
Time), Sequence-Number Diference (DiffFSN) and Throughput Rate (T). These metrics are
computed as follows:
Frame Check Sequence Error Rate (CRC)
The Frame Check Sequence (FCS) is a value included on each frame to validate the consistency
of the data transmitted on it. Looking at the number of FCS error rate, it is possible to identify
the healthiness on the data delivered within the WiFi network and uncover unusual activity
patterns or high number of collisions.
The errors detected by the FCS might be caused due to several reasons: collisions
in the communication channel, hardware issues with the Wireless Network Interface Card
(WNIC)/cable/socket or incorrect generation in the source node.
Frame Duration Difference (NAV)
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) as the time required
for a station to completely transmit a specific frame. This estimated value is considered the
frame duration, and should always be close to match the real time required to complete the
transmission of a frame.
The DoS attack investigated on this thesis has a direct relation with the NAV value, as
the attacker will always report the longest duration on the NAV value while transmitting data
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frames with a shorter duration. The proposed metric computes the difference between the
NAV value indicated within the frame and the actual duration of the frame transmission in
milliseconds. This value has been directly referred to NAV on this thesis.
The short name assigned to this metric does not represent the actual NAV field value
included within the header of the MAC messages, and will always be cited as NAV metric in
the following sections, to avoid confusing the reader.
Inter-arrival Time (∆Time)
The inter-arrival time is defined as the time difference between the arrival of two consecutive
frames to the same node from the same sender. This time is an indicator of the traffic load
inflicted by a single node on an specific host. Once the attack is active, this metric is expected
to increase, as the transmissions slots are coped by the jamming station reducing the chances of
successful legitimate transmissions and, consequently, increasing the time between the arrivals
of consecutive messages.
Sequence-Number Diference (DiffFSN)
The Frame Sequence Number (FSN) is a numeration used to identify the sequencing of each
frame in the time scale. During a normal transmission, FSN values are expected to have
consecutive values on each radio link, unless any frame is lost or discarded at reception due to
data corruption. Looking at the difference between each data frame exchanged between each
node and the Access Point (AP), this metrics is able to reveal the lost of data frames due to
normal network congestion[49] or as consequence of a DoS attack coping with most of the
resources.
Throughput Rate (T)
As the name indicates, this metrics is the equivalent throughput rate registered by each node on
every sampling slot. This metrics belongs to the Physical (PHY) layer, making it very sensitive
to any changes produced on the physical communication channel such as physical obstacles
between node and AP affecting the radio signal characteristics, external radio interferences,
or the variations in the number of nodes competing for the same radio channel. However, this
metrics represent the most reliable figures to verify the side effects of a DoS, expecting abrupt
decreases on the registered throughput whenever a DoS attack is launched.
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3.5 Proposed metrics for DoS on LTE networks
Once the Wi-Fi metrics have been explained, three new metrics for detecting the RRC signalling
DoS attack in LTE networks are presented on this section. The three metrics have been specially
designed by the author of this thesis to characterise the particularities of the DoS attack studied,
being used for first time to target this attack to the best knowledge of this author.
All the metrics used for detecting the signalling attack are extracted from the same layer
in the LTE protocol stack [56], the RRC layer. Following the same reasoning described in
section 3.4, every metric presented on this section has a more descriptive long name, and
the actual name used across the different chapters of this thesis, which is mentioned between
brackets.
3.5.1 Metrics definition
Connection Release Rate (CRR)
Since the attacker will never be able to successfully complete the authentication phase, the
RRC connection will be closed with a rrcConnectionRelease message sent by the base station.
This would never happen in a normal node, because the RRC connectivity remains stable, even
in stand-by mode, unless the node were constantly performing handover to another base station.
CRR(x) =
#CRX
△T (3.24)
where
CRX = number of Connection Request messages on the current window
T = duration of the window
Average RRC Session Establishment (SMT)
A UE is considered to have established an RRC session once it is able to allocate a radio bearer
to initiate the RRC authentication phase. This metric evaluates the frequency of RRC session
established within a certain period of time. During the attack, all the attacking nodes will trigger
a new RRC session establishment every time the evolved-Node B (eNB) reject the previous
request due to incorrect challenge response or master key mismatch. Additionally, legitimate
session establishments might be triggered on already established RRC sessions whenever the
servicing network decides to reconfigure the link by reassigning a new bearer or changing
3.6 Summary 47
any additional parameter previously negotiated, affecting the effectiveness of this metric to
distinguish between rogue and legitimate node behaviour.
ASE(x) =
∑SEX
n2
(3.25)
where
SEX = average Session Establishment duration for the sliding window x.
n = number of sessions established on the current window.
Session Success Rate (SR)
This metrics evaluates the number of successful RRC sessions established between each node
and the serving eNB. Since the attacker nodes will not be able to complete any RRC session
establishment, this metrics is expected to contribute positively to characterise the attack and
reduce the uncertainty.
SSR(x) =
∑x0 #AA−∑x0 #AF
∑x0 #CR
(3.26)
where
AA = number of Attach Accepted messages sent on the current window.
AF = number of Attach Failure messages sent on the current window.
CR = total number of Connection Request messages registered on this window.
3.6 Summary
This chapter has defined the particularities of the detection algorithm presented on this thesis
compatible with virtual jamming attacks in IEEE 802.11 wireless networks, and RRC signalling
attacks in LTE cellular systems. The detection algorithm takes advantage of the automated BPA
function created by F. Aparicio-Navarro et al. [66] to automatically estimate the probabilities
of the three hypothesis evaluated on each scenario: the chances of having normal traffic, attack
traffic or uncertainty due to the lack of enough evidence. The detection process is completed
with the fuse of the source of evidence with D-S theory, producing a final outcome. To produce
the evidence of the attack, five metrics have been presented for wireless communications: CRC,
NAV, ∆Time, DiffFSN and T. In a similar manner, three new metrics have been introduced for
LTE systems: CRR, SMT and SR.

CHAPTER 4
Experimentation and result evaluation
4.1 Introduction
This chapter contains the analysis of results supporting the conclusions presented on this
thesis, including a technical description of the two test-beds and all the scenarios recreated for
collecting the datasets.
Section 4.2 defines the particularities of each test-bed and explains the design and imple-
mentation process to reproduce the selected Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In a brief manner,
the technical specifications are detailed for each network node, indicating its role on the attack
and additional configuration parameters required to complete the execution.
The results displayed on this chapter are a small sample of the entire dataset generated by
both test-beds. They are limited to the most representative cases for every scenario and the
optimal sliding window size deducted for each technology. Each case is analysed in section 4.3,
displaying a list of figures to reflect the evolution of the proposed metrics through all the phases
of the attack.
The study and interpretation of the presented figures concludes this chapter, revealing the
identification of patterns and node behaviours, and finally extracting conclusions from them.
4.2 Test-bed description
The first action of the experimental phase was the actual construction of the test-beds, which is a
crucial part of this research project and main element for producing the dataset required to study
both DoS attacks. As chapter 1 revealed, acquiring the necessary equipment for constructing an
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Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 network is an affordable and
straight forward task, imposing the only challenge of identifying a Wireless Network Interface
Controller (WNIC) chipset with a public source code for the driver controlling the wireless
card.
However, deploying a cellular network demands a costly investment on equipment and
represents a real legal challenge. The usage of radio spectrum is regulated by the Wireless
Telegraphy Act 2006 [72], requiring a licensed allocation of the radio spectrum prior any
emission over the frequencies used for 4th Generation of mobile communications (4G) systems.
Due to this impediment, the 4G test-bed was created using emulated hardware, which was
interconnected with wired connections and signal attenuation devices to reproduce real urban
propagation models.
The following paragraphs reveal the structure of each test-bed and present the list of
technical equipment selected for their construction. Additional configuration parameters are
also specified, including physical tampering and software-based amendments to reproduce
the desired conditions on the scenarios defined on the following section 4.3. Finally, the role
represented by each device on the attack is described, mentioning the software, scripts and
standard Linux commands required to perform it.
Fig. 4.1 IEEE 802.11 Test-bed Architecture
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4.2.1 IEEE 802.11 Test-bed
This test-bed reproduces a standard configuration of an IEEE 802.11 network, with a variation
on the number of mobile and static clients camping on it, and a single jamming node attacking
at specific time intervals. There are four main stations: a jammer node, a monitor node, a Fluke
Wireless Signal Analyser and client hosts; as described in figure 4.1.
Each station is configure as follows:
JAMMER
• This node runs on Linux Ubuntu 10.04 to meet the technical requirements and
guarantee compatibility with the legacy ar5k-driver developed by R.Flöter et al.
[73] for Atheros chipsets.
• The desktop computer was equipped with a WNIC using the Atheros 5100 chipset,
which is fully compatible with the aforementioned driver.
• Manipulating the source code, the Request-To-Send/Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS)
mechanism was redefined to avoid listening to the channel when a collision oc-
curs, and automatically set the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) duration to the
maximum value.
• The modified version of the driver was compiled and loaded into the kernel, forcing
an automated bound with the hardware during the OS booting process, replacing
the official driver included in the kernel by default.
MONITOR
• This station has the only functionality of monitoring the communications and
capturing all the network activity into a Packet Capture (PCAP) [74] file.
• The WNIC has the same Atheros chipset, which is configured in MONITOR MODE
to listen to the channel.
• Using the athstats command, which is provided by the ar5k-driver driver to gather
live statistics from the wireless interface card, the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)
errors are monitored through all the duration of the simulation.
FLUKE
• This device is a FLUKE Networks OptiView Series III Integrated Network Analyser,
model OPVS3GIGW, including the Wireless LAN Adapter required to monitor
wireless networks.
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• Similar to the monitor station, this node captures all the traffic in a PCAP file for
correlating the CRC error measurements with the Monitor node.
CLIENT
• The only function of this node is sending traffic through all the monitoring period.
• The traffic is generated artificially with the IPERF Linux command [75], which
sends User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic at a constant rate.
The second well-behaved station was added to evaluate the detection performance with
multiple clients located at different distances. The jammer station and both legitimate clients
were interconnected using a single Access Point (AP) to cover the room where the test-bed was
installed.
Monitoring the activity on the wireless network coverage area was conducted by two
different nodes: a dedicated equipment designed for advanced network monitoring, named as
FLUKE, which offers accuracy and reliable radio signal measurements; and a normal desktop
workstation equipped with the same Atheros chipset and the modified version of the ar5k-driver,
to guarantee the monitoring of all the CRC errors registered during the radio transmissions.
The changes applied on the drivers are explained in Appendix B. Data from both monitoring
stations was fused into a single PCAP file, using the timestamps to match the frames and merge
the information captured on them.
4.2.2 LTE Emulation Test-bed
In contrast with Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) technologies, reproducing a LTE network within
a research laboratory for experimental purposes is not a trivial task, due to the expensive
equipment required for it and the legal implications of using public radio spectrum without
the mandatory licenses. Researchers have been tackling this problem by establishing close
bonds with the industry and collaborating with MNOs to share their testing installations for
conducting research experiments. Additionally, there are several Long Term Evolution (LTE)
software-based simulators in the market able to produce reliable results, such as LTE-Sim [76],
NS3 [77] or OPNET [32], offering partial implementations of the LTE protocol and multiple
path-loss models to imitate the characteristic of the radio channel.
This research project was initially focused on implementing the selected DoS attack within
a simulated environment, aiming at verifying its feasibility beyond the theoretical approach,
and evaluating its impact on the core-network components. Using OPNET Modeler Suite,
it was possible to confirm the side effects that running the Radio Resource Control (RRC)
signalling attack could inflict on the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). Figure 4.2 shows the
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Fig. 4.2 CPU Utilisation Registered in the MME with 500 req/sec
Central Processing Unit (CPU) utilisation registered in the HSS, where the attack was able to
saturate the resource in a short period of time. Once the attack was stopped after 4 minutes, the
system quickly recovered back to its normal behaviour.
During this simulation, the attacker node was sending 500 RRC Connection Request
messages per second using different International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) values,
forcing the serving network to compute all the required cryptographic material to challenge the
User Equipment (UE) and verifying its legitimacy. However, OPNET was not able to provide
real traffic captures to be used when evaluating the proposed metrics to detect the attack. The
LTE modules were in an early stage and there were not plans in the development pipeline to
implement the additional traffic information for the lower layers in the protocol stack, which
was the main interest of this research project.
Due to the limitations with OPNET, a physical test-bed was designed using hardware-based
emulating equipment to run the required application-level services, and the core components
composing a 4G deployment: Evolved Packet Core (EPC) entities, Mobile Management Entity
(MME), evolved-Node B (eNB) and UE/s. The final architecture of the test-bed is displayed in
figure 4.3.
APP TRAFFIC GENERATOR
• The network traffic was managed in a Lenovo ThinkCentre M73 Tiny Desktop
PC, equipped with an Intel Core i3-4130T Processor (2.9GHz), 8 GB RAM and
Windows 7 Pro 64 bits.
• This host was configured to run an FTP server with Microsoft IIS 6.0, allowing the
UEs to perform file downloading via FTP to keep a continuous data flow through
all the duration of the emulation session.
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Fig. 4.3 LTE Test-bed Architecture
ENODE-B
• The RAN infrastructure was emulated using an LTE Enterprise Femtocell board,
manufactured by Mindspeed with model number M84300, including a Transcend
T3310 chipset for implementing all the standard LTE modulation schemes.
• The femtocell station was configured to have 3 sectors, requiring only one sector to
create a single cell for camping all the UEs required for conducting the experiments.
• All the communications between the femtocell and the UE emulator were performed
with wired connections and physical signal fading emulators, able to reproduce mul-
tiple radio path-loss schemes for signal attenuation. Free-space path-loss scheme
was selected for this test-bed, making the UE emulator responsible for implementing
the urban path-loss attenuation prediction on the registered radio measurements.
EVOLVED PACKET CORE (EPC)
• A single Aeroflex PXI 3000 modular platform was equipped with the Aeroflex LTE
Base Station RF Measurements modules for providing the EPC capabilities to the
test-bed.
• The equipment was configured to use FDD modulation for both downlink and
uplink.
• All the UEs were registered in the HSS with the same master key, facilitating the
implementation of the attack.
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UE EMULATOR
• The UE emulation was managed in an Aeroflex E500 Network Tester, able to
emulate the behaviour of up to 4000 UEs with the configuration used on this
test-bed: 4 x Aeroflex TM500 modules interconnected to each other.
• The data traffic load was generated on the UE side using a Spirent C50 TestCenter,
model number C50-KIT-04-START, with 4-port 10/1 Gbps Ethernet SFP able to
manage a volume of up to 40 Gbps.
• The TM500 was configured to emulate different groups of malicious and legitimate
UE nodes, as described in table 4.2.
4.3 Simulation scenarios
The simulation scenarios were designed to be compatible with the previously described test-
beds, aiming at covering a wide variety of real-life use cases. The selected set of scenarios
provides a rich dataset for each attack analysed, where edge cases are included to guarantee the
best characterisation of the attacks. Minor variations are added on each scenario, by changing
the number of active hosts, or their behaviour, to evaluate how efficient the proposed detection
algorithm is when adapting to different network traffic patterns.
The following section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 present each case studied and describe the required
physical and software amendments to run each experiment. Explanatory graphics are included
to represent the physical distribution of the equipment, as well as the main reasons for including
every case on the dataset and the technical configuration applied on the active nodes.
4.3.1 IEEE 802.11 Scenario Definition
The proposed detection algorithm requires an initial training phase where it is fed with normal
network traffic, as it is during this phase when the pattern for normality will be dynamically
constructed. Due to this requirement, all the scenarios have been designed to meet the following
three phases:
1. INITIAL PHASE
The client stations are booted and the data transmissions are initiated among all the active
nodes. This phase allows the detection algorithm to build a record of normal activity and
create the baseline for all the metrics monitored.
2. ATTACKING PHASE
The attacker station is enabled and the jamming frames are transferred through the
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communication channel. The attacker is configured to cope with all the available re-
sources and completely disrupt the communications of all the active clients throughout
the duration of this phase.
3. FINAL PHASE
The attacker is deactivated, leaving free the communication channel. This action will al-
low all the previously active nodes to proceed with their communications, and recovering
the normal activity of the network.
Each phase has been set to a duration of 30 seconds with the aim of proving the resilience
of the on-line detection algorithm for adapting to each phase and recover normality without
reducing the detection rate. In all the scenarios, the monitor node and the fluke station are
constantly sensing the channel and capturing all the activity on it.
Scenario Client Nodes Distance RTS/CTS IP Transport
1 1 x Static node 1m No UDP
2 1 x Static node 1m No UDP
1 x Static node 5m No UDP
3 1 x Mobile node - No UDP
4 2 x Mobile node - No UDP
5 1 x Static node 5m No UDP
1 x Mobile node - No UDP
6 1 x Static node 1m No UDP
1 x Mobile node - No UDP
7 1 x Static node 1m Yes UDP
8 1 x Static node 1m Yes UDP
1 x Static node 5m No UDP
9 1 x Static node 1m Yes UDP
1 x Static node 5m Yes UDP
10 1 x Static node 1m No UDP
1 x Static node 5m Yes UDP
11 1 x Static node 1m No TCP
12 1 x Static node 5m No TCP
Table 4.1 IEEE 802.11 Scenario Properties
The definition of each scenario takes into consideration the characteristic of the IEEE
802.11 standard and how the communication channel may be affected due to external factors.
The client stations are considered to be in a static mode whenever there is no movement through
all the duration of the experiments. In consequence, a client is considered a mobile node if it is
in constant movement while the experiment is being conducted. The movement does follow a
random direction and variable speed, reproducing a normal situation in real life.
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Furthermore, two different distances are considered when placing the static nodes on each
experiment: a short distance equal to 1m, and a long distance, which increases the separation
by 5 times. The distance indicates how far the nodes are from the serving AP. This value is
directly linked with the higher throughput a node can reach, due to the characteristics of the
radio channel and the higher probability of suffering collisions when sensing the channel.
The last variable to take into account is the activation of the RTS/CTS mechanism, which
forces the client node to listen the communication channel in search of any RTS and/or CTS
control frames, respecting the channel availability dictated by other node’s activity in the
network. This mechanism can be manually activated/deactivated on each node independently
of the role played on the experiment (attacker or client).
Table 4.1 provides a summary of all the evaluated scenarios, the number of active client
nodes and the partial/total utilisation of the RTS/CTS mechanism for the nodes involved in the
experiment.
The final two scenarios, scenario 11 and 12, evaluate the effects of the virtual jamming attack
when the application traffic is encapsulated in Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packages
[78], instead of UDP datagrams [79]. TCP transport layer requires of a successful three-way
handshake completion for establishing a TCP connection, making this communications more
vulnerable [80] from suffering the side effects of the DoS attack.
Scenario 1
Fig. 4.4 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 1
This scenario reproduces a single client station camping the WiFi network on a fixed
location close to the AP, with no mobility through all the duration of this experiment. There is
58 Experimentation and result evaluation
an inactive attacker node, which is temporary activated during the attacking phase, where the
node jams the communication channel uninterruptedly.
Although this scenario only includes a potential victim node, Client A, the jamming node
will manage to interrupt the communications not only to the active client, but also to any
potential node attempting to attach to the AP while the attacking phase is active.
Scenario 2
Fig. 4.5 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 2
In this scenario, a second client station is placed within the same Wi-Fi coverage area,
increasing the distance within client and AP. During the attacking phase, both client stations
are sending network traffic to the AP.
The attacker begins to jam the communication channel as soon as the attacking phase starts,
provoking collisions on the radio channel whenever there is an on-going active transmission
from/to the legitimate client nodes.
Scenario 3
Mobility is added into this scenario, using a single mobile node roaming around the AP coverage
area while sending network traffic to the AP. The addition of mobility eliminates the stability
on all the radio parameters of the WNIC, forcing the detection algorithm to dynamically evolve
the normality pattern to consider this new variable.
It is noteworthy mentioning the direct effect of adding mobility on the metrics used for
detecting the attack, having a less stable throughput through all the duration of the session,
as well as a potential increase of CRC errors due to higher number of radio signal reflections
affecting the radio bearer.
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Fig. 4.6 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 3
Scenario 4
A second mobile node is added to the coverage area on this scenario, moving independently
from each other across the room while following a random direction. Both nodes remains
active through all the session, emitting data traffic in an endless loop. As a result of having two
mobile nodes in constant data emission, the level of radio interferences increases with respect
to Scenario 3, having higher probabilities of CRC errors.
Fig. 4.7 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 4
Whenever the number of attached nodes is greater than one, the chances of suffering a
higher number of collisions increases due to the well-known hidden node problem [81]. This
phenomenon is specially harmful on this scenario, as the CTS/RTS mechanism is not enabled in
any of the active clients, increasing the chances of simultaneous emissions from nodes located
within the AP coverage area while being out of range from each other. This problem could lead
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the detection algorithm to misclassifying some of the frames emitted by legitimate nodes as
malicious, increasing the number of false alarms.
Other side effect to be considered is the longer waiting times imposed to the legitimate
nodes when accessing the radio channel, as the number of active stations competing for the
same communication channel has increased, having a direct impact in some of the metrics used
by the detection algorithm, such as the NAV and ∆ Time.
Scenario 5
Mobility remains active for one of the nodes on this scenario, placing the second node in a
fixed position within a long distance from the AP. The fixed node act as intended actor for
producing the hidden node problem whenever the mobile node exits its coverage range, as both
nodes have been configured to continuously transmitting data through all the duration of the
monitoring session.
Fig. 4.8 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 5
Following the same reasoning described in the previous Scenario 4, a higher number of
CRC errors are expected with a potential increase in the number of false alarms.
Scenario 6
This scenario reproduces the same conditions as Scenario 5, reducing the distance between the
AP and the fixed node by 3 times as it is represented in figure4.9.
The probabilities of suffering from the hidden node problem are reduced considerably with
regard to Scenario 5, although the threat remains active while having 2 active nodes and no
RTS/CTS mechanism in place.
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Fig. 4.9 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 6
Scenario 7
Introducing a new variable to the scenario, the RTS/CTS mechanism is enabled in a static node,
Client A, which is placed within a short distance from the AP. Since there is only one active
node in the wireless network, enabling the RTS/CTS mechanism will offer no benefit, as it
only causes additional frame transmissions without being required. Looking at the similarities
Fig. 4.10 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 7
between Scenario 1 and this scenario, which is depicted in figure 4.10, the detection algorithm
is expected to provide similar results. The only metric expected to be affected by the additional
transmission delays inflicted by the RTS/CTS mechanism, and the increase of the number of
frames transmitted, is the ∆ Time.
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Scenario 8
In a similar manner to Scenario 2, two static nodes named as Clients A and Client B are placed
within the same coverage area at a short and a long distance from the AP, respectively. Only
Client A, which is the closest node to the AP, has the RTS/CTS mechanism active. Whenever a
RTS/CTS frame is received in the AP, it will be broadcast to Client B, reducing the potential
collisions and CRC errors.
Fig. 4.11 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 8
However, Client B has the potential to provoke collisions, as no RTS/CTS control messages
will be preceding/concluding its data frame transmissions.
Scenario 9
Fig. 4.12 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 9
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Scenario 9 extends the conditions described in Scenario 8, to enable the RTS/CTS mecha-
nism on Client B, the fixed node located at the furthest distance from the AP.
Reduced number of collisions are expected, due to the lack of mobility in both legitimate
nodes and the additional safeguard measurement against the hidden node problem provided by
the RTS/CTS mechanism.
Scenario 10
The last scenario using UDP as transport protocol is Scenario 10. It reproduces the conditions
of Scenario 8, when only the static node located within a long distance from the AP has the
RTS/CTS mechanism activated. Protecting this node will minimise the probabilities of suffering
additional collisions in the communication channel.
Fig. 4.13 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 10
Scenario 11
A single node is camping the WiFi network, sending TCP traffic to the AP, which is located
within a short distance. The test-bed reproduces the same topology as in Scenario 1, modifying
the network transport protocol used to transmit the data. This change does not affect neither
the status of the lower layers in the protocol stack, physical and data link layer, nor the metrics
computed from the information gathered from these two layers.
However, the data throughput might be affected due to the additional data exchange required
for establishing a TCP session using the 3-way handshake [78].
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Fig. 4.14 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 11
Scenario 12
The last scenario, Scenario 12, evaluates the same conditions introduce in Scenario 11, reposi-
tioning the fixed node into a longer distance from the AP. The increase on the distance between
Fig. 4.15 IEEE 802.11 Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 12
the AP and the wireless node inflicts a variation in the radio signal strength on the physical
layer, affecting the maximum data throughput reachable during the transmission. In particular,
this scenario helps to understand how the establishment of a TCP communication session and
management of the connection aliveness could increase/reduce the effectiveness of the DoS
attack.
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4.3.2 LTE Scenario Definition
The complexity of the design proposed for the LTE scenarios is a reduced representation of a
commercial deployment, since the test-bed used is mainly composed with an LTE emulated
eNB connected to an emulated LTE core network. Due to the method selected for implementing
the RRC signalling attack, it is possible to identify two types of UE nodes: legitimate UEs,
using a valid master key (K) value and registered in the HSS as active subscribers; and rogue
UEs, which are also registered in the HSS and have been configured with an incorrect K value,
to force a failure during the establishment of a RRC session.
In a real-life attack, the attacker would perform exactly the same actions, as the only
information under its control would be the IMSI value of legimitate UEs, but it would not be
able to compromise the private K associated to every mobile subscriber.
Since the aim of a malicious user is to disrupt the service in the most efficient manner, the
attacker role was configured to be composed by multiple sets of rogue UEs acting as a single
attacker node. Only by having multiple rogue UEs attempting to establish RRC sessions in
parallel, it is possible to reproduce the equivalent network traffic volume produced by a single
attacking UE targeting a commercial LTE cell.
The ratio between legitimate and rogue nodes has been modified across the three scenarios,
as described in table 4.2 offering a wider vision of the impact on core equipment when the
rogue traffic load is equal and higher than the traffic generated by the legitimate UEs.
In contrast with the wireless scenario definition introduced in section 4.3.1, the duration of
initial and attacking phases is set to 30 seconds for the Scenario 1, and 5 minutes for Scenario
2 and Scenario 3; whereas the duration of the final phase varies on each scenario. Moreover,
the time allocated to the initial and attacking phases includes the time required for initiating the
legitimate and malicious UEs, having a gradual increase in the cellular network traffic received
at the eNB.
Scenario Legitimate UEs Rogue UEs Initial/Attack Phase Final Phase Total Duration
1 200 200 30 sec 95 sec 2 min 35 sec
2 50 450 300 sec 221 sec 13 min 41 sec
3 200 200 300 sec 431 sec 17 min 11 sec
Table 4.2 LTE Scenario properties
The attack duration represented in table 4.2 for the initial and attack phases is the total
duration of each phase individually, including the time required for booting all the UE nodes
participating in the emulation as legitimate and rogue UEs, respectively.
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Scenario 1
This scenario is composed by an equal number of legitimate and rogue nodes, located within
the same cell and attached to the same eNB. The aim of this scenario is to prove how effective
Fig. 4.16 LTE Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 1
the detection algorithm is when the network traffic load generated by the attacker and the
legitimate UEs has a similar magnitude. However, it is expected to register a higher number of
messages exchanged between the rogue nodes and the eNB, as the legitimate UEs only require
to establish an RRC session once. Meanwhile, the rogue UEs will continuously attempt to
establish new RRC sessions, triggering the exchange of multiple control frames. The duration
of the monitoring session has been reduced to less than 3 minutes to preserve the ratio of
control/data frames transmitted by legitimate and rogue UEs through all its duration.
Scenario 2
Using a higher proportion of rogue nodes, this scenario emulates the worse case when the rogue
network traffic overpasses the legitimate traffic through all the attacking period. The aim of this
case is to study the effectiveness of the detection algorithm constructing the normality pattern
when it is fed with a reduced number of legitimate samples. Due to the fact that the number of
attacker UEs is 9 times bigger than the legitimate nodes, this scenario presents a real challenge
for the detection mechanism.
Nonetheless, the duration of the emulation has been extended to guarantee enough iterations
for the normal buffer to construct the normality pattern, and measuring the recovery time
required until the detection rate becomes stable.
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Fig. 4.17 LTE Attack - Test-bed for Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Although this case has the same legitimate/rogue nodes ratio as described in figure 4.16,
Scenario 3 extends the emulation time for a longer period. Using a wider emulation duration,
the detection algorithm has additional time to recover normality once the attack has finished,
allowing a more accurate assessment of the detection efficiency.
During a longer monitoring session, it is also possible to challenge the detection algorithm
during the attacking phase, as the traffic load generated by legitimate and rogue UEs will evolve
during the five-minutes duration of this phase. At the beginning of the attacking phase, some
legitimate UEs are expected to produce similar control traffic loads as the rogue UEs, which
will be gradually enabled during the first 20 seconds. Once all the rogue nodes are active, their
traffic pattern will remain the same, while the legitimate UEs are expected to register higher
data traffic rates and minimal control traffic, to keep the RRC session active.
4.4 Results
The last section of this chapter contains a summary of the results collected for each technology,
using the test-bed described on section 4.2 to run a set of scenarios and collecting network
traffic from each node. The network traffic composes the dataset used for computing the
proposed metrics, and proceed with the evaluation of their effectiveness when being used for
detecting the DoS attacks targeted on this thesis.
The evaluation of the detection performance is conducted using different performance
indicators, which are introduced in Section 4.4.1, allowing a better understanding of the results
obtained on each scenario. The last requirement before proceeding with the detection of the
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attack on each experiments is the definition of the optimal Sliding Window (SW) size, as it
has to be tailored to the particular attack studied for an optimal detection performance. The
discussion and final establishment of the optimal size for the SW is conducted in Section 4.4.2.
Section 4.4.3 provides a summary of the most suitable set of metrics to detect the virtual
jamming attack across all the scenarios, highlighting other cases where the detection rate
remains within an acceptable ratio while adding modifications on the set of metrics used on the
detection.
In section 4.4.4, the results for the LTE signalling attack are studied following the same
approach applied for IEEE 802.11 and revealing the most suitable set of metrics for each
scenario presented. In contrast with the previous section, where a wide range of detection
performance rates are presented depending of the metrics evaluated on each analysis, the results
obtained for the LTE experiments have been proven an overall high effectiveness for identifying
the attack no matter the metric combination used.
4.4.1 Evaluating the Detection Performance
The data collected during the execution of the test cases was processed off-line for extracting
representative data and automate the calculation of each metric evaluated. Using the information
extracted from each frame, every metric was computed, and automated beliefs were assigned
for the three hypothesis: normal, attack or uncertainty; using the automated Basic Probability
Assignment (BPA) function introduced by K. Kyriakopoulos et al [69]. Using the computed
beliefs, a final decision is made for each frame to classify it as attack or not attack by fusing
the beliefs with D-S theory as indicated in the previous chapter 3.
Analysing the performance of the detection algorithm is a challenging process, requiring
the study of several parameters to better understand how effective the algorithm performs
when identifying the attack. Using multiple performance indicators, it is possible to avoid
constructing the analysis of the results with incomplete and/or misleading information.
This thesis evaluates the usual parameters applied for assessing result performance in
pattern recognition, data mining techniques and the statistical analysis of binary classifications
[82], as the final target of the detection algorithm is answering the attack/no attack hypothesis
for each frame.
The first step to evaluate the performance is the definition of the classification for all the
predictions of the algorithm into 4 categories:
TP: A True Positive event occurs whenever an attacker’s frame is correctly identified by the
detection algorithm as malicious.
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FP: A False Positive event indicates that the detection algorithm has misclassified a normal
frame as malicious, also named as Type-I error.
TN: A True Negative event is a successful classification of a normal frame by the detection
algorithm.
FN: A False Negative event is also called Type-II error, as it means that a malicious frame has
been missed by the detection algorithm, and incorrectly marked as normal.
Fig. 4.18 Graphical Representation of the Detection Performance Indicators
In the following figure 4.18, the population is represented by the final decision computed
by the algorithm for each frame registered in an specific scenario. The relevant items are the
values within the populations that falls into the ’attack’ category, no matter if they have been
successfully identified (TP) or misclassified by the algorithm (FN). The sample or selection is
composed by the results of the algorithm, with all the frames classified as ’attack’, including
both the TP and FP cases.
Using the definitions previously described, the following performance indicators can be
defined for evaluating the detection algorithm [82, 70]: Detection Rate (DR), False Positive
Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR). The DR, also known as True Positive Rate (TPR),
Recall or Sensitivity, indicates the proportion of malicious frames detected in comparison with
the total number of frames emitted by the attacker. This parameter offers a clear indication
of how efficient the detection algorithm is. However, this value is not able to provide a fair
assessment of the detection performance by itself and could lead to an error when analysed
individually, since it does not take into account the negative effects of misclassifying malicious
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frames as normal (FN), or the opposite case when a false alarm is raised (TN) as result of
applying the detection algorithm.
DR =
T P
T P+FN
(4.1)
FPR =
FP
TotalFrames
=
FP
T P+FP+T N+FN
(4.2)
FNR =
FN
T P+FN
(4.3)
This information has a direct impact into the overall detection performance and must
be taken into account when analysing the performance. Looking at the test evaluation in
pattern recognition theory [82] and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [83], it is possible to
judge the performance in a more complete manner by evaluating: the Overall Successful Rate
(OSR), also known as accuracy, which takes into account the correctly classified frames against
the total population; the Precision (P), also known as the Positive Predictive Value (PPV),
which evaluates the number of frames correctly classified malicious among the total of frames
classified as malicious by the algorithm; and finally, the F1-Score, also known as F-Score or
F-measure, which is the harmonic mean of the DR and Precision, and evaluates the balance
between these two parameters.
OSR =
T P+T N
T P+FP+T N+FN
(4.4)
P =
T P
T P+FP
(4.5)
F1−SCORE = 2∗P∗DRP+DR (4.6)
In general, high values of the DR and F1-Score indicates a good performance of the detection
algorithm. However, it is important to remark that the OSR parameter might cause confusion
and also lead to misinterpretation of the performance, since it assumes equal weight to both
types of errors (FP and FN), and the successful frame classifications (TP and TN). This might
cause the OSR to reach high values even when the DR is quite poor. Only the analysis of all the
parameters described on this section as a group provides a correct interpretation of the results.
4.4.2 Sliding Window Size
The detection algorithm rely on a pre-defined SW size, which must be optimised and tailored
for each technology to guarantee the highest efficiency on the detection rate. An initial analysis
of the SW size was conducted on every experimental scenario, for both cellular and wireless
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networks, covering multiple sizes within the range of 2 to 50 samples with 5 sample increments,
and all the distinct permutations in metric combinations. This analysis produced 341 and 77
combinations for each WiFi and LTE scenario, respectively, composing a dataset with 4092
and 231 evaluations of the proposed algorithm. Figure 4.19 and figure 4.20 show the results of
this analysis, displaying the average DR obtained when analysing the captured network traffic
on each test case for every different SW size and metric combination evaluated.
Fig. 4.19 IEEE 802.11 - Average Detection Rate based on Sliding Window Size
In general, the graphs show how the DR tends to stabilise for SW sizes equal or bigger
than 20 samples, while the maximum DR is obtained for lower sampling groups of 2-5 items.
However, using low sampling groups make the detection algorithm more vulnerable against
peak values on the DR, reducing its adaptability to pattern changes in the network traffic flows.
This is the reason for selecting the SW size with the highest DR right after the peak DR values
registered for the smaller SW sizes.
Following the same approach, if all the results are aggregated for every scenario into a
single graph, representing the average DR value grouped by SW size, a similar pattern is
revealed with a stabilisation point when the size is equal or bigger than 30 samples, represented
in the following figure 4.21 and figure 4.22.
Once all the cases have been grouped by the SW size, it is possible to identify that the SW
size of 20 samples seems to be the most optimal for the IEEE 802.11 test-bed, with the peak
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Fig. 4.20 LTE - Average Detection Rate based on Sliding Window Size
DR value once the algorithm has stabilised, having the lowest distance between the average
and mean DR value. However, the optimum size for the LTE test-bed seems to be when the
SW size is equal to 30 samples, as the graph represent a clear peak value of the DR after the
algorithm has stabilised.
In order to make the final decision, it is necessary to take into account all the performance
indicators described on section 4.4.1, as they help to reduce uncertainty and provide a more
accurate picture of the detection performance. Figure 4.23 support the selection of 20 SW size
as optimal value, where the average DR reaches its peak value of 25.63% while still having
an average F1-Score of 12.01%. Looking at the detection performance indicators for the LTE
experiments, represented in figure 4.24, the SW size of 30 samples remains the most optimal
with an average DR of 89.30% and F1-Score of 89.66%.
Although in all the figures included on this section the SW size of 2 and 5 samples obtain
a better DR and F1-Score, they are not considered optimal for a live IDS,. This is due to the
fact that having such a low size would make the system more vulnerable to peak values in the
metrics monitored, which could occur as part of a natural evolution of the node behaviour over
the time.
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Fig. 4.21 IEEE 802.11 - Global Average Detection Rate based on Sliding Window Size
Fig. 4.22 LTE - Global Average Detection Rate based on Sliding Window Size
4.4.3 IEEE 802.11 Results
Finally, this section provides a summary of the results collected while analysing each scenario,
showing the highest DR obtained on each case, and the most suitable metric combinations to
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Fig. 4.23 IEEE 802.11 - Global Detection Performance
Fig. 4.24 LTE - Global Detection Performance
accurately detect the virtual jamming attack as part of the security mechanism implemented on
an on-line IDS.
Nonetheless, the overall results for IEEE 802.11 networks can be summed up on table 4.3
with the individual analysis of the NAV metric, which provides the highest DR on all the
scenarios using the optimal SW size. This table also provides a view of the magnitude of data
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collected on each scenario, decomposing the total of frames captured into the basic performance
indicators of FP, FN, TP and TN.
Scenario # FP (%) FN(%) TP(%) TN(%) Total frames DR(%)
1 0.11 0.00 25.16 74.73 143,814 100.00
2 7.93 0.00 17.53 74.54 112,895 100.00
3 0.10 0.00 22.91 76.99 143,558 100.00
4 2.98 0.00 5.05 91.97 130,692 100.00
5 2.62 0.00 12.47 84.90 139,622 100.00
6 2.18 0.00 3.81 94.01 140,810 100.00
7 1.73 0.00 26.64 71.63 115,059 100.00
8 21.58 0.00 18.35 60.07 143,483 100.00
9 34.70 0.00 9.10 56.19 130,892 100.00
10 12.90 0.00 13.22 73.88 110,867 100.00
11 4.53 0.00 12.24 83.23 204,262 100.00
12 5.72 0.00 12.49 81.79 145,494 100.00
Table 4.3 Summary of the detection performance for IEEE 802.11
This case is based on a single metric, the NAV metric, allowing the detection of the attack
with a 100% accuracy on all the scenarios. The SW was configured with a size of 20 samples.
However, FP and FN ratios can be observed in most of the cases, being required a combina-
tion of metrics on the analysis for taking more reliable decisions not based in a single source of
evidence. Using multiple metrics in the analysis provides robustness to the detection process in
complex scenario where the uncertainty increases.
The following sections evaluate additional combinations of metrics and sliding sample
window, studying the results obtained and indicating the advantages and/or disadvantages
on each case. Further data collected during the experiments have been excluded from this
chapter due to space restrictions, and can be found in Appendix A. The original scripts used for
implementing the detection algorithm are also presented in Appendix B.
Scenario 1
The analysis of Scenario 1 reveals the most effective metric for detecting the WiFi DoS attack
studied on this thesis: the NAV. Looking at the processed results displayed in table 4.4, the
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individual analysis of the NAV metric provides the highest DR value, being able to identify
the majority of malicious frames for this scenario with an OSR of ∼99.89% and F1-Score of
∼99.78%.
Fig. 4.25 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 1 - NAV
Alternatively, the ∆ Time metric has proven very effective on this scenario, registering a
DR of 82.61% when used individually or as part of a set with the NAV metric. In both cases,
the OSR, Precision and F1-Score parameters registers the same value of ∼35.13%, ∼25.57%
and ∼39.05% respectively, which is an acceptable performance for a commercial IDS.
On the contrary, the poorest performance is achieved when the CRC metric is evaluated
individually, with a FNR rate of 100%, which indicates that all the malicious frames were
incorrectly tagged as normal. The OSR indicates a ∼72.60% success rate due to the correctly
classified normal frames (TN). This parameter might cause confusion due to the high value
registered, unless the Precision and F1-Score are also reviewed.
The OSR becomes more useful when analysing the other 14 metric combinations producing
the same 0% DR, where a slightly higher OSR of ∼74.85% is appreciated, in comparison with
the previously mentioned case. This difference is due to the error inflicted by the 2.24% FPR
when the detection algorithm only uses the CRC metric, which has been reduced to 0% causing
the proportional increase on the OSR.
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Fig. 4.26 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 1 - ∆ TIME
Fig. 4.27 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 1 - CRC
78 Experimentation and result evaluation
DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 0.113% 99.887% 99.551% 99.775% NAV
82.613% 17.387% 60.494% 35.132% 25.569% 39.052% ∆Time
82.613% 17.387% 60.494% 35.132% 25.569% 39.052% ∆Time,NAV
69.544% 30.456% 17.281% 75.058% 50.307% 58.382% ∆Time,T,NAV
39.840% 60.160% 17.249% 67.617% 36.749% 38.232% T, NAV
39.840% 60.160% 17.279% 67.588% 36.710% 38.211% ∆Time,T
39.818% 60.182% 17.249% 67.612% 36.736% 38.215% T
1.183% 98.817% 27.695% 47.447% 1.063% 1.120% DiffFSN
1.183% 98.817% 27.695% 47.447% 1.063% 1.120% DiffFSN, NAV
1.045% 98.955% 23.877% 51.230% 1.089% 1.066% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
1.045% 98.955% 23.877% 51.230% 1.089% 1.066% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.923% 99.077% 10.358% 64.719% 2.193% 1.299% T, DiffFSN, NAV
0.923% 99.077% 17.183% 57.894% 1.334% 1.091% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
0.923% 99.077% 17.183% 57.894% 1.334% 1.091% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.509% 99.491% 10.356% 64.617% 1.220% 0.718% T,DiffFSN
0.066% 99.934% 0.097% 74.764% 14.634% 0.132% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% T, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% T, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 74.845% 0.000% 0.000% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 2.240% 72.605% 0.000% 0.000% CRC
Table 4.4 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 1 with SW=20
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If the individual values registered for the NAV and ∆ Time are observed on Scenario 1,
represented in figure 4.25 and figure 4.26 respectively, a clear pattern arises for differentiating
normal and malicious frames. Looking at figure 4.27, where the values registered for the CRC
metric are plotted, the difficulty of discerning between anomaly and normal behaviour becomes
more obvious.
Scenario 2
In Scenario 2, the NAV metric registers a slightly lower F1-Score of ∼81.55% in comparison
with the previous Scenario, followed by the results provided by the ∆ Time metric, with a very
close ∼98.55% DR but less than half of the OSR and F1-Score. Surprisingly, the combination
of these two metrics does not improve the results produced when using the ∆ Time metric
individually, having exactly the same value on all the performance indicators.
Fig. 4.28 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 2 - CRC
The CRC metric remains the worst option with a higher Type-I error cases represented by the
FPR value of ∼15.03%. Excluding the individual metrics, the number of metric combinations
with poor performance equal to 0% DR has increased to 15, due to the addition of a secondary
client host into this scenario.
The detection algorithm now is fed with data frames coming from two different nodes,
increasing complexity for producing the normality pattern and leading to higher values of
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 7.931% 92.069% 68.845% 81.548% NAV
98.549% 1.451% 63.589% 36.157% 21.360% 35.110% ∆Time
98.549% 1.451% 63.589% 36.157% 21.360% 35.110% ∆Time,NAV
14.839% 85.161% 17.036% 68.038% 13.244% 13.996% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
2.765% 97.235% 6.844% 76.115% 6.612% 3.899% DiffFSN, NAV
2.719% 97.281% 16.511% 66.440% 2.805% 2.762% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
2.274% 97.726% 6.571% 76.302% 5.719% 3.254% DiffFSN
1.577% 98.423% 3.825% 78.926% 6.739% 2.556% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
1.021% 98.979% 1.946% 80.707% 8.420% 1.821% T, DiffFSN, NAV
0.986% 99.014% 3.655% 78.992% 4.513% 1.618% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
0.409% 99.591% 13.675% 68.871% 0.522% 0.459% T, NAV
0.409% 99.591% 19.880% 62.665% 0.360% 0.383% ∆Time,T
0.409% 99.591% 19.880% 62.665% 0.360% 0.383% ∆Time,T,NAV
0.030% 99.970% 1.850% 80.629% 0.286% 0.055% T,DiffFSN
0.030% 99.970% 11.605% 70.875% 0.046% 0.036% T
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% T, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% T, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 82.474% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.050% 82.423% 0.000% 0.000% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.348% 82.126% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.354% 82.120% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 15.025% 67.449% 0.000% 0.000% CRC
Table 4.5 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 2 with SW=20
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Fig. 4.29 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 2 - NAV
Fig. 4.30 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 2 - ∆ TIME
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FN events. The plots for the most characteristic metrics of this scenario are displayed in the
following figure 4.29, figure 4.30 and figure 4.28, with very similar patterns to the represented
for Scenario 1.
Scenario 3
The results collected on this scenario represent an important improvement on the overall
detection performance. Three metric combinations are able to produce a 100% DR when used
individually on the detection algorithm. The highest performance remains in the NAV metric
individually, with a ∼99.90% OSR value, F1-Score of ∼99.78% and minimal detection errors
with 0% FNR and only 0.1% FPR.
As it was initially predicted during the definition of the scenario, adding mobility to the
node could potentially increase the number of CRC errors registered. This is the reason why on
this scenario the CRC metric becomes more relevant and is able to provide a 100% DR when
analysed individually, besides of misclassifying some frames as FP. The FPR value of∼68.85%
is responsible for the significant decrease of the OSR, Precision and F1-Score indicators when
comparing this metric against the NAV metric. Combining the NAV and CRC metrics does not
improve the registered performance for the CRC metric individually.
Fig. 4.31 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 3 - CRC
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 0.102% 99.898% 99.555% 99.777% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 68.852% 31.148% 24.968% 39.959% CRC
100.000% 0.000% 68.852% 31.148% 24.968% 39.959% NAV, CRC
82.749% 17.251% 55.802% 40.246% 25.359% 38.822% ∆Time
82.749% 17.251% 55.802% 40.246% 25.359% 38.822% ∆Time,NAV
82.749% 17.251% 55.802% 40.246% 25.359% 38.822% ∆Time,CRC
82.749% 17.251% 55.802% 40.246% 25.359% 38.822% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
53.036% 46.964% 1.863% 87.377% 86.708% 65.815% ∆Time,T,NAV
53.036% 46.964% 1.863% 87.377% 86.708% 65.815% T, NAV, CRC
53.036% 46.964% 26.446% 62.793% 31.482% 39.510% ∆Time,T,CRC
53.036% 46.964% 26.446% 62.793% 31.482% 39.510% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
3.609% 96.391% 1.854% 76.062% 30.839% 6.462% T
3.609% 96.391% 1.854% 76.062% 30.839% 6.462% ∆Time,T
3.609% 96.391% 1.854% 76.062% 30.839% 6.462% T, NAV
3.609% 96.391% 1.854% 76.062% 30.839% 6.462% T, CRC
0.629% 99.371% 26.702% 50.531% 0.537% 0.580% DiffFSN
0.629% 99.371% 26.702% 50.531% 0.537% 0.580% DiffFSN, NAV
0.629% 99.371% 26.702% 50.531% 0.537% 0.580% DiffFSN, CRC
0.629% 99.371% 26.702% 50.531% 0.537% 0.580% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.547% 99.453% 12.807% 64.407% 0.970% 0.700% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.538% 99.462% 22.550% 54.662% 0.544% 0.541% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
0.538% 99.462% 22.550% 54.662% 0.544% 0.541% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.538% 99.462% 22.550% 54.662% 0.544% 0.541% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.538% 99.462% 22.550% 54.662% 0.544% 0.541% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.401% 99.599% 1.187% 75.993% 7.190% 0.760% T, DiffFSN, NAV
0.401% 99.599% 12.805% 64.375% 0.713% 0.514% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
0.401% 99.599% 12.805% 64.375% 0.713% 0.514% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.401% 99.599% 12.805% 64.375% 0.713% 0.514% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.401% 99.599% 12.805% 64.375% 0.713% 0.514% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.401% 99.599% 12.805% 64.375% 0.713% 0.514% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.036% 99.964% 1.179% 75.919% 0.704% 0.069% T,DiffFSN
Table 4.6 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 3 with SW=20
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On the forth position, the ∆ Time metric obtains a ∼82.75% DR with a higher OSR of
∼40.25%, improving the precision offered by the CRC or (NAV, CRC) metric combinations.
Furthermore, the F1-Score only decreases by 1%, a clear indicator of how effective this metric
is on this scenario.
Looking at the representation of the values registered on the CRC metric, it is possible to
identify a notorious increment on the CRC errors registered, with higher CRC values recorded
on figure 4.31.
Scenario 4
The predomination of the NAV metric is clear with a 100% DR and only 2.98% FPR, leading
to a very high OSR , with a value of 97.02%. The second best DR value is equally registered
for the ∆ Time metric when analysed individually or in combination with the NAV metric.
Fig. 4.32 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 4 - DiffFSN
The main change on this scenario is the modest ∼29.66% DR registered by the DiffFSN
metric, no matter if used individually or in combination with the NAV metric. This scenario
includes two different mobile nodes, increasing the chances of delays in the transmissions, and
potential frame lost or corruption when both nodes attempt to occupy the channel at the same
time. This phenomenon is also represented in the lower DR registered when using the CRC
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 2.980% 97.020% 62.869% 77.202% NAV
79.151% 20.849% 68.884% 30.064% 5.481% 10.251% ∆Time
79.151% 20.849% 68.884% 30.064% 5.481% 10.251% ∆Time,NAV
29.659% 70.341% 19.591% 76.859% 7.097% 11.454% DiffFSN
29.659% 70.341% 19.591% 76.859% 7.097% 11.454% DiffFSN, NAV
23.351% 76.649% 18.003% 78.129% 6.143% 9.727% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
23.351% 76.649% 18.003% 78.129% 6.143% 9.727% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
3.882% 96.118% 2.974% 92.175% 6.179% 4.768% ∆Time,T,NAV
3.169% 96.831% 6.517% 88.597% 2.395% 2.728% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
1.213% 98.787% 5.430% 89.585% 1.115% 1.162% T, DiffFSN, NAV
1.213% 98.787% 6.517% 88.498% 0.931% 1.053% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
0.334% 99.666% 5.151% 89.820% 0.326% 0.330% T,DiffFSN
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% T, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% T, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 94.954% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.018% 94.936% 0.000% 0.000% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.065% 94.889% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.068% 94.886% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.121% 94.833% 0.000% 0.000% T
0.000% 100.000% 0.152% 94.802% 0.000% 0.000% T, NAV
0.000% 100.000% 0.213% 94.741% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T
0.000% 100.000% 17.494% 77.459% 0.000% 0.000% CRC
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Fig. 4.33 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 4 - T
metric or the combination of (∆ Time, T), as the throughput fluctuates more with the constant
movement of both client nodes leading to an increase in the detection errors.
Figure 4.32 and figure 4.33 represent the values registered for the DiffFSN and T metric,
respectively.
Scenario 5
In a similar manner to Scenario 3, the outperforming metrics are the NAV and CRC, no matter
if they are analysed individually or combined. The ∆ Time metric provides a ∼80.83% DR,
registering the same performance when combined with the NAV and/or CRC metrics. However,
only the NAV metric is able to provide accuracy with ∼97.38% OSR and ∼82.63% precision
on the detection, while all the other aforementioned metric combinations only provide OSR
values below 25% with a Precision smaller than 15%.
The main reason to explain the lack of strong detection accuracy, whenever the DR falls
within acceptable values for a unsupervised on-line IDS, is the hidden node problem. This
scenario has a fixed node placed within a long distance from the AP, increasing the probabilities
of suffering from this problem as a secondary mobile node comped for the same resources with
an advantage position whenever it moves closer to the AP. The direct effect of the hidden node
problem is an increase on the collision throughout the duration of the monitoring period, which
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Fig. 4.34 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 5 - CRC
Fig. 4.35 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 5 - DiffFSN
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 2.623% 97.377% 82.626% 90.487% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 76.262% 23.738% 14.057% 24.649% CRC
100.000% 0.000% 76.262% 23.738% 14.057% 24.649% NAV, CRC
80.828% 19.172% 68.919% 28.690% 12.762% 22.044% ∆Time
80.828% 19.172% 68.919% 28.690% 12.762% 22.044% ∆Time,NAV
80.828% 19.172% 68.919% 28.690% 12.762% 22.044% ∆Time,CRC
80.828% 19.172% 68.919% 28.690% 12.762% 22.044% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
29.019% 70.981% 29.224% 61.922% 11.021% 15.975% ∆Time,T,NAV
29.019% 70.981% 29.224% 61.922% 11.021% 15.975% T, NAV, CRC
29.019% 70.981% 38.560% 52.586% 8.582% 13.246% ∆Time,T,CRC
29.019% 70.981% 38.560% 52.586% 8.582% 13.246% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
16.663% 83.337% 20.183% 69.422% 9.337% 11.968% DiffFSN
16.663% 83.337% 20.183% 69.422% 9.337% 11.968% DiffFSN, NAV
16.663% 83.337% 20.183% 69.422% 9.337% 11.968% DiffFSN, CRC
16.663% 83.337% 20.183% 69.422% 9.337% 11.968% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
13.614% 86.386% 18.776% 70.449% 8.294% 10.308% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
13.614% 86.386% 18.776% 70.449% 8.294% 10.308% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
13.614% 86.386% 18.776% 70.449% 8.294% 10.308% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
13.614% 86.386% 18.776% 70.449% 8.294% 10.308% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
11.817% 88.183% 16.784% 72.216% 8.073% 9.593% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
6.241% 93.759% 12.648% 75.658% 5.799% 6.012% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
6.241% 93.759% 12.648% 75.658% 5.799% 6.012% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
6.241% 93.759% 15.100% 73.204% 4.903% 5.492% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
4.823% 95.177% 6.998% 81.131% 7.917% 5.994% T, DiffFSN, NAV
4.823% 95.177% 12.648% 75.481% 4.541% 4.678% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
4.823% 95.177% 12.648% 75.481% 4.541% 4.678% T, DiffFSN, CRC
3.445% 96.555% 29.210% 58.746% 1.450% 2.041% T
3.445% 96.555% 29.210% 58.746% 1.450% 2.041% ∆Time,T
3.445% 96.555% 29.210% 58.746% 1.450% 2.041% T, NAV
3.445% 96.555% 29.210% 58.746% 1.450% 2.041% T, CRC
1.476% 98.524% 6.985% 80.725% 2.568% 1.874% T,DiffFSN
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can be observed on figure 4.34 where the CRC metric is represented. This problem also have a
lower impact on the DiffFSN metric, as shown in figure 4.35.
Scenario 6
The similarities between Scenario 6 and the previous results obtained on Scenario 5 is obvious,
and can be easily understood by looking at the changes applied on the definition of each
scenario. In Scenario 6, the mobile node remains intact, whereas the fixed node is moved to a
position 5 times closer to the AP. The hidden node problem reduces its probability considerably,
and it has a direct effect on the results obtained for the NAV metric, with a minimal 2.18% FPR
with 100% DR.
Fig. 4.36 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 6 - DiffFSN
The CRC metric is able to register 100% DR when evaluated independently or in combina-
tion with the NAV metric, although the FPR increases by 3% in comparison with the previous
scenario. On the contrary, the combinations including the ∆ Time metric suffer a general
improvement on its performance and accuracy, with a lower FNR rate which causes an increase
of nearly 8% for the best case, the metric set of (∆ Time, NAV).
The worse performance is obtained when using the T metric, with a small ∼2.78% DR and
very high FNR/FPR, with a value of 97.22% and 36.48% respectively. A slightly improvement
can be seen in the representation of the DiffFSN metric on figure 4.36.The T metric, plotted
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 2.180% 97.820% 63.625% 77.769% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 79.704% 20.296% 4.565% 8.731% CRC
100.000% 0.000% 79.704% 20.296% 4.565% 8.731% NAV, CRC
98.398% 1.602% 63.578% 36.361% 5.571% 10.546% ∆Time,NAV
98.398% 1.602% 71.825% 28.113% 4.963% 9.450% ∆Time,CRC
98.398% 1.602% 71.825% 28.113% 4.963% 9.450% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
75.671% 24.329% 63.542% 35.530% 4.343% 8.214% ∆Time
56.986% 43.014% 45.340% 53.020% 4.572% 8.465% ∆Time,T,NAV
56.986% 43.014% 52.978% 45.382% 3.939% 7.369% T, NAV, CRC
56.986% 43.014% 64.295% 34.065% 3.268% 6.182% ∆Time,T,CRC
56.986% 43.014% 64.295% 34.065% 3.268% 6.182% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
48.342% 51.658% 36.567% 61.464% 4.798% 8.730% T, NAV
48.342% 51.658% 52.928% 45.103% 3.365% 6.292% T, CRC
46.740% 53.260% 45.049% 52.920% 3.805% 7.037% ∆Time,T
36.494% 63.506% 16.973% 80.606% 7.576% 12.547% DiffFSN
36.494% 63.506% 16.973% 80.606% 7.576% 12.547% DiffFSN, NAV
36.494% 63.506% 16.973% 80.606% 7.576% 12.547% DiffFSN, CRC
36.494% 63.506% 16.973% 80.606% 7.576% 12.547% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
35.898% 64.102% 15.564% 81.993% 8.082% 13.194% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
35.898% 64.102% 15.564% 81.993% 8.082% 13.194% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
35.898% 64.102% 15.564% 81.993% 8.082% 13.194% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
35.898% 64.102% 15.564% 81.993% 8.082% 13.194% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
30.496% 69.504% 12.682% 84.668% 8.397% 13.168% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
29.937% 70.063% 11.184% 86.145% 9.260% 14.144% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
21.498% 78.502% 9.316% 87.691% 8.086% 11.752% T, DiffFSN, NAV
21.498% 78.502% 11.180% 85.827% 6.830% 10.366% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
21.498% 78.502% 11.180% 85.827% 6.830% 10.366% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
21.498% 78.502% 11.180% 85.827% 6.830% 10.366% T, DiffFSN, CRC
21.498% 78.502% 11.190% 85.818% 6.824% 10.360% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
19.449% 80.551% 9.311% 87.618% 7.375% 10.695% T,DiffFSN
2.776% 97.224% 36.487% 59.807% 0.289% 0.524% T
Table 4.9 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 6 with SW=20
4.4 Results 91
Fig. 4.37 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 6 - T
on figure 4.37 does not provide a clear distinction between the values registered during the
attacking phase and the initial/normal phases, explaining why the individual use of this metric
does not provide successful detection results.
Scenario 7
The major novelty on this case is the incorporation of the RTS/CTS mechanism in the single
active node of this scenario. This mechanism has a clear impact on the most efficient metric
identified for this case: NAV, ∆ Time and T. The three metrics have been represented in
figure 4.38, figure 4.39 and figure 4.40.
The combinations of the ∆ Time metric with the NAV metric does not have any impact
on its performance. Similarly, the four combinations evaluated with the T metric: (∆ Time,
T), (T, NAV) and (∆ Time, T, NAV); matches their detection performance and accuracy, with
a ∼67.05% DR and ∼55.47% OSR. The FNR and FPR values remain within the 30-40%
interval.
Since the RTS/CTS mechanism aims at preventing collisions from happening, it is expected
for the CRC metric to play a secondary role on this scenario. The highest DR is reached with
the metric combination (∆ Time, T, DiffFSN, NAV).
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Fig. 4.38 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 7 - NAV
Fig. 4.39 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 7 - ∆ TIME
4.4 Results 93
DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 1.733% 98.267% 93.892% 96.850% NAV
85.880% 14.120% 60.023% 36.215% 27.597% 41.771% ∆Time
85.880% 14.120% 60.023% 36.215% 27.597% 41.771% ∆Time,NAV
67.052% 32.948% 35.751% 55.472% 33.317% 44.515% T
67.052% 32.948% 35.751% 55.472% 33.317% 44.515% ∆Time,T
67.052% 32.948% 35.751% 55.472% 33.317% 44.515% T, NAV
67.052% 32.948% 35.751% 55.472% 33.317% 44.515% ∆Time,T,NAV
1.905% 98.095% 9.988% 63.880% 4.836% 2.734% DiffFSN
1.905% 98.095% 9.988% 63.880% 4.836% 2.734% DiffFSN, NAV
1.595% 98.405% 7.897% 65.889% 5.107% 2.431% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
1.595% 98.405% 7.897% 65.889% 5.107% 2.431% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
1.272% 98.728% 4.754% 68.945% 6.655% 2.136% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
1.266% 98.734% 4.075% 69.623% 7.642% 2.172% T, DiffFSN, NAV
1.266% 98.734% 4.745% 68.952% 6.635% 2.126% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
1.263% 98.737% 2.995% 70.702% 10.097% 2.245% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
1.263% 98.737% 4.062% 69.635% 7.647% 2.167% T,DiffFSN
0.444% 99.556% 0.043% 73.436% 73.514% 0.882% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.444% 99.556% 2.891% 70.588% 3.928% 0.797% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% T, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% T, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 73.361% 0.000% 0.000% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.000% 100.000% 2.363% 70.997% 0.000% 0.000% CRC
Table 4.10 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 7 with SW=20
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Fig. 4.40 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 7 - T
Scenario 8
As previously, the most effective metrics for detecting the attack are NAV and CRC, and
the combination of them into a single set of metrics. The DR is 100%, with no FN cases
registered. However, when using the CRC individually or in combination with the NAV metric,
the accuracy decreases due to the number of cases misclassified as FP.
This scenario is also vulnerable to the hidden node problem, as the RTS/CTS mechanism
has only been enabled in the closest node to the AP located on a fixed position.
The combination of the NAV metric with the (∆ Time reduces the DR by (∼16.30%, as
well as decrementing the FPR, which is compensated by an increment of the FNR that decrease
the Precision of the detection.
The high values of FNR and FPR are self-explained when observing the figure 4.41 and
figure 4.42, were minimal differences can be identified for the attacker traffic and the normal
traffic (prior and during the attacking phase), in a quick look at the metric values registered.
Figure 4.43 shows the level of uncertainty inflicted by the T metric, with the worse per-
formance obtained for this scenario when combined with the DiffFSN metric. The DR and
accuracy only offer a slightly better performance whenever the DiffFSN metric is used individ-
ually.
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 21.582% 78.418% 45.948% 62.965% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 69.363% 30.637% 20.917% 34.597% CRC
100.000% 0.000% 69.363% 30.637% 20.917% 34.597% NAV, CRC
83.706% 16.294% 53.807% 43.204% 22.203% 35.097% ∆Time,NAV
83.706% 16.294% 60.269% 36.742% 20.306% 32.684% ∆Time,CRC
83.706% 16.294% 60.269% 36.742% 20.306% 32.684% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
65.996% 34.004% 50.565% 43.197% 19.319% 29.888% ∆Time
50.397% 49.603% 38.815% 52.085% 19.238% 27.846% T, NAV, CRC
37.188% 62.812% 28.345% 60.132% 19.400% 25.498% T, NAV
37.188% 62.812% 34.471% 54.005% 16.522% 22.879% T, CRC
34.103% 65.897% 29.720% 58.191% 17.391% 23.035% ∆Time,T,NAV
34.103% 65.897% 39.264% 48.647% 13.744% 19.592% ∆Time,T,CRC
34.103% 65.897% 39.265% 48.646% 13.744% 19.592% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
20.894% 79.106% 25.370% 60.118% 13.126% 16.123% T
20.894% 79.106% 25.377% 60.111% 13.123% 16.121% ∆Time,T
4.715% 95.285% 10.764% 71.754% 7.437% 5.771% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
2.336% 97.664% 15.872% 66.210% 2.629% 2.474% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
1.987% 98.013% 15.354% 66.665% 2.319% 2.140% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
1.634% 98.366% 13.510% 68.444% 2.170% 1.864% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
1.634% 98.366% 15.303% 66.651% 1.921% 1.766% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
1.041% 98.959% 8.517% 73.329% 2.193% 1.412% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.733% 99.267% 6.938% 74.852% 1.902% 1.058% T, DiffFSN, NAV
0.733% 99.267% 8.108% 73.682% 1.632% 1.012% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.688% 99.312% 7.257% 74.524% 1.709% 0.981% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.688% 99.312% 9.127% 72.653% 1.363% 0.914% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.653% 99.347% 6.823% 74.952% 1.727% 0.948% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
0.456% 99.544% 7.416% 74.322% 1.115% 0.647% DiffFSN, NAV
0.456% 99.544% 15.473% 66.265% 0.538% 0.493% DiffFSN, CRC
0.395% 99.605% 12.952% 68.774% 0.557% 0.462% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
0.338% 99.662% 5.714% 76.002% 1.074% 0.514% DiffFSN
0.304% 99.696% 6.594% 75.116% 0.838% 0.446% T,DiffFSN
Table 4.11 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 8 with SW=20
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Fig. 4.41 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 8 - CRC
Fig. 4.42 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 8 - DiffFSN
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Fig. 4.43 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 8 - T
Scenario 9
During the definition of this scenario, the benefits of enabling the RTS/CTS mechanism in
all the active clients were described. This effect is the reason why the detection performance
suffers an important improvement in comparison with Scenario 8.
However, the highest F1-Score value is not registered when using the NAV metric on this
occasion, as it is obtained when evaluating the set of metrics composed by the combination (∆
Time, NAV, CRC). The OSR value is ∼69.03%, 4% below the value obtained when using NAV
metric individually.
The minimum DR obtained occurs when using the (∆ Time, DiffFSN) metric combination.
Figure 4.44 and figure 4.45 represent the values obtained for these two metrics, where the
DiffFSN values are very similar for normal and attack frames through all the attacking phase.
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Fig. 4.44 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 9 - ∆ TIME
Fig. 4.45 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 9 - DiffFSN
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 34.703% 65.297% 20.777% 34.406% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 34.703% 65.297% 20.777% 34.406% NAV, CRC
100.000% 0.000% 81.489% 18.512% 10.047% 18.259% CRC
91.027% 8.973% 30.157% 69.026% 21.551% 34.851% ∆Time,NAV
91.027% 8.973% 30.157% 69.026% 21.551% 34.851% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
91.027% 8.973% 69.941% 29.242% 10.591% 18.974% ∆Time
91.027% 8.973% 69.941% 29.242% 10.591% 18.974% ∆Time,CRC
43.952% 56.048% 16.660% 78.239% 19.362% 26.882% ∆Time,T,NAV
43.952% 56.048% 16.660% 78.239% 19.362% 26.882% T, NAV, CRC
43.952% 56.048% 16.660% 78.239% 19.362% 26.882% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
43.952% 56.048% 40.778% 54.121% 8.933% 14.849% ∆Time,T,CRC
28.079% 71.921% 11.888% 81.567% 17.694% 21.708% T, NAV
28.079% 71.921% 33.086% 60.368% 7.170% 11.423% ∆Time,T
28.079% 71.921% 33.086% 60.368% 7.170% 11.423% T, CRC
28.045% 71.955% 33.065% 60.386% 7.166% 11.416% T
16.889% 83.111% 6.544% 85.891% 19.021% 17.892% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
15.538% 84.462% 5.852% 86.461% 19.462% 17.280% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
15.538% 84.462% 5.852% 86.461% 19.462% 17.280% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
15.538% 84.462% 12.852% 79.461% 9.913% 12.104% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
13.355% 86.645% 5.560% 86.554% 17.941% 15.312% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
5.129% 94.871% 3.178% 88.187% 12.807% 7.324% T, DiffFSN, NAV
5.129% 94.871% 3.178% 88.187% 12.807% 7.324% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
5.129% 94.871% 3.178% 88.187% 12.807% 7.324% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
5.129% 94.871% 7.976% 83.389% 5.529% 5.321% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
5.129% 94.871% 7.976% 83.389% 5.529% 5.321% T, DiffFSN, CRC
5.129% 94.871% 7.976% 83.389% 5.529% 5.321% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
1.570% 98.430% 3.909% 87.132% 3.526% 2.172% T,DiffFSN
1.284% 98.716% 1.674% 89.342% 6.527% 2.146% DiffFSN, NAV
1.284% 98.716% 4.504% 86.511% 2.530% 1.704% DiffFSN
1.284% 98.716% 4.504% 86.511% 2.530% 1.704% DiffFSN, CRC
1.158% 98.842% 4.273% 86.731% 2.408% 1.564% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
Table 4.12 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 9 with SW=20
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Scenario 10
Looking at the results presented in table 4.13, enabling the RTS/CTS mechanism in the node
positioned at the farthest distance from the AP has a minimal effect on the CRC and (NAV,CRC)
metric combinations. If the results obtained are compared with Scenario 8, where the RTS/CTS
mechanism was enabled in the client located at a short distance from the AP, it is possible to
differentiate a minor increase on the FPR accompanied by a reduction of the FNR. Obviously,
these two parameters are directly related with the Type-I and Type-II errors, extending the
negative effect on the parameters measuring the detection accuracy: OSR, Precision and
F1-Score.
Fig. 4.46 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 10 - T
On the contrary, the single NAV metric enhances its detection performance on this scenario,
with a 10% reduction of the FPR value, directly translated to the OSR.
The negative effect of the T metric remains active, specially when combined with DiffFSN,
CRC and/or ∆ Time in metric sets of 2-3 metrics, registering a FNR close to 100% on the
combination displayed towards the end of the table.
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 12.894% 87.106% 50.630% 67.225% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 80.995% 19.005% 14.034% 24.614% CRC
100.000% 0.000% 80.995% 19.005% 14.034% 24.614% NAV, CRC
84.209% 15.791% 64.121% 33.791% 14.796% 25.170% ∆Time,NAV
84.209% 15.791% 72.737% 25.175% 13.276% 22.936% ∆Time,CRC
84.209% 15.791% 72.737% 25.175% 13.276% 22.936% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
76.685% 23.315% 62.469% 34.448% 13.965% 23.628% ∆Time
71.698% 28.302% 42.821% 53.437% 18.127% 28.938% T, NAV, CRC
55.907% 44.093% 41.500% 52.669% 15.120% 23.803% ∆Time,T,NAV
55.907% 44.093% 45.150% 49.020% 14.070% 22.482% ∆Time,T,CRC
55.907% 44.093% 45.150% 49.020% 14.070% 22.482% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
35.900% 64.100% 40.588% 50.936% 10.471% 16.213% T, NAV
35.900% 64.100% 40.611% 50.913% 10.466% 16.207% ∆Time,T
35.900% 64.100% 40.611% 50.913% 10.466% 16.207% T, CRC
35.873% 64.127% 40.586% 50.935% 10.465% 16.203% T
11.030% 88.970% 7.692% 80.543% 15.939% 13.038% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
9.693% 90.307% 9.864% 78.195% 11.500% 10.519% DiffFSN
9.693% 90.307% 9.864% 78.195% 11.500% 10.519% DiffFSN, NAV
9.693% 90.307% 9.864% 78.195% 11.500% 10.519% DiffFSN, CRC
9.693% 90.307% 9.864% 78.195% 11.500% 10.519% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
8.315% 91.685% 9.030% 78.847% 10.855% 9.417% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
8.315% 91.685% 9.030% 78.847% 10.855% 9.417% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
8.315% 91.685% 9.030% 78.847% 10.855% 9.417% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
8.315% 91.685% 9.030% 78.847% 10.855% 9.417% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
8.036% 91.965% 7.450% 80.389% 12.481% 9.777% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
7.606% 92.394% 7.172% 80.611% 12.299% 9.399% T, DiffFSN, NAV
7.606% 92.394% 7.348% 80.434% 12.038% 9.322% T, DiffFSN, CRC
6.658% 93.342% 6.616% 81.041% 11.743% 8.498% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
6.658% 93.342% 7.532% 80.126% 10.465% 8.138% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
6.228% 93.772% 6.514% 81.086% 11.223% 8.011% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
4.045% 95.955% 7.120% 80.192% 6.987% 5.124% T,DiffFSN
Table 4.13 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 10 with SW=20
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Scenario 11
This scenario replaces the use of UDP as transport protocol, to force the establishment of TCP
sessions prior to sharing any data between AP and client node. In a first sigh to the results, the
change introduce has a direct impact in most of the combinations, triggering the FNR to its
highest value in most cases. Only the first 6 combinations of the table 4.14 are able to detect
the attack with 100% DR.
Fig. 4.47 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 11 - CRC
If a threshold is set in the accuracy of the detection performance, only the NAV and (NAV,
CRC) metric combinations are able to produce an acceptable Precision and OSR, which is
supported by a F1-Score higher than 80%.
The CRC metric obtains the worse results, with a 100% FNR and 0% DR, registering the
measurements depicted in figure 4.47.
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 4.528% 95.472% 72.999% 84.392% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 4.528% 95.472% 72.999% 84.392% NAV, CRC
100.000% 0.000% 85.526% 14.473% 12.521% 22.255% ∆Time
100.000% 0.000% 85.526% 14.473% 12.521% 22.255% ∆Time,NAV
100.000% 0.000% 85.526% 14.473% 12.521% 22.255% ∆Time,CRC
100.000% 0.000% 85.526% 14.473% 12.521% 22.255% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
0.580% 99.420% 10.591% 77.238% 0.666% 0.620% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.580% 99.420% 10.591% 77.238% 0.666% 0.620% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.348% 99.652% 5.777% 82.024% 0.732% 0.472% DiffFSN, NAV
0.348% 99.652% 5.777% 82.024% 0.732% 0.472% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.348% 99.652% 10.309% 77.492% 0.411% 0.377% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
0.348% 99.652% 10.309% 77.492% 0.411% 0.377% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.332% 99.668% 5.764% 82.035% 0.700% 0.450% DiffFSN
0.332% 99.668% 5.764% 82.035% 0.700% 0.450% DiffFSN, CRC
0.188% 99.812% 0.725% 87.057% 3.078% 0.354% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.188% 99.812% 0.725% 87.057% 3.078% 0.354% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.168% 99.832% 0.418% 87.361% 4.688% 0.324% T, DiffFSN, NAV
0.168% 99.832% 0.418% 87.361% 4.688% 0.324% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.168% 99.832% 0.658% 87.121% 3.030% 0.318% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
0.168% 99.832% 0.658% 87.121% 3.030% 0.318% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.112% 99.888% 7.249% 80.523% 0.189% 0.141% T, NAV
0.112% 99.888% 7.249% 80.523% 0.189% 0.141% T, NAV, CRC
0.112% 99.888% 16.634% 71.138% 0.082% 0.095% ∆Time,T
0.112% 99.888% 16.634% 71.138% 0.082% 0.095% ∆Time,T,NAV
0.112% 99.888% 16.634% 71.138% 0.082% 0.095% ∆Time,T,CRC
0.112% 99.888% 16.634% 71.138% 0.082% 0.095% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
0.036% 99.964% 0.372% 87.391% 1.172% 0.070% T,DiffFSN
0.036% 99.964% 0.372% 87.391% 1.172% 0.070% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.036% 99.964% 5.322% 82.441% 0.083% 0.050% T
0.036% 99.964% 5.322% 82.441% 0.083% 0.050% T, CRC
0.000% 100.000% 2.222% 85.536% 0.000% 0.000% CRC
Table 4.14 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 11 with SW=20
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Scenario 12
The last scenario represented on the dataset presents the same characteristics as Scenario 11,
increasing the distance between AP and active client host by 5 times. The detection performance
shows a satisfactory improvement among all the metric combinations evaluated.
The biggest improvement is produced in the CRC metric, reporting a 100% DR with
∼13.19% Precision caused by the errors reported on the FPR, which has a value of ∼82.25%.
The graphical representation of the collected metric values through the duration of the experi-
ment reveal a clean pattern, which is represented in figure 4.48, is the main cause of the massive
improvement experienced by this metric.
Fig. 4.48 Metric for IEEE802.11 Scenario 12 - CRC
The increase on the distance between the AP and the client causes a natural increase in
the CRC errors registered. Since the TCP implement its own mechanism for detecting data
frames discarded in transmission in both directions, it also increases the number of data frames
required to transmit the same information. Due to that, the probability of CRC errors during the
attacking phase is higher, converting this metric in an important indicator to identify the attack.
The rest of the other metrics remains offering a very similar detection performance with a
minimal improvement with regard to the analysis described in section 4.4.3.
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DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 5.715% 94.285% 68.612% 81.384% NAV
100.000% 0.000% 81.449% 18.552% 13.299% 23.475% ∆Time
100.000% 0.000% 81.449% 18.552% 13.299% 23.475% ∆Time,NAV
100.000% 0.000% 81.449% 18.552% 13.299% 23.475% ∆Time,CRC
100.000% 0.000% 81.449% 18.552% 13.299% 23.475% ∆Time,NAV,CRC
100.000% 0.000% 82.245% 17.755% 13.187% 23.301% CRC
100.000% 0.000% 82.245% 17.755% 13.187% 23.301% NAV, CRC
68.469% 31.531% 26.592% 69.469% 24.338% 35.911% ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
3.136% 96.864% 20.065% 67.834% 1.915% 2.378% ∆Time,T,NAV
3.136% 96.864% 20.065% 67.834% 1.915% 2.378% T, NAV, CRC
3.136% 96.864% 26.099% 61.800% 1.479% 2.010% ∆Time,T,CRC
1.865% 98.135% 5.946% 81.795% 3.771% 2.496% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
1.651% 98.349% 3.620% 84.093% 5.389% 2.527% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV
1.651% 98.349% 3.643% 84.070% 5.356% 2.523% DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
1.651% 98.349% 5.888% 81.825% 3.383% 2.219% ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
1.469% 98.531% 1.760% 85.931% 9.441% 2.542% DiffFSN, NAV
1.469% 98.531% 3.617% 84.075% 4.829% 2.253% ∆Time,Di f f FSN
1.469% 98.531% 3.640% 84.051% 4.800% 2.249% DiffFSN, CRC
1.122% 98.878% 1.759% 85.889% 7.383% 1.949% DiffFSN
0.880% 99.120% 2.749% 84.868% 3.846% 1.433% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
0.748% 99.252% 1.278% 86.323% 6.817% 1.348% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV
0.748% 99.252% 1.278% 86.323% 6.817% 1.348% T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
0.748% 99.252% 1.802% 85.799% 4.931% 1.299% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
0.242% 99.758% 17.036% 70.501% 0.177% 0.205% T, NAV
0.242% 99.758% 19.093% 68.445% 0.158% 0.191% ∆Time,T
0.242% 99.758% 19.093% 68.445% 0.158% 0.191% T, CRC
0.066% 99.934% 0.962% 86.554% 0.850% 0.123% T, DiffFSN, NAV
0.066% 99.934% 1.147% 86.369% 0.714% 0.121% ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN
0.066% 99.934% 1.147% 86.369% 0.714% 0.121% T, DiffFSN, CRC
0.055% 99.945% 16.682% 70.833% 0.041% 0.047% T
0.022% 99.978% 0.909% 86.601% 0.301% 0.041% T,DiffFSN
Table 4.15 Results for IEEE 802.11 Scenario 12 with SW=20
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4.4.4 LTE Results
The results obtained for the LTE test-bed provide enough evidence to confirm the effectiveness
of the proposed metrics on detecting the attack. All the metric combinations evaluated provide
an accurate detection performance and reasonable FPR/FNR values, indicating the suitability
of the proposed metrics for characterising the DoS Signalling attack studied on this thesis.
Although the metrics have only been evaluated in three scenarios, the strong accuracy of
the results obtained makes the detection algorithm an efficient and lightweight on-line IDS able
to be implemented in a real 4G deployment.
Scenario 1
The first scenario is the most simple one, with a small duration and equal number of legitimate
and rogue UEs. Table 4.16 shows a summary of the detection performance obtained for every
possible combination of the three metrics, revealing a fantastic performance.
The highest DR is obtained when using the Connection Release Rate (CRR) metric indi-
vidually, with a 98.1% DR and minimal detection errors, represented on the 1.91% FNR and
11.53% FPR. The detection failures affect negatively to the OSR parameter, due to the impact
of the FN and FP cases, but the F1-Score remains above 90%.
DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
98.095% 1.905% 11.526% 87.227% 84.774% 90.949% CRR
97.143% 2.857% 23.988% 74.143% 72.598% 83.096% CRR, SMT
96.190% 3.810% 0.000% 97.508% 100.000% 98.058% CRR, SR
88.571% 11.429% 11.526% 80.997% 83.408% 85.912% CRR, SMT, SR
84.762% 15.238% 23.988% 66.044% 69.804% 76.559% SMT
83.810% 16.190% 0.000% 89.408% 100.000% 91.192% SR
82.857% 17.143% 0.000% 88.785% 100.000% 90.625% SMT, SR
Table 4.16 Results for LTE Scenario 1 with SW=20
In section 4.4.1, when defining the performance indicators, it was stated that the DR by
itself does not provide an accurate view of the overall detection performance on each case. This
affirmation becomes more obvious if the results obtained are analysed for the following metric
combinations: (CRR, SR) and SR (Success Rate); where the DR is lower than the top metric
combination (CRR), but has a higher OSR, Precision and F1-Score. In contrast, the (SMT, SR)
combination metric also achieves a lower DR, registering a higher SR and Precision, but is
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Fig. 4.49 Metric for LTE Scenario 1 - CRR
Fig. 4.50 Metric for LTE Scenario 1 - SMT
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unable to overpass its F1-Score value due to the important difference in DR caused by a lower
number of TP cases.
Looking at the representation of each metric in figure 4.49, figure 4.50 and figure 4.51, it
is possible to differentiate the exact moment when the attack is triggered and its effect on the
metric values.
The results obtained on the scenario 1 are displayed on the following figure 4.49, figure 4.50
and figure 4.51.
Fig. 4.51 Metric for LTE Scenario 1 - SR
Scenario 2
Combining the metrics (CRR, SR), the DR is equal to 100%, with an accuracy of 100%
registered across all the performance parameters: OSR, Precision and F1-Score. This is due to
the null FP and FN cases registered for this set of metrics, offering the best outcome possible. If
the analysis is reduced to the individual evaluation of the CRR metric, the detection performance
only decreases less than 2% for the DR and OSR, and ∼0,6% for the F1-Score indicator.
The positive detection trend obtained on this scenario is due to the changes performed on
the definition of Scenario 2. The first variation is an extension of the emulation by more than 12
minutes. Additionally, the ratio of legitimate/rogue UEs is balanced in favour of the rouge UEs
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Fig. 4.52 Metric for LTE Scenario 2 - CRR
Fig. 4.53 Metric for LTE Scenario 2 - SMT
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Fig. 4.54 Metric for LTE Scenario 2 - SR
by 9 times. This second change produces a drastic increase on the malicious network traffic,
facilitating the construction of the normality and anomaly patterns by the detection algorithm.
The last four metric combinations on table 4.17 have suffered an important increase of
∼10% with regard to the DR values registered on the previous Scenario 1.
DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
100.000% 0.000% 0.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% CRR, SR
98.814% 1.186% 0.000% 98.862% 100.000% 99.403% CRR
97.536% 2.464% 0.088% 97.548% 99.907% 98.707% SMT
97.536% 2.464% 0.088% 97.548% 99.907% 98.707% CRR, SMT
97.536% 2.464% 0.088% 97.548% 99.907% 98.707% CRR, SMT, SR
96.989% 3.011% 0.088% 97.023% 99.906% 98.426% SMT, SR
95.803% 4.197% 0.000% 95.972% 100.000% 97.857% SR
Table 4.17 Results for LTE Scenario 2 with SW=20
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If the values registered on each metric are analysed by looking at the figures, a more abrupt
increase occurs in the exact moment the attack is launched, enabling the rogue UEs which start
injecting malicious traffic on the core network.
Scenario 3
Finally, the last Scenario to be evaluated for the LTE experiments uses the same configuration
as the previously analysed Scenario 1. However, the total duration of the emulation has been
extended more than 6 times the initial duration. The wider duration affects not only to the
initial/attack phase, but also to the final phase.
In general, the changes produce a positive effect in the registered DR values across all the
metrics. A significant increase of the FNR and FPR is detected for better performing metric
combinations, reaching up to 0.1% and 1.92% in the worse cases, respectively.
The CRR metric outperforms in all the metric combinations where it is used, having its best
performance when used individually with a ∼99.92% DR and an extremely positive accuracy
across all the cases. The F1-Score remains close to 100%, with a distance lower than 2%.
DR FNR FPR OSR Precision F1-Score Metrics
99.915% 0.085% 1.918% 98.011% 97.765% 98.828% CRR
99.915% 0.085% 1.918% 98.011% 97.765% 98.828% CRR, SR
93.401% 6.599% 0.852% 93.608% 98.925% 96.084% SMT
93.401% 6.599% 0.852% 93.608% 98.925% 96.084% CRR, SMT
93.401% 6.599% 0.852% 93.608% 98.925% 96.084% CRR, SMT, SR
79.272% 20.728% 0.852% 81.747% 98.736% 87.940% SMT, SR
0.423% 99.577% 0.000% 16.406% 100.000% 0.842% SR
Table 4.18 Results for LTE Scenario 3 with SW=20
However, the worst performance detection registered for the entire dataset is produced
when using the SR metric individually. The DR drops to ∼0.42%, the lowest value registered
for the attack with the proposed detection algorithm. To better understand the reason why this
metric becomes misleading, producing a ∼99.58% FNR and an OSR value of ∼16.41%, all the
values collected on this scenario have been represented in figure 4.55, being difficult to identify
a clear pattern on the represented values.
The SR measures the average ratio of successful RRC session established by each node,
which makes this metric less volatile over long period of evaluation. This is due to the fact that
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Fig. 4.55 Metric for LTE Scenario 3 - SR
every UE will only establish a new RRC session if it has migrated from RRC-CONNECTED
to RRC-IDLE for any of the reasons describe in Chapter 2.
Nevertheless, this metric remains being very useful to detect the RRC signalling attack
studied on this thesis, as it does not increase the FPR when combined with the CRR while still
offering a very high DR and OSR values. Moreover, the combination of multiple metrics in the
detection algorithm makes the final IDS more robust and resilient against abrupt changes in the
network traffic behaviour.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has detailed all the challenges faced for designing, obtaining the required equip-
ment, configuring it and finally utilising it to build the test-beds required for producing a dataset
for LTE and WiFi networks. The network traffic gathered on each dataset contains traces of
anomaly traffic generated while performing a virtual jamming attack on IEEE 802.11 networks,
and a RRC signalling attach on LTE networks, which are the main area of study chosen for this
thesis.
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A complete range of traffic patterns have been presented and included on the dataset,
inspired by real-life scenarios where special cases are considered to guarantee a better charac-
terisation of the attacks. Finally, an exhaustive analysis of all the results is presented, including
a list of figures on each scenario to better understand the complexity faced by the detection
algorithm and how it adjusts itself to maintain an optimal detection performance.
The results studied on this chapter support the effectiveness of the new metrics proposed on
this thesis. The NAV metric provides the best overall detection performance for IEEE 802.11
technologies, strengthening the detection algorithm against unexpected changes on the normal
network traffic pattern when it is combined with two additional metrics: CRC and/or ∆ Time.
Finally, the results obtained for the LTE test-bed revealed the CRR metric as the most
effective for detecting the RRC signalling attack, registering a strong detection performance
when used individually or in combination with the Session Mean Time (SMT) and Success Rate
(SR) metrics.

CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and future work
This chapter closes the thesis with a brief interpretation of the research findings obtained while
conducting this research project, with special focus on the most productive phases in term of
outcomes: the experimental and analysis phases. Section 5.1 performs an empirical analysis
of the results collected in the two test-beds, extracting the most valuable conclusions and
deducted achievements. A special emphasis is placed on the new set of metrics identified as
effective indicators for detecting DoS attacks in wireless and cellular networks, which has been
experimentally tested and successfully evaluated.
Section 5.2 presents a clear explanation of the experimental method followed on this thesis
to validate the collected results and deduct the conclusions, confirming the applicability in any
real network.
The validation method is followed with a synthesised description of the most important
contributions of this work, which are presented in section 5.3. In addition, this section sums
up the multiple actions taken to disseminate the research findings, and exposing them to peer-
reviewing analysis. The list includes all the research events, conferences and journals where
this work has been published and shared with the research community, without excluding the
local academic events attended as student at Loughborough University.
Lastly, additional ideas are presented in section 5.4 for extending this work, aiming at
overcoming the existing limitations and extending the scope of this research direction to
address the existing challenges.
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5.1 Conclusions
This thesis has successfully discovered a new method for identifying Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks in radio-based communication systems. The proposed algorithm can be easily imple-
mented into an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) without adding much computational load to it.
The mathematical operations required on each iteration of the sliding window are basic opera-
tions, providing an overall low computational complexity to complete the detection process
with the fusion of beliefs.
The proposed solution extracts meaningful information from every frame for the suggested
metrics, as part of the sample collection process, eliminating the need of temporary storing
all the data transferred through the communication channel. The collected results reveal a
variation of the effectiveness for each metric combination depending on the conditions of the
network, which can be used to tailor the algorithm for an specific network usage pattern.
Using a single metric, both DoS attacks have been successfully detected with Detection
Rate (DR) higher than 90%. In the same line, the Overall Successful Rate (OSR) remains above
75% for 11 of the 12 scenarios evaluated for Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), and the totality of the
scenarios evaluated for the Long Term Evolution (LTE) attack. The satisfactory results registered
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed metrics to characterise the targeted DoS attacks.
This characteristic makes the detection algorithm fully compatible with IDS implementations
for the future multi-Radio-Access Technologies (multi-RAT) cellular networks[84], where WiFi
and LTE are expected to be the two major standards for accessing Internet [5].
The design of three new metrics for the DoS attack in LTE networks has been a real
challenge, due to the lack of previous work conducted within the research community to set
the state of the art. The results obtained with the LTE emulated environment have been very
satisfactory, registering only two metric combinations where the detection algorithm was not
able to correctly identify the attack. For all the other cases, the DR remains above 80% with
OSR values higher than 80%, or almost close to 100% in most of the cases.
5.1.1 IEEE 802.11 virtual jamming attack
The first conclusion obtained after analysing the data-set becomes obvious when looking at
the collected results. The effectiveness of the NAV metric provides a quasi-perfect detection
performance, reaching 100% in all the cases whenever this metric is individually used on the
detection algorithm. Since the implementation of the attack sets a fixed value on the NAV field
within the MAC message header, this parameter becomes very sensitive for detecting the attack.
The lowest False Positive Rate (FPR) registered across all the experiments is detected when
individually using the NAV metric to detect the attack on Scenario 3, where only a single active
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node in motion is sending traffic through the Access Point (AP). This is a clear indicator of how
positively the NAV metric adapts to constant changes in the radio parameters due to the node’s
movement.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that defining the NAV field to its maximum
value is not a clear indicator of rogue behaviour by itself. The use of the NAV metric must be
strengthened with additional metrics to reduce the FPR in congested wireless networks, where
fragmentation on the data frames increases the number of messages with high NAV field values
[30]. Having high values in the NAV field causes the legitimate nodes to register a similar
pattern to traffic coming from the jammer node, the attacker. Since the proposed NAV metric
looks at the mismatching between the duration indicated on the NAV field, and the actual
duration of the transmitted frame, evaluating long periods of transmissions with fragmented
frames could affect the attack detection effectiveness when using only the NAV metric.
The ∆ Time metric has also obtained very high detection performance in all the Wi-Fi
scenarios, evaluating a DR lower than 75% in a single scenario, Scenario 8, where the DR
falls to ∼66%. This decrease is directly caused by the existence of a node using Request-
To-Send/Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS) mechanism while located in a fixed position close to the
AP. This node registers a small frame inter-arrival time due to the short distance to the AP,
registering also minimal frame discarding due to collisions thanks to the RTS/CTS mechanism,
which produces a ∆ Time value similar to the attacker. Fortunately, the lack of clarity when
used individually can be reduced by combining this metric with NAV, boosting the DR to
∼83.71% while maintaining the OSR around ∼43.20%. The metric combination (∆ Time,
CRC) and (∆ Time, NAV, CRC) achieve the same DR, registering a higher FPR that reduces
the OSR down to ∼36.74%.
The outstanding performance obtained by the ∆ Time metric in Scenario 11 and 12, where
the DR is equal to 100% and the False Negative (FN) are reduced to 0%, reveals the effectiveness
of this metric for detecting the attack in networks with predominant Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) traffic. This transport protocol increases the number of packets exchanged
between nodes due to the additional traffic load imposed by the TCP mechanisms. This
protocol requires of a constant control message for establishing the connection, maintaining
the link alive, acknowledging the received messages and/or requesting re-transmissions when
needed. On the contrary, this metric is also prone to producing high False Positive (FP) alarms,
registering values above 50% across all the scenarios when being evaluated individually.
The following conclusion to highlight is obtained when analysing the behaviour of the CRC
metric on the 12 scenarios studied, proving itself not adequate in wireless networks where
the number of active nodes is small, and they are not in motion. These two factors facilitate
the availability of the communication channel, reducing to the minimum the probabilities
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of suffering collisions in a radio channel with stable parameters. The CRC metric produced
extreme results, detecting all the True Positive (TP) cases with a DR of 100% and 0% False
Negative Rate (FNR) in 7 scenarios (Scenario 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 12), or 0% DR and 100%
FNR in the remaining 5 scenarios.
Moreover, the perfect DR values come at the price of reducing the accuracy of the overall
detection, with an OSR ranging from 31.15% to 17.76%, and an average FPR of 77% across
the 7 scenarios where the attacker’s frames were successfully detected. Furthermore, if the
(CRC, NAV) metric combination is analysed on the seven positive scenarios mentioned before,
the CRC metric only adds value in Scenario 9, helping to reduce the FPR by ∼46.2% and
consequently boosting the OSR by ∼46.8% while maintaining the 100% DR.
The last two metrics to analyse for extracting valuable conclusions are DiffFSN and T.
These two metrics does not provide enough evidence of the attack by themselves, requiring a
fuse of intelligence coming from other metrics to provide an acceptable DR.
The DiffFSN metric fails to detect the attacker’s frames, reaching a maximum 36% DR
with a high OSR of 80% in Scenario 6. However, the Precision is extremely low, with a basic
∼7.58%, which pushes the F1-Score down to ∼12.55%. This metric obtains its best results
when using UDP traffic, as it doesn’t produce any frame retransmission that could increase the
time between two consecutive frames successfully delivered. Any attacker frame missed on
reception due to the collisions will cause a slightly increase on the samples collected by this
metric, facilitating the registered TP value. Furthermore, it will also increase the chances of FP
whenever the collisions occur as part of the traffic exchanged between the legitimate nodes, or
due to the hidden node phenomenon.
Combining the DiffFSN metric with any of the other 4 metrics does not provide any better
detection performance in most of the scenarios, obtaining a minimal increase in Scenario 2, 8,
9, 10, 11 and 12, when this metric is combined. The best increase is up to 12% on the DR in
Scenario 2, when this metric is used in combination with ∆ Time and NAV, registering the forth
best DR on this scenario, and the second best OSR with ∼68.04%.
If the DiffFSN metric is combined with (∆ Time, NAV, T, CRC), (∆ Time, NAV, CRC), (∆
Time, T, NAV) or (NAV, CRC), the DR suffers an increase up to ∼2%, with respect to the rest
of the metric combinations including the DiffFSN.
Scenario 2 has proven to be the most challenging experiment conducted, due to its simplicity.
The two active nodes only transfer UDP data-frames, which no protection against collisions or
missed packages. Furthermore, the distance between them is long enough to produce some
collisions due to the hidden node problem. However, the absence of motion helps the DiffFSN
metric to quickly build the normality pattern and easily differentiate it from the changes inflicted
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on the network traffic pattern by the attacker. The same occurs with the ∆ Time metric on this
scenario, positioning itself as the second best metric right after the NAV metric.
Finally, the analysis of the results obtained for the T metric provides evidence of the value
added when it is combined with other metrics. It obtains its best DR when combined with the
NAV and CRC metrics on Scenario 10, reaching a DR of ∼71.7% with an OSR of ∼53.44%,
although it only provides a reduced F1-Score of ∼28.94% due to the high FPR, which is
∼2.82%.
The T metric becomes more sensitive to variations whenever there are active nodes located
far from the AP, such as in Scenario 10, 7 and 12, where the DR is above 67.05% for all the
metric combinations which includes the T metric. Longer distances increase the chances of
suffering reflections on the radio bearer due to objects between the node and the AP, forcing the
throughput to fluctuate depending on the signal quality registered on the radio link. However,
the best result for the individual use of the T metric is registered in Scenario 7, with a ∼67.05%
DR. On this case, the OSR decreases to ∼55.47% due to the more than 30% value obtained for
the FPR and value registered for the FNR.
Scenario 7 is composed by a single static node, which produces a constant network traffic
flow due to the RTS/CTS mechanism, stabilising the throughput. When the attack is triggered,
it causes an abrupt change on the T metric, which disappears after a few seconds once the
throughput has been stabilised down to 0%. It is only during the abrupt changes when this
metrics obtains its best performance.
To conclude, the experiments conducted on this thesis can be used to affirm that the metrics
proposed are able to detect the attack in all the scenarios. In particular, the NAV metric has
proven to be the most meaningful metric to characterise the attack across all the evaluated
scenarios, followed by the ∆ Time and CRC metrics. The best metric combinations to provide
an overall detection performance in most of the scenarios are: (∆ Time, NAV) and (NAV, CRC).
These two metric combinations are the ideal candidates to be implemented into an IDS system
without requiring any additional knowledge of the targeted wireless network.
5.1.2 LTE signalling attack
The LTE experiments have proven how accurately the proposed metrics detect the attack, no
matter if they are used individually or as part of a set of metrics. However, if the individual
performance of each metric is analysed, the Connection Release Rate (CRR) metric raises as
the strongest metric to detect the attack, with a DR higher than 98% in the three scenarios
presented on this thesis. This conclusion was predictable due to the fact that the process for
performing the DoS attack studied on this thesis is by creating an unusual traffic of Radio
Resource Control (RRC) Connection Request, which might end up with a RRC Connection
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Release message when the attacker’s requests are rejected, or in specific legitimate cases as
mentioned in Chapter 3.
The best overall performance is obtained in Scenario 2, with the metric combination (CRR,
SR), when every single frame is correctly tagged and all the performance indicators reach their
highest positive value. The DR and OSR are raised to 100%, due to a very accurate detection
with a Precision and F1-Score of 100%. This result is specially important because Scenario 2
was specifically designed to facilitate the detection, with only 50 legitimate User Equipments
(UEs) and 5 times more rogue UEs.
If the same metric combination is evaluated in the Scenario 1 and 3, where the legiti-
mate/rogue UE ratio is equal to 1, the DR decreases down to 96.19% when the emulation
duration is short, or ∼99.92% when the experiment has a duration similar to Scenario 2. In
both cases, the OSR and F1-Score obtain very positive results, remaining above 97.5% due to
the accuracy on the classification of the collected network traffic.
The Session Mean Time (SMT) metric is the second metric providing the best results,
requiring a long duration of the emulation to guarantee the best performance. This metric is
able to detect the attack with a DR of ∼97.54% and ∼93.4% in Scenario 2 and 3, respectively.
On the contrary, the OSR obtains a better result in Scenario 2, with a ∼97.55% against the
∼93.62% evaluated for Scenario 3 due to the increase of FNR, with a ∼6.6%. The reason for
this minor difference is one more time the ratio between legitimate and rogue UEs, as only the
legitimate UEs are able to successfully complete an RRC session and modify the average RRC
session aliveness monitored by the SMT metric.
If the behaviour of the SMT metric is analysed when it is combined with either the Success
Rate (SR) or the CRR metrics, it is possible to perceive an important decrease of the DR
and increase on the FNR. Scenario 1 registers the worse case, when the (SMT, SR) metric
combination manages to obtain a decent 82.86% DR. This value implies a reduction of almost
15% on the DR if it is evaluated against its highest detection performance, when this metric is
individually used in Scenario 2. However, even in this case, this metric combination is able to
provide a high level of accuracy, with a 100% Precision and F1-Score of 90.63%
The lowest result across all the conducted experiments is registered for the SR metric in
Scenario 3, with an unacceptable ∼0.42% DR and FNR of ∼00.58%. The registered Precision
is 100% due to the absence of FP cases, which boosts the OSR to a minimal ∼16.41%.
Although the SR is present in all the lowest DR registered on all the scenarios, it adds value
when combined with the CRR metric, as previously mentioned at the beginning of this section.
The (CRR, SR) metric combination provides positive results not only for aforementioned
Scenario 2, but also in the remaining experiments, as introduced before. It obtains a DR higher
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than 96% in both scenarios, which is backed up with an OSR of 97.51% in Scenario 1, and a
better 98.01% OSR in Scenario 3.
Looking at the obtained results, it is possible to conclude that an attacker attempting to
execute the signalling DoS attack should inject a similar number of RRC Connection Request
messages equivalent to the actual number of legitimate requests registered on the network,
reducing the attack duration to short periods of time. The optimisation of the attack implies a
period of monitoring the channel, in an attempt to match the average legitimate RRC Connection
Request messages registered within a certain time. Only by tailoring the attack duration and
injection rate, the attacker will be able to reduce the chances of being detected by the proposed
algorithm.
5.2 Validation Methodology
The process to validate the proposed detection algorithm is based on the experimental evaluation
of its detection performance against a test battery of real scenarios. This process was followed
for every candidate metric deduced during the analysis and characterisation of the DoS attacks.
Due to that reason, the attack characterisation and definition of candidate metrics have been
included as steps of the validation methodology.
During the creation of the scenarios for Wi-Fi and LTE technologies, the author of this
thesis focused on selecting realistic episodes of real-life usage patterns. Additionally, edge
cases where added to the test battery, where the detection process was expected to have a poor
performance due to the direct effects on the variables included to calculate the selected metrics.
Fig. 5.1 Steps of the Validation Methodology
Figure 5.1 represents the validation approach followed on this thesis to confirm the effec-
tiveness of the detection algorithm, and the suitability of the proposed metrics to detect the two
DoS attacks. Although the results obtained are directly affected by the selected thresholds when
assigning the beliefs in Normal/Attack and the Sliding Window (SW) size, they are an objective
and clear evidence of the effectiveness when the algorithm is adjusted to detect specific threats.
In Appendix A, additional results are presented with alternative SW sizes and similar detection
results. These results evidence the wide tolerance of the proposed algorithm to be readjusted,
and its suitability to be implemented in a generic IDS to detect multiple attacks.
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5.3 Contributions
The work conducted during this research project has facilitated the achievement of five major
contributions on the study of attacks against the service availability on wireless and cellular
networks, as Chapter 1 introduced briefly:
Identidifaction of metrics for detecting DoS attacks in Wi-Fi
This thesis has presented and evaluated the effectiveness of a new set of metrics able to
characterise virtual jamming attacks in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) 802.11 networks. The proposed metrics have been tested against multiple scenar-
ios and network traffic patterns, individually and as part of a subset, providing positive,
reliable and accurate detection results for all the cases analysed on the dataset.
Design of a test-bed to perform virtual jamming attacks on Wi-Fi networks
Combining equipment with basic hardware specifications, equivalent to any device
available in the market for domestic use, this thesis has created a test-bed and successfully
implemented a virtual jamming attack. The implementation of the attack exploits the
CTS/RTS mechanism and the procedure for computing the back-off time on each node
using the NAV field.
Creation of three new metrics for DoS attacks in LTE
Due to the lack of existing work conducted by other researchers, this thesis conducted a
new characterisation of the RRC signalling attack with the purpose of finding meaningful
metrics. The proposed three metrics, CRR, SE and SSR, have been experimentally
validated, obtaining a satisfactory detection performance not only when used individually,
but also when they are combined as part of a set of metrics.
Emulation of RRC signalling attack in LTE
Using the test-bed proposed on this thesis, composed of LTE emulation equipment, it was
possible to perform the study of the RRC signalling attack. The proposed implementation
replicates the conditions of suffering the attack in a commercial LTE deployment. The
results, obtained by analysing the network traffic collected on the test-bed, demonstrate
how easy the attack can be performed in a matter of minutes.
Novel on-line IDS to detect multiple DoS attacks
The presented detection algorithm meets all the requirements to be implemented in
an on-line IDS, offering a fast, efficient and lightweight mechanism for detecting two
particular DoS attacks. The implementation of this algorithm into an IDS, which could
be embedded into a femtocell device for future 5G networks, could be easily achieved
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without affecting the network performance. MNOs could use it as defence mechanisms
for protecting their public networks against attacks targeting the service availability,
protecting not only their interests but also providing safer communication services to
their customers.
5.3.1 Publications
The findings obtained on this thesis has been presented, exposed to open discussion, peer-
reviewed and finally published in different conferences and editorials. The following paragraphs
enumerate the list of publications resulting from this work, classified by publication type and
including the internal publications presented as part of the PhD research degree programme
and the research skills development plan.
Conference Proceeding Papers
• [85] G. Escudero-Andreu, Raphael C.-W. Phan and David J. Parish, Analysis and Design
of Security for Next Generation 4G Cellular Networks, The 13th Annual Post Graduate
Symposium on the Convergence of Telecommunications, Networking and Broadcasting
(PGNET), 2012.
• [43] G. Escudero-Andreu, K. G. Kyriakopoulos, F. J. Aparicio Navarro, D. J. Parish, D.
Santoro and M. Vadursi, A Data Fusion Technique to Detect Wireless Network Virtual
Jamming Attacks, The IEEE International Workshop on Measurements & Networking
(M&N), 2015.
Journal Articles
• [86] D. Santoro, G. Escudero-Andreu, K. G. Kyriakopoulos, F. J. Aparicio Navarro, D. J.
Parish and M. Vadursi, A Hybrid Intrusion Detection System for Virtual Jamming Attacks
on Wireless Networks, Measurement, Elsevier, 2017.
Internal School Publications
• Abstract presented at the annual conference on the School of Electronic, Electrical and
Systems Engineering, 2011.
• Poster presented at the annual conference on the School of Electronic, Electrical and
Systems Engineering, 2012.
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• Poster presented at Loughborough University on the Research That Matters Conference,
2013.
• Short paper presented at the annual conference on the School of Electronic, Electrical
and Systems Engineering, 2014.
5.4 Future work
To conclude the chapter, this section indicates the main research directions that could help
expanding the work conducted on this research project, aiming at improving the obtained
detection performance. Looking at the current trends on anomaly detection and wireless
network security, the author expresses his opinion on the most suitable ideas for enhancing the
contributions of this thesis.
In an attempt to reduce the level of type-I and type-II errors, the metrics proposed on this
thesis should be enriched with contextual information, as this information has proven very
valuable for understanding the results obtained in Chapter 4 on each scenario. Current trends
within the research community reveal a notorious interest [87, 88] on applying the knowledge,
easily deducted from expected network usage patterns and historical records, as contextual
information to be included into the detection phase. The benefits of making the IDS aware of
the surrounding network environment have proven very valuable to boost the IDS performance
and reduce unnecessary alarms or FP [89, 70, 88].
The second approach to extend this work would focus on discovering additional metrics
capable of enhancing the detection performance. IEEE 802.11 was first released in 1997 and
has been widely studied over the past few years, reducing the chances of finding new metrics
which have not been studied before. However, LTE is a relatively new technology and not
much research has been conducted on protecting it against signalling DoS attacks with IDS and
anomaly detection techniques.
The metrics presented on this thesis are very efficient to detect the specific attacks studied
during this research project. However, LTE networks are exposed to additional threats and
further research should be conducted to verify the applicability of the existing metrics to detect
other attacks, as well as aiming to reduce the false alarms incorrectly raised when using the
proposed metrics.
Furthermore, the results presented on this thesis have been collected after reproducing real-
life scenarios, which were designed to cover all the expected user behaviours and problematic
edge cases. However, further scenarios should be evaluated against the same metrics to discover
alternative metric combinations capable of reproducing the already registered detection results
under different network traffic patterns. This idea becomes more interesting for the LTE
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experiments, where the test-bed was composed by 3 emulated scenarios due to the legal
impediments for evaluating the detection performance in a real LTE deployment.
Finally, this thesis has opened a new research direction towards the actual implementation
of the proposed set of metrics into a centralised multi-RAT IDS capable of protecting not only
local Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), but also cellular Wide Area Networks (WANs).
Using monitoring stations at the endpoint equipment, such as the evolved-Node B (eNB) and/or
the femtocell units, the hybrid IDS can easily be hosted within the Mobile Network Operator’s
(MNO) network to prevent any physical tampering and facilitate the management process.
However, the IDS design and optimal installation within the cellular network must be first
investigated thoroughly to guarantee the best performance while keeping the low computational
overhead and manageable data flows.
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APPENDIX A
Supplementary Results
Legend for IEEE 802.11
Case Metrics Used Case Metrics Used
1 ∆Time 17 ∆Time,CRC
2 T 18 T, CRC
3 ∆Time,T 19 Time, T, CRC
4 DiffFSN 20 DiffFSN, CRC
5 ∆Time,Di f f FSN 21 ∆Time,Di f f FSN,CRC
6 T,DiffFSN 22 T, DiffFSN, CRC
7 ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN 23 ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,CRC
8 NAV 24 NAV, CRC
9 ∆Time,NAV 25 ∆Time,NAV,CRC
10 T, NAV 26 T, NAV, CRC
11 ∆Time,T,NAV 27 ∆Time,T,NAV,CRC
12 DiffFSN, NAV 28 DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
13 ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV 29 ∆Time,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
14 T, DiffFSN, NAV 30 T, DiffFSN, NAV, CRC
15 ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV 31 ∆Time,T,Di f f FSN,NAV,CRC
16 CRC
Table A.1 Legend for IEEE 802.11 Test Case
All the results displayed on this appendix have been normalised to follow the same case
nomenclature while reducing the space required to display the set of metrics selected on each
iteration. The data was generated using an automated loop process which iterates through
all the existing combinations of metrics selection and sliding window size. Applying the
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detection algorithm on each case, it is possible to reveal the optimal combination/s to enhance
the detection rate and minimise the false positive/negative alarms.
Table A.1 shows the combination of metrics selected on each experiment case ID, and
the size of the SW used to compute the partial BPA values. All the scenarios follow a cycle
of 31 metric combination for each sliding window size, which is the equivalent to the binary
permutations of the 5 available metrics (25−1), subtracting the null permutation equal to 20,
when no metric is selected.
Additional Results for IEEE 802.11
Table A.2 IEEE 802.11 - Full List of Results for Test 1
Scenario Case TN TP FN FP DR OSR
1 1 20638 29887 6290 86999 82.613% 35.132%
2 82830 14405 21772 24807 39.818% 67.612%
3 82788 14413 21764 24849 39.840% 67.588%
4 67807 428 35749 39830 1.183% 47.447%
5 73298 378 35799 34339 1.045% 51.230%
6 92744 184 35993 14893 0.509% 64.617%
7 82925 334 35843 24712 0.923% 57.894%
8 107470 36177 0 163 100.000% 99.887%
9 20638 29887 6290 86999 82.613% 35.132%
10 82830 14413 21764 24807 39.840% 67.617%
11 82785 25159 11018 24852 69.544% 75.058%
12 67807 428 35749 39830 1.183% 47.447%
13 73298 378 35799 34339 1.045% 51.230%
14 92741 334 35843 14896 0.923% 64.719%
15 82925 334 35843 24712 0.923% 57.894%
16 104420 0 36177 3222 0.000% 72.605%
17 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
18 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
19 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
20 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
21 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
22 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
23 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
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24 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
25 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
26 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
27 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
28 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
29 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
30 107640 0 36177 0 0.000% 74.845%
31 107500 24 36153 140 0.066% 74.764%
2 1 21320 19499 287 71789 98.549% 36.157%
2 80008 6 19780 13101 0.030% 70.875%
3 70665 81 19705 22444 0.409% 62.665%
4 85691 450 19336 7418 2.274% 76.302%
5 74469 538 19248 18640 2.719% 66.440%
6 91020 6 19780 2089 0.030% 80.629%
7 88983 195 19591 4126 0.986% 78.992%
8 84155 19786 0 8954 100.000% 92.069%
9 21320 19499 287 71789 98.549% 36.157%
10 77671 81 19705 15438 0.409% 68.871%
11 70665 81 19705 22444 0.409% 62.665%
12 85383 547 19239 7726 2.765% 76.115%
13 73876 2936 16850 19233 14.839% 68.038%
14 90912 202 19584 2197 1.021% 80.707%
15 88791 312 19474 4318 1.577% 78.926%
16 76146 0 19786 16963 0.000% 67.449%
17 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
18 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
19 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
20 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
21 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
22 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
23 92716 0 19786 393 0.000% 82.126%
24 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
25 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
26 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
27 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
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28 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
29 93109 0 19786 0 0.000% 82.474%
30 93052 0 19786 57 0.000% 82.423%
31 92709 0 19786 400 0.000% 82.120%
3 1 30559 27217 5674 80108 82.749% 40.246%
2 108010 1187 31704 2662 3.609% 76.062%
3 108010 1187 31704 2662 3.609% 76.062%
4 72334 207 32684 38333 0.629% 50.531%
5 78295 177 32714 32372 0.538% 54.662%
6 108980 12 32879 1692 0.036% 75.919%
7 92284 132 32759 18383 0.401% 64.375%
8 110520 32891 0 147 100.000% 99.898%
9 30559 27217 5674 80108 82.749% 40.246%
10 108010 1187 31704 2662 3.609% 76.062%
11 107990 17444 15447 2674 53.036% 87.377%
12 72334 207 32684 38333 0.629% 50.531%
13 78295 177 32714 32372 0.538% 54.662%
14 108960 132 32759 1704 0.401% 75.993%
15 92284 132 32759 18383 0.401% 64.375%
16 11824 32891 0 98843 100.000% 31.148%
17 30559 27217 5674 80108 82.749% 40.246%
18 108010 1187 31704 2662 3.609% 76.062%
19 72701 17444 15447 37966 53.036% 62.793%
20 72334 207 32684 38333 0.629% 50.531%
21 78295 177 32714 32372 0.538% 54.662%
22 92284 132 32759 18383 0.401% 64.375%
23 92284 132 32759 18383 0.401% 64.375%
24 11824 32891 0 98843 100.000% 31.148%
25 30559 27217 5674 80108 82.749% 40.246%
26 107990 17444 15447 2674 53.036% 87.377%
27 72701 17444 15447 37966 53.036% 62.793%
28 72334 207 32684 38333 0.629% 50.531%
29 78295 177 32714 32372 0.538% 54.662%
30 92284 132 32759 18383 0.401% 64.375%
31 92282 180 32711 18385 0.547% 64.407%
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4 1 34071 5220 1375 90026 79.151% 30.064%
2 123940 0 6595 158 0.000% 94.833%
3 123820 0 6595 278 0.000% 94.741%
4 98493 1956 4639 25604 29.659% 76.859%
5 100570 1540 5055 23529 23.351% 78.129%
6 117370 22 6573 6732 0.334% 89.820%
7 115580 80 6515 8517 1.213% 88.498%
8 120200 6595 0 3895 100.000% 97.020%
9 34071 5220 1375 90026 79.151% 30.064%
10 123900 0 6595 198 0.000% 94.802%
11 120210 256 6339 3887 3.882% 92.175%
12 98493 1956 4639 25604 29.659% 76.859%
13 100570 1540 5055 23529 23.351% 78.129%
14 117000 80 6515 7097 1.213% 89.585%
15 115580 209 6386 8517 3.169% 88.597%
16 101230 0 6595 22863 0.000% 77.459%
17 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
18 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
19 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
20 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
21 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
22 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
23 124010 0 6595 85 0.000% 94.889%
24 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
25 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
26 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
27 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
28 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
29 124100 0 6595 0 0.000% 94.954%
30 124070 0 6595 23 0.000% 94.936%
31 124010 0 6595 89 0.000% 94.886%
5 1 25980 14077 3339 96226 80.828% 28.690%
2 81422 600 16816 40784 3.445% 58.746%
3 81422 600 16816 40784 3.445% 58.746%
4 94026 2902 14514 28180 16.663% 69.422%
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5 95991 2371 15045 26215 13.614% 70.449%
6 112450 257 17159 9752 1.476% 80.725%
7 104550 840 16576 17659 4.823% 75.481%
8 118540 17416 0 3662 100.000% 97.377%
9 25980 14077 3339 96226 80.828% 28.690%
10 81422 600 16816 40784 3.445% 58.746%
11 81403 5054 12362 40803 29.019% 61.922%
12 94026 2902 14514 28180 16.663% 69.422%
13 95991 2371 15045 26215 13.614% 70.449%
14 112440 840 16576 9770 4.823% 81.131%
15 104550 1087 16329 17659 6.241% 75.658%
16 15728 17416 0 106480 100.000% 23.738%
17 25980 14077 3339 96226 80.828% 28.690%
18 81422 600 16816 40784 3.445% 58.746%
19 68368 5054 12362 53838 29.019% 52.586%
20 94026 2902 14514 28180 16.663% 69.422%
21 95991 2371 15045 26215 13.614% 70.449%
22 104550 840 16576 17659 4.823% 75.481%
23 101120 1087 16329 21083 6.241% 73.204%
24 15728 17416 0 106480 100.000% 23.738%
25 25980 14077 3339 96226 80.828% 28.690%
26 81403 5054 12362 40803 29.019% 61.922%
27 68368 5054 12362 53838 29.019% 52.586%
28 94026 2902 14514 28180 16.663% 69.422%
29 95991 2371 15045 26215 13.614% 70.449%
30 104550 1087 16329 17659 6.241% 75.658%
31 98772 2058 15358 23434 11.817% 72.216%
6 1 45968 4062 1306 89474 75.671% 35.530%
2 84065 149 5219 51377 2.776% 59.807%
3 72008 2509 2859 63434 46.740% 52.920%
4 111540 1959 3409 23900 36.494% 80.606%
5 113530 1927 3441 21915 35.898% 81.993%
6 122330 1044 4324 13111 19.449% 87.618%
7 119700 1154 4214 15743 21.498% 85.827%
8 132370 5368 0 3069 100.000% 97.820%
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9 45918 5282 86 89524 98.398% 36.361%
10 83952 2595 2773 51490 48.342% 61.464%
11 71599 3059 2309 63843 56.986% 53.020%
12 111540 1959 3409 23900 36.494% 80.606%
13 113530 1927 3441 21915 35.898% 81.993%
14 122320 1154 4214 13118 21.498% 87.691%
15 119700 1154 4214 15743 21.498% 85.827%
16 23211 5368 0 112230 100.000% 20.296%
17 34305 5282 86 101140 98.398% 28.113%
18 60914 2595 2773 74528 48.342% 45.103%
19 44908 3059 2309 90534 56.986% 34.065%
20 111540 1959 3409 23900 36.494% 80.606%
21 113530 1927 3441 21915 35.898% 81.993%
22 119700 1154 4214 15743 21.498% 85.827%
23 119690 1154 4214 15756 21.498% 85.818%
24 23211 5368 0 112230 100.000% 20.296%
25 34305 5282 86 101140 98.398% 28.113%
26 60843 3059 2309 74599 56.986% 45.382%
27 44908 3059 2309 90534 56.986% 34.065%
28 111540 1959 3409 23900 36.494% 80.606%
29 113530 1927 3441 21915 35.898% 81.993%
30 119690 1607 3761 15748 29.937% 86.145%
31 117580 1637 3731 17858 30.496% 84.668%
7 1 15346 26323 4328 69062 85.880% 36.215%
2 43273 20552 10099 41135 67.052% 55.472%
3 43273 20552 10099 41135 67.052% 55.472%
4 72916 584 30067 11492 1.905% 63.880%
5 75322 489 30162 9086 1.595% 65.889%
6 79734 387 30264 4674 1.263% 69.635%
7 78948 388 30263 5460 1.266% 68.952%
8 82414 30651 0 1994 100.000% 98.267%
9 15346 26323 4328 69062 85.880% 36.215%
10 43273 20552 10099 41135 67.052% 55.472%
11 43273 20552 10099 41135 67.052% 55.472%
12 72916 584 30067 11492 1.905% 63.880%
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13 75322 489 30162 9086 1.595% 65.889%
14 79719 388 30263 4689 1.266% 69.623%
15 78938 390 30261 5470 1.272% 68.945%
16 81689 0 30651 2719 0.000% 70.997%
17 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
18 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
19 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
20 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
21 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
22 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
23 81082 136 30515 3326 0.444% 70.588%
24 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
25 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
26 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
27 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
28 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
29 84408 0 30651 0 0.000% 73.361%
30 84359 136 30515 49 0.444% 73.436%
31 80962 387 30264 3446 1.263% 70.702%
8 1 44608 17372 8951 72551 65.996% 43.197%
2 80758 5500 20823 36401 20.894% 60.118%
3 80748 5500 20823 36411 20.894% 60.111%
4 108960 89 26234 8198 0.338% 76.002%
5 98575 104 26219 18584 0.395% 68.774%
6 107700 80 26243 9461 0.304% 75.116%
7 107370 172 26151 9789 0.653% 74.952%
8 86193 26323 0 30966 100.000% 78.418%
9 39956 22034 4289 77203 83.706% 43.204%
10 76489 9789 16534 40670 37.188% 60.132%
11 74516 8977 17346 42643 34.103% 58.191%
12 106520 120 26203 10640 0.456% 74.322%
13 97775 430 25893 19384 1.634% 68.444%
14 107210 193 26130 9954 0.733% 74.852%
15 106750 181 26142 10412 0.688% 74.524%
16 17635 26323 0 99524 100.000% 30.637%
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17 30684 22034 4289 86475 83.706% 36.742%
18 67699 9789 16534 49460 37.188% 54.005%
19 60822 8977 17346 56337 34.103% 48.647%
20 94958 120 26203 22201 0.456% 66.265%
21 95202 430 25893 21957 1.634% 66.651%
22 105530 193 26130 11633 0.733% 73.682%
23 104060 181 26142 13095 0.688% 72.653%
24 17635 26323 0 99524 100.000% 30.637%
25 30684 22034 4289 86475 83.706% 36.742%
26 61467 13266 13057 55692 50.397% 52.085%
27 60821 8977 17346 56338 34.103% 48.646%
28 94385 615 25708 22774 2.336% 66.210%
29 95129 523 25800 22030 1.987% 66.665%
30 104940 274 26049 12220 1.041% 73.329%
31 101710 1241 25082 15445 4.715% 71.754%
9 1 27432 10844 1069 91547 91.027% 29.242%
2 75700 3341 8572 43279 28.045% 60.386%
3 75672 3345 8568 43307 28.079% 60.368%
4 113080 153 11760 5895 1.284% 86.511%
5 113390 138 11775 5593 1.158% 86.731%
6 113860 187 11726 5117 1.570% 87.132%
7 108540 611 11302 10440 5.129% 83.389%
8 73555 11913 0 45424 100.000% 65.297%
9 79506 10844 1069 39473 91.027% 69.026%
10 103420 3345 8568 15560 28.079% 81.567%
11 97172 5236 6677 21807 43.952% 78.239%
12 116790 153 11760 2191 1.284% 89.342%
13 111320 1851 10062 7660 15.538% 86.461%
14 114820 611 11302 4160 5.129% 88.187%
15 114820 611 11302 4160 5.129% 88.187%
16 12317 11913 0 106660 100.000% 18.512%
17 27432 10844 1069 91547 91.027% 29.242%
18 75672 3345 8568 43307 28.079% 60.368%
19 65604 5236 6677 53375 43.952% 54.121%
20 113080 153 11760 5895 1.284% 86.511%
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21 102160 1851 10062 16822 15.538% 79.461%
22 108540 611 11302 10440 5.129% 83.389%
23 108540 611 11302 10440 5.129% 83.389%
24 73555 11913 0 45424 100.000% 65.297%
25 79506 10844 1069 39473 91.027% 69.026%
26 97172 5236 6677 21807 43.952% 78.239%
27 97172 5236 6677 21807 43.952% 78.239%
28 110410 2012 9901 8566 16.889% 85.891%
29 111320 1851 10062 7660 15.538% 86.461%
30 114820 611 11302 4160 5.129% 88.187%
31 111700 1591 10322 7277 13.355% 86.554%
10 1 26949 11242 3418 69258 76.685% 34.448%
2 51211 5259 9401 44996 35.873% 50.935%
3 51183 5263 9397 45024 35.900% 50.913%
4 85271 1421 13239 10936 9.693% 78.195%
5 86196 1219 13441 10011 8.315% 78.847%
6 88313 593 14067 7894 4.045% 80.192%
7 88985 913 13747 7222 6.228% 81.086%
8 81912 14660 0 14295 100.000% 87.106%
9 25118 12345 2315 71089 84.209% 33.791%
10 51208 5263 9397 44999 35.900% 50.936%
11 50197 8196 6464 46010 55.907% 52.669%
12 85271 1421 13239 10936 9.693% 78.195%
13 86196 1219 13441 10011 8.315% 78.847%
14 88256 1115 13545 7951 7.606% 80.611%
15 88872 976 13684 7335 6.658% 81.041%
16 6410 14660 0 89797 100.000% 19.005%
17 15566 12345 2315 80641 84.209% 25.175%
18 51183 5263 9397 45024 35.900% 50.913%
19 46151 8196 6464 50056 55.907% 49.020%
20 85271 1421 13239 10936 9.693% 78.195%
21 86196 1219 13441 10011 8.315% 78.847%
22 88060 1115 13545 8147 7.606% 80.434%
23 87857 976 13684 8350 6.658% 80.126%
24 6410 14660 0 89797 100.000% 19.005%
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25 15566 12345 2315 80641 84.209% 25.175%
26 48733 10511 4149 47474 71.698% 53.437%
27 46151 8196 6464 50056 55.907% 49.020%
28 85271 1421 13239 10936 9.693% 78.195%
29 86196 1219 13441 10011 8.315% 78.847%
30 87947 1178 13482 8260 8.036% 80.389%
31 87679 1617 13043 8528 11.030% 80.543%
11 1 4559 25005 0 174700 100.000% 14.473%
2 168390 9 24996 10871 0.036% 82.441%
3 145280 28 24977 33976 0.112% 71.138%
4 167480 83 24922 11774 0.332% 82.035%
5 158200 87 24918 21058 0.348% 77.492%
6 178500 9 24996 759 0.036% 87.391%
7 177910 42 24963 1344 0.168% 87.121%
8 170010 25005 0 9249 100.000% 95.472%
9 4559 25005 0 174700 100.000% 14.473%
10 164450 28 24977 14807 0.112% 80.523%
11 145280 28 24977 33976 0.112% 71.138%
12 167460 87 24918 11801 0.348% 82.024%
13 157620 145 24860 21634 0.580% 77.238%
14 178400 42 24963 854 0.168% 87.361%
15 177780 47 24958 1480 0.188% 87.057%
16 174720 0 25005 4539 0.000% 85.536%
17 4559 25005 0 174700 100.000% 14.473%
18 168390 9 24996 10871 0.036% 82.441%
19 145280 28 24977 33976 0.112% 71.138%
20 167480 83 24922 11774 0.332% 82.035%
21 158200 87 24918 21058 0.348% 77.492%
22 178500 9 24996 759 0.036% 87.391%
23 177910 42 24963 1344 0.168% 87.121%
24 170010 25005 0 9249 100.000% 95.472%
25 4559 25005 0 174700 100.000% 14.473%
26 164450 28 24977 14807 0.112% 80.523%
27 145280 28 24977 33976 0.112% 71.138%
28 167460 87 24918 11801 0.348% 82.024%
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29 157620 145 24860 21634 0.580% 77.238%
30 178400 42 24963 854 0.168% 87.361%
31 177780 47 24958 1480 0.188% 87.057%
12 1 8815 18176 0 118500 100.000% 18.552%
2 103050 10 18166 24272 0.055% 70.833%
3 99539 44 18132 27779 0.242% 68.445%
4 124760 204 17972 2559 1.122% 85.889%
5 122060 267 17909 5262 1.469% 84.075%
6 126000 4 18172 1323 0.022% 86.601%
7 125650 12 18164 1669 0.066% 86.369%
8 119000 18176 0 8315 100.000% 94.285%
9 8815 18176 0 118500 100.000% 18.552%
10 102530 44 18132 24786 0.242% 70.501%
11 98124 570 17606 29194 3.136% 67.834%
12 124760 267 17909 2561 1.469% 85.931%
13 122050 300 17876 5267 1.651% 84.093%
14 125920 12 18164 1400 0.066% 86.554%
15 125460 136 18040 1859 0.748% 86.323%
16 7656 18176 0 119660 100.000% 17.755%
17 8815 18176 0 118500 100.000% 18.552%
18 99539 44 18132 27779 0.242% 68.445%
19 89345 570 17606 37973 3.136% 61.800%
20 122020 267 17909 5296 1.469% 84.051%
21 118750 300 17876 8567 1.651% 81.825%
22 125650 12 18164 1669 0.066% 86.369%
23 124700 136 18040 2622 0.748% 85.799%
24 7656 18176 0 119660 100.000% 17.755%
25 8815 18176 0 118500 100.000% 18.552%
26 98124 570 17606 29194 3.136% 67.834%
27 88628 12445 5731 38690 68.469% 69.469%
28 122020 300 17876 5301 1.651% 84.070%
29 118670 339 17837 8651 1.865% 81.795%
30 125460 136 18040 1859 0.748% 86.323%
31 123320 160 18016 4000 0.880% 84.868%
147
Legend for LTE
Following the same example, the LTE results displayed on this appendix have been normalised
to follow the same case nomenclature while reducing the space required to show the set of
metrics selected on each iteration, as indicated in Table A.3.
Case Metrics Used
1 CRR
2 SMT
3 CRR, SMT
4 SR
5 CRR, SR
6 SMT, SR
7 CRR, SMT, SR height
Table A.3 Legend for IEEE 802.11 Test Case
Additional Results for LTE
The following Table A.4 contain the list of TP, TN, FP and FN obtained on each LTE scenario,
as well as the two main detection performance indicators already discussed in the previous
chapters: the DR and OSR.
Table A.4 IEEE 802.11 - Full List of Results for Test 1
Scenario Case TN TP FN FP DR OSR
1 1 74 206 4 37 98.095% 87.227%
2 34 204 6 77 97.143% 74.143%
3 111 202 8 0 96.190% 97.508%
4 74 186 24 37 88.571% 80.997%
5 34 178 32 77 84.762% 66.044%
6 111 176 34 0 83.810% 89.408%
7 111 174 36 0 82.857% 88.785%
2 1 46 1096 0 0 100.000% 100.000%
2 46 1083 13 0 98.814% 98.862%
3 45 1069 27 1 97.536% 97.548%
4 45 1069 27 1 97.536% 97.548%
5 45 1069 27 1 97.536% 97.548%
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6 45 1063 33 1 96.989% 97.023%
7 46 1050 46 0 95.803% 95.972%
3 1 199 1181 1 27 99.915% 98.011%
2 199 1181 1 27 99.915% 98.011%
3 214 1104 78 12 93.401% 93.608%
4 214 1104 78 12 93.401% 93.608%
5 214 1104 78 12 93.401% 93.608%
6 214 937 245 12 79.272% 81.747%
7 226 5 1177 0 0.423% 16.406
APPENDIX B
MATLAB Implementation of Detection Algorithm
Main File and Configuration Parameters
The main file is used to load the matrix with all the data samples for each metric. The
configuration parameters allow to tailor the detection algorithm with the desired sliding window
size, aggregating the samples in groups to compute average values or specify the combination
of metrics to be tested.
Once the configuration parameters are defined, this script will call to all the auxiliary
functions to perform the different processes composing the detection algorithm. Finally, an
output file is generated and tagged with the name specified in the configuration parameters,
together with the indexed of the metrics used to perform the analysis.
1 close all
2 clear all
3 clc
4
5 % METRIC INDEXES IN INPUT FILE
6 % 1 > type
7 % 2 > subtype
8 % 3 > deltatime
9 % 4 > throughput
10 % 5 > diffdt
11 % 6 > nav
12 % 7 > crc
13 % 8 > flag
150 MATLAB Implementation of Detection Algorithm
14
15 for filenum=1:1:12
16 %% LOAD SCENARIO DATA
17 clearvars −except filenum;
18 step = 5;
19 counter=1;
20 data_file = './data/test';
21 data_file = strcat(data_file, num2str(filenum));
22 data_file = strcat(data_file, '.mat');
23
24 load(data_file);
25 data = all_stats(:, 3:10);
26 flags = data(:, 8);
27 grouped = NaN;
28 % data = data(15:length(data), :);
29
30 %COMPUTE ALL THE METRIC COMBINATIONS (BINARY PERMUTATIONS)
31 permutations = zeros(31, 5);
32
33 for p=1:1:31
34 permutations(p,:) = de2bi(p,5);
35 end
36
37 permutations (:, 1) = permutations (:, 1) * 3;
38 permutations (:, 2) = permutations (:, 2) * 4;
39 permutations (:, 3) = permutations (:, 3) * 5;
40 permutations (:, 4) = permutations (:, 4) * 6;
41 permutations (:, 5) = permutations (:, 5) * 7;
42
43 % LOOP FOR INCREASING SLIDING WINDOW SIZE
44 for c=0:step:50;
45
46 sw_numsamples = c;
47 if (sw_numsamples==0)
48 sw_numsamples = 2;
49 end
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50
51 for i = 1:1:31
52 % ADD ACTIVE METRICS TO metrics_index
53 metrics_index = [];
54 for j=1:length(permutations(i,:))
55 if (permutations (i,j) > 0)
56 metrics_index = [metrics_index permutations(i,j)];
57 end
58 end
59
60 %% INITIALIZATION
61 % sliding window
62 buffers = zeros(length(metrics_index), sw_numsamples);
63 % algorithm notations
64 ann = zeros(length(data), 1);
65 % BPA values for each metric and sample
66 bpas = zeros(length(data), length(metrics_index), 3);
67 % Overall BPA values
68 obpas = zeros(length(data), 3);
69
70 %
71 new_data = [ ];
72
73 for k1 = 1:length(metrics_index)
74
75 new_data = [ new_data data(:, metrics_index(k1)) ];
76
77 end
78
79 data_computed = new_data;
80
81 % GROUP METRIC SAMPLES (WHEN IT IS REQUIRED)
82 if ~isnan(grouped)
83
84 %
85 new_data = [ ];
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86 new_flags = [ ];
87
88 for k1 = 1:grouped:(length(data_computed) − grouped − 1)
89
90 rvector = [ ];
91
92 for k2 = 1:length(metrics_index)
93
94 t = data_computed(k1:(k1 + grouped − 1), k2);
95 t(find(isnan(t))) = [ ];
96
97 rvector = [ rvector mean(t) ];
98
99 end
100
101 new_data = [ new_data; rvector ];
102
103 new_flags = [ new_flags; double(sum(flags(k1:(k1 +
grouped − 1))>0)) ];
104
105 end
106
107 data_computed = new_data;
108 flags = new_flags;
109
110 ann = zeros(length(data_computed), 1);
111 bpas = zeros(length(data_computed), length(metrics_index)
, 3);
112 obpas = zeros(length(data_computed), 3);
113
114 end
115
116 % LOAD THE BUFFERS
117 for k1 = 1:length(metrics_index)
118
119 t = data_computed(:, k1);
153
120 t(find(isnan(t))) = [ ];
121 buffers(k1, :) = t(1:sw_numsamples);
122
123 end
124
125 %% COMPUTE BPAS
126 for k1 = sw_numsamples+1:length(data_computed)
127
128 for k2 = 1:length(metrics_index)
129
130 if isnan(data_computed(k1, k2))
131
132 continue;
133
134 end
135
136 [ t_n_bpa t_a_bpa t_u_bpa ] = calculate_bpas(buffers(
k2, :), data_computed(k1, k2));
137
138 bpas(k1, k2, 1) = t_n_bpa;
139 bpas(k1, k2, 2) = t_a_bpa;
140 bpas(k1, k2, 3) = t_u_bpa;
141
142 new_buffer = update_buffer(buffers(k2, :), bpas(k1,
k2, :), data_computed(k1, k2));
143
144 buffers(k2, :) = new_buffer;
145
146 end
147
148 [ n_obpa a_obpa u_obpa ] = calculate_obpa(bpas(k1, :, :))
;
149 obpas(k1, 1) = n_obpa;
150 obpas(k1, 2) = a_obpa;
151 obpas(k1, 3) = u_obpa;
152
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153 ann(k1) = isAttack(n_obpa, a_obpa, u_obpa);
154
155 end
156
157 %% ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
158 tp = sum(flags & ann);
159 fn = sum((flags − ann) == 1);
160 fp = sum((flags − ann) == −1);
161 tn = length(ann) −tp −fn −fp;
162
163 fnr = fn / ( tp + fn );
164 dr = tp / ( tp + fn );
165 fpr = fp / length(ann);
166
167 %% DEFINE OUTPUT FILE
168 filename = './Test';
169 filename = strcat(filename, num2str(filenum));
170 filename = strcat(filename, '/');
171 filename = strcat(filename, num2str(counter));
172 filename = strcat(filename, '_Results_SW_');
173 filename = strcat(filename, num2str(sw_numsamples));
174 filename = strcat(filename, '_Metrics_');
175
176 for k1 = 1:length(metrics_index)
177
178 filename = strcat(filename, num2str(metrics_index(k1)));
179
180 end
181
182 save(filename);
183 a_res = [counter dr fnr fpr tn tp fn fp];
184
185 output_file = './Test';
186 output_file = strcat(output_file, num2str(filenum));
187 output_file = strcat(output_file, '/results_test');
188 output_file = strcat(output_file, num2str(filenum));
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189 output_file = strcat(output_file, '.csv');
190 dlmwrite(output_file, a_res, '−append');
191 counter = counter + 1;
192 end
193 end
194 end
A_BPA Function This function is responsible for computing the probability for the Attack
hypothesis (without the correcting factor).
1 function bpa = calculate_a_bpa( buffer, sample )
2
3 mmax = max(buffer);
4
5 [ mmode fmax ] = mode(buffer);
6
7 dmax = mmax − mmode;
8
9 angle_max = acos( fmax / sqrt( dmax^2 + fmax^2 ) );
10
11 d = sample − mmode;
12
13 angle = acos ( fmax / sqrt( d^2 + fmax^2 ) );
14
15 if angle >= angle_max
16
17 bpa = 0.5;
18
19 else
20
21 bpa = 0.5*angle/angle_max;
22
23 end
24
25 end
BPAS Function
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All the individual BPA values, which have been previously computed, are merged on this
function by applying the correcting factor.
1 function [ n_bpa a_bpa u_bpa ] = calculate_bpas( buffer, sample )
2
3 n_bpa = calculate_n_bpa(buffer, sample);
4 a_bpa = calculate_a_bpa(buffer, sample);
5 u_bpa = calculate_u_bpa(n_bpa, a_bpa);
6
7 avalue = ( (n_bpa + a_bpa + u_bpa) − 1 ) / 3;
8
9 n_bpa = n_bpa − avalue;
10 a_bpa = a_bpa − avalue;
11 u_bpa = u_bpa − avalue;
12
13 end
DS_BPA Function
This function fuses the BPA values obtained for two different observers into a final belief
using D-S theory.
1 function [ obpa ] = calculate_dsbpa( bpa1, bpa2 )
2
3 obpa = [ 0 0 0 ];
4
5 beltab = zeros(3, 3);
6
7 t = bpa1(1)*bpa2(2) + bpa1(2)*bpa2(1);
8 t = 1 − t;
9
10 obpa(1) = bpa1(1)*bpa2(1) + bpa1(1)*bpa2(3) + bpa1(3)*bpa2(1);
11 obpa(2) = bpa1(2)*bpa2(2) + bpa1(2)*bpa2(3) + bpa1(3)*bpa2(2);
12 obpa(3) = bpa1(3)*bpa2(3);
13
14 if t == 0
15
16 obpa(3) = 1;
17
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18 else
19
20 obpa = obpa./t;
21
22 end
23
24 end
N_BPA Function
This function is responsible for computing the BPA values for the Normal hypothesis
(without the correcting factor).
1 function bpa = calculate_n_bpa( buffer, sample )
2
3 mmin = min(buffer);
4 mmax = max(buffer);
5
6 q = quantile(buffer, [0.25 0.50 0.75]);
7 q1 = q(1);
8 me = q(2);
9 q3 = q(3);
10
11 if sample == me
12 bpa = 0.5;
13 else
14 cond1 = q1 < sample < me;
15 cond2 = me < sample < q3;
16
17 if cond1 || cond2
18 bpa = 0.4;
19 else
20 cond1 = mmin < sample < q1;
21 cond2 = q3 < sample < mmax;
22
23 if cond1 || cond2
24 bpa = 0.3;
25 else
26 bpa = 0.15;
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27 end
28 end
29 end
30 end
O_BPA Function
The purpose of this function is to compute the final decision based on the individual beliefs
obtained for each hypothesis.
1 function [ n_obpa a_obpa u_obpa ] = calculate_obpa( bpas )
2
3 n_obpa = 0;
4 a_obpa = 0;
5 u_obpa = 0;
6
7 [ d1 d2 d3 ] = size(bpas);
8 bpas = reshape(bpas(1, :, :), [], d3);
9
10 if d2 == 1
11 n_obpa = bpas(1, 1);
12 a_obpa = bpas(1, 2);
13 u_obpa = bpas(1, 3);
14 else
15 k1 = 1;
16
17 while true
18 bpa1 = bpas(k1, :);
19 bpa2 = bpas(k1 + 1, :);
20 obpa = calculate_dsbpa(bpa1, bpa2);
21
22 bpas(k1, :) = obpa;
23 bpas(k1 + 1, :) = [ ];
24 [d1 d2] = size(bpas);
25
26 k1 = k1 + 1;
27
28 if d1 == 1
29 break;
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30 end
31
32 if d1 == 2
33 k1 = 1;
34 end
35 end
36
37 n_obpa = bpas(1, 1);
38 a_obpa = bpas(1, 2);
39 u_obpa = bpas(1, 3);
40 end
41 end
U_BPA Function
This function is responsible for computing the BPA values for the Uncertainty hypothesis
(without the correcting factor).
1 function bpa = calculate_u_bpa( n_bpa, a_bpa )
2
3 t = [ n_bpa a_bpa ];
4
5 bpa = 0.5*min(t)/max(t);
6
7 end

APPENDIX C
Changes on atr5k-driver for IEEE 802.11 WNIC
Due to space limits, only the two modified files are included in this appendix. The entire
method affected by the changes has been quoted, to facilitate the understanding of the way the
DoS attack has been implemented. The driver’s source code used on this thesis is an extender
version of the original Linux kernel driver for Atheros chipsets. The source code was created
by R. Flöter using reverse-engineering techniques, and is distributed under a GNU General
Public License as published. The copyright rights belong to its authors.
The initial comments of each file have been preserved on this quotation to emphasise that the
author of this thesis has not contributed in any manner on the development of this source-code.
Only two minor amendments were included on the original code, as highlighted with the green
comments, to be able to implement the attacker behaviour. For further information, please
consult the full implementation of the ar5k-driver for the Atheros chipsets [73].
HACK 1: Disable Contention Window
1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 2004−2008 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
3 * Copyright (c) 2006−2008 Nick Kossifidis <mickflemm@gmail.com>
4 * Copyright (c) 2007−2008 Pavel Roskin <proski@gnu.org>
5 *
6 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
7 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
8 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
9 *
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10 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED 'AS IS' AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES
11 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
12 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE
FOR
13 * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
14 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT
OF
16 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
17 *
18 */
19
20 [...] // OTHER METHODS HAVE BEEN OMITTED
21
22 /*
23 * Initialize the 4−word tx control descriptor on 5212
24 */
25 static int ath5k_hw_setup_4word_tx_desc(struct ath5k_hw *ah,
26 struct ath5k_desc *desc, unsigned int pkt_len, unsigned int
hdr_len,
27 int padsize,
28 enum ath5k_pkt_type type, unsigned int tx_power, unsigned int
tx_rate0,
29 unsigned int tx_tries0, unsigned int key_index,
30 unsigned int antenna_mode, unsigned int flags,
31 unsigned int rtscts_rate,
32 unsigned int rtscts_duration)
33 {
34 struct ath5k_hw_4w_tx_ctl *tx_ctl;
35 unsigned int frame_len;
36
37 tx_ctl = &desc−>ud.ds_tx5212.tx_ctl;
38
39 /*
40 * Validate input
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41 * − Zero retries don't make sense.
42 * − A zero rate will put the HW into a mode where it continously
sends
43 * noise on the channel, so it is important to avoid this.
44 */
45 if (unlikely(tx_tries0 == 0)) {
46 ATH5K_ERR(ah−>ah_sc, zero retries);
47 WARN_ON(1);
48 return −EINVAL;
49 }
50 if (unlikely(tx_rate0 == 0)) {
51 ATH5K_ERR(ah−>ah_sc, zero rate);
52 WARN_ON(1);
53 return −EINVAL;
54 }
55
56 tx_power += ah−>ah_txpower.txp_offset;
57 if (tx_power > AR5K_TUNE_MAX_TXPOWER)
58 tx_power = AR5K_TUNE_MAX_TXPOWER;
59
60 /* Clear descriptor */
61 memset(&desc−>ud.ds_tx5212, 0, sizeof(struct
ath5k_hw_5212_tx_desc));
62
63 /* Setup control descriptor */
64
65 /* Verify and set frame length */
66
67 /* remove padding we might have added before */
68 frame_len = pkt_len − padsize + FCS_LEN;
69
70 if (frame_len & ~AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL0_FRAME_LEN)
71 return −EINVAL;
72
73 tx_ctl−>tx_control_0 = frame_len & AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL0_FRAME_LEN
;
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74
75 /* Verify and set buffer length */
76
77 /* NB: beacon's BufLen must be a multiple of 4 bytes */
78 if (type == AR5K_PKT_TYPE_BEACON)
79 pkt_len = roundup(pkt_len, 4);
80
81 if (pkt_len & ~AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL1_BUF_LEN)
82 return −EINVAL;
83
84 tx_ctl−>tx_control_1 = pkt_len & AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL1_BUF_LEN;
85
86 tx_ctl−>tx_control_0 |=
87 AR5K_REG_SM(tx_power, AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL0_XMIT_POWER) |
88 AR5K_REG_SM(antenna_mode,
AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL0_ANT_MODE_XMIT);
89 tx_ctl−>tx_control_1 |= AR5K_REG_SM(type,
90 AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL1_FRAME_TYPE);
91 tx_ctl−>tx_control_2 = AR5K_REG_SM(tx_tries0,
92 AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL2_XMIT_TRIES0);
93 tx_ctl−>tx_control_3 = tx_rate0 & AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL3_XMIT_RATE0
;
94
95 #define _TX_FLAGS(_c, _flag) \
96 if (flags & AR5K_TXDESC_##_flag) { \
97 tx_ctl−>tx_control_##_c |= \
98 AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL##_c##_##_flag; \
99 }
100
101 _TX_FLAGS(0, CLRDMASK);
102 _TX_FLAGS(0, VEOL);
103 _TX_FLAGS(0, INTREQ);
104 _TX_FLAGS(0, RTSENA);
105 _TX_FLAGS(0, CTSENA);
106 _TX_FLAGS(1, NOACK);
107
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108 #undef _TX_FLAGS
109
110 /*
111 * WEP crap
112 */
113 if (key_index != AR5K_TXKEYIX_INVALID) {
114 tx_ctl−>tx_control_0 |=
AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL0_ENCRYPT_KEY_VALID;
115 tx_ctl−>tx_control_1 |= AR5K_REG_SM(key_index,
116 AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL1_ENCRYPT_KEY_IDX);
117 }
118
119 /*
120 * RTS/CTS
121 */
122 if (flags & (AR5K_TXDESC_RTSENA | AR5K_TXDESC_CTSENA)) {
123 if ((flags & AR5K_TXDESC_RTSENA) &&
124 (flags & AR5K_TXDESC_CTSENA))
125 return −EINVAL;
126 /*************
127 ORIGINAL VALUE
128 **************/
129 /*tx_ctl−>tx_control_2 |= rtscts_duration &
130 AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL2_RTS_DURATION;*/
131
132 /**********************************************
133 CHANGE TO SET NAV DURATION TO THE MAXIMUM VALUE
134 ***********************************************/
135 tx_ctl−>tx_control_2 |= AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL2_RTS_DURATION
;
136 tx_ctl−>tx_control_3 |= AR5K_REG_SM(rtscts_rate,
137 AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL3_RTS_CTS_RATE);
138 }
139
140 return 0;
141 }
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143 [...] // OTHER METHODS HAVE BEEN OMITTED
HACK 2: NAV Value Set to Maximum Value
1 /*−
2 * Copyright (c) 2002−2005 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting
3 * Copyright (c) 2004−2005 Atheros Communications, Inc.
4 * Copyright (c) 2006 Devicescape Software, Inc.
5 * Copyright (c) 2007 Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
6 * Copyright (c) 2007 Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@winlab.rutgers.edu>
7 *
8 * All rights reserved.
9 *
10 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * are met:
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer,
15 * without modification.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce at minimum a
disclaimer
17 * similar to the 'NO WARRANTY' disclaimer below ('Disclaimer') and
any
18 * redistribution must be conditioned upon including a substantially
19 * similar Disclaimer requirement for further binary redistribution.
20 * 3. Neither the names of the above−listed copyright holders nor the
names
21 * of any contributors may be used to endorse or promote products
derived
22 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
23 *
24 * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
25 * GNU General Public License (GPL) version 2 as published by the Free
26 * Software Foundation.
27 *
28 * NO WARRANTY
29 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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30 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
31 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF NONINFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTIBILITY
32 * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
33 * THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY
,
34 * OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
OF
35 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
BUSINESS
36 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER
37 * IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
OTHERWISE)
38 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
39 * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
40 *
41 */
42
43 [...] // OTHER METHODS HAVE BEEN OMITTED
44
45 /**************\
46 * Queues setup *
47 \**************/
48
49 static struct ath5k_txq *
50 ath5k_txq_setup(struct ath5k_softc *sc,
51 int qtype, int subtype)
52 {
53 struct ath5k_hw *ah = sc−>ah;
54 struct ath5k_txq *txq;
55 struct ath5k_txq_info qi = {
56 .tqi_subtype = subtype,
57 /* XXX: default values not correct for B and XR channels,
58 * but who cares? */
59 .tqi_aifs = AR5K_TUNE_AIFS,
60 /**************
61 ORIGINAL VALUE
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62 **************/
63 //.tqi_cw_min = AR5K_TUNE_CWMIN,
64 //.tqi_cw_max = AR5K_TUNE_CWMAX
65 /************************************
66 CHANGE TO ELIMINATE CONTENTION WINDOW
67 *************************************/
68 .tqi_cw_min = 0,
69 .tqi_cw_max = 0
70 };
71 int qnum;
72
73 /*
74 * Enable interrupts only for EOL and DESC conditions.
75 * We mark tx descriptors to receive a DESC interrupt
76 * when a tx queue gets deep; otherwise we wait for the
77 * EOL to reap descriptors. Note that this is done to
78 * reduce interrupt load and this only defers reaping
79 * descriptors, never transmitting frames. Aside from
80 * reducing interrupts this also permits more concurrency.
81 * The only potential downside is if the tx queue backs
82 * up in which case the top half of the kernel may backup
83 * due to a lack of tx descriptors.
84 */
85 qi.tqi_flags = AR5K_TXQ_FLAG_TXEOLINT_ENABLE |
86 AR5K_TXQ_FLAG_TXDESCINT_ENABLE;
87 qnum = ath5k_hw_setup_tx_queue(ah, qtype, &qi);
88 if (qnum < 0) {
89 /*
90 * NB: don't print a message, this happens
91 * normally on parts with too few tx queues
92 */
93 return ERR_PTR(qnum);
94 }
95 if (qnum >= ARRAY_SIZE(sc−>txqs)) {
96 ATH5K_ERR(sc, 'hw qnum %u out of range, max %tu!\n', qnum
, ARRAY_SIZE(sc−>txqs));
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97 ath5k_hw_release_tx_queue(ah, qnum);
98 return ERR_PTR(−EINVAL);
99 }
100 txq = &sc−>txqs[qnum];
101 if (!txq−>setup) {
102 txq−>qnum = qnum;
103 txq−>link = NULL;
104 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&txq−>q);
105 spin_lock_init(&txq−>lock);
106 txq−>setup = true;
107 txq−>txq_len = 0;
108 txq−>txq_poll_mark = false;
109 txq−>txq_stuck = 0;
110 }
111 return &sc−>txqs[qnum];
112 }
113
114 [...] // OTHER METHODS HAVE BEEN OMITTED
